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CHAPTER 1 
 
Trust and Control in Teams: An Introduction 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Trust and control represent two fundamental mechanisms that drive organizational 
member cooperation and that help organizations achieve their goals. After decades of scholarly 
focus on formal control (Dornbusch, Scott, & Busching, 1975; Merchant, 1985; Tannenbaum, 
1962), trust has been recognized as becoming increasingly important due to more recent 
developments within organizations (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; McAllister, 1995). 
Notably, organizations have become flatter and more team-centered (Devine, Clayton, Philips, 
Dunford, & Melner, 1999; Lawler, Mohrman, & Ledford, 1995) and teamwork, lateral 
relationships and self-management have gained in importance; all factors that heighten the need 
for trust while diminishing managers’ capacity to exercise formal control (Jones & George, 
1998; Mayer et al., 1995; Ouchi, 1980). However, while trust has been praised for bringing about 
a variety of beneficial outcomes (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001), it would be naive to assume that trust is 
a panacea to all organizational problems and that control has been eliminated all together. 
Instead, the reality is that too much trust can be harmful as well (Langfred, 2004) and that formal 
managerial controls are increasingly being replaced by alternative and more participative forms 
of control by peers (Barker, 1993). By now, both trust and peer control have become widespread 
phenomena within contemporary organizations that can have a profound impact on the 
functioning of organizational units (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Leifer & Mills, 1996; Loughry, in 
press). 
This dissertation focuses on the performance implications of trust and peer control within 
teams. Scholarly investigations on this topic have not kept pace with the growing importance of 
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trust and peer control within team contexts nor with repeated calls for more research in this area 
(Kiffin-Petersen, 2004; Langfred, 2004; Loughry, in press; Loughry & Tosi, 2008). As a result, 
many important issues surrounding trust and control within teams are still unclear. For instance, 
while scholars have long extolled the potential performance benefits of trust and control for 
teams (Golembiewski & McConkie, 1975; Ouchi, 1979), empirical evidence in this area is 
contradictory (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Loughry, in press), suggesting that trust and control may 
enhance team performance, but may also act as a barrier to team performance (Langfred, 2004; 
Loughry & Tosi, 2008). Furthermore, although some scholars have recognized that intrateam 
trust and peer control are related in complex but fundamental ways (Khodyakov, 2007), most 
scholars have tended to study trust and control separately. Consequently, little is known about 
the joint implications of trust and control for team performance, thereby feeding speculation and 
scholarly disagreement about the interrelations among these variables (Ferrin, Bligh, & Kohles, 
2007; Salas, Sims, & Burke, 2005; Webber, 2008). These mixed results and continuing debates 
clearly indicate the need to study trust and peer control in greater detail.  
Accordingly, the aim of the present dissertation is to advance theoretical and empirical 
understanding of intrateam trust and peer control within teams by answering the following 
research questions:  
 
1) What is the nature of intrateam trust and peer control? That is, what are their underlying 
components or properties?  
2) When do intrateam trust and peer control matter to teams? That is, under which 
conditions do they promote or inhibit team processes and performance?   
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3) How do intrateam trust and peer control affect team performance? That is, through which 
processes do they affect team performance?  
 
Examining these questions from a team-level perspective,1 this dissertation will show that 
the answer to each of these questions has important implications for understanding the way trust 
and control relate and operate within teams. The literatures on team performance, intrateam trust 
and peer control have remained remarkably separate so far and hence lack a common theoretical 
framework that naturally links the key variables in this dissertation – team performance, 
intrateam trust and peer control – together. Indeed scholarly attempts to connect these previously 
disparate bodies of literature have started only recently (e.g. Kiffin-Petersen, 2004; Loughry, in 
press). This dissertation thus contributes to a field of theory and research that is much more 
emerging than it is established. Given this state of the field, the emphasis in this dissertation will 
primarily lie on using insights from different literatures to tie together these key variables in 
order to lay out a foundation for theory development and future research. In doing so, special 
attention will be given to possibilities for cross-fertilization – i.e. using theoretical insights from 
one body of literature to advance understanding of an issue raised in another body of literature – 
and to disentangling the causal order among intrateam trust, peer control and team performance.  
In this introductory chapter, I will first discuss the conceptual foundations of the key 
variables. I will then give an overview of the progress made by past studies with respect to be 
abovementioned issues and identify potential avenues for cross-fertilization that may help to 
advance understanding of some of these issues. Finally, I will introduce the three empirical 
                                                            
1 In adopting a team level perspective , we follow Gully’s (2000) assertion that research on teams should take the 
team as the primary level of analysis. 
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studies reported in this dissertation that were designed to address the issues of What, When and 
How.  
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
Team Performance 
A team is defined as a group of individuals who are brought together to perform 
organizationally relevant tasks, who share one or more common goals, who interact socially, 
who exhibit task interdependencies, and who are embedded within an organizational context 
(Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006; Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson, 2008). Team effectiveness has 
been conceptualized as a broad construct that consists of three underlying dimensions: team 
performance, team viability and team member satisfaction (Hackman, 1987; 1990). Team 
performance refers to the extent to which the team's productive output (that is, its product or 
service) meets the standards of quantity, quality, and timeliness of the people who receive, 
review, or use that output. Team viability refers to team members’ capability to work together as 
a team in the future, while team member satisfaction refers to the extent to which the group 
experience satisfies the personal needs of team members. Since team performance can be 
regarded as the “holy grail” that team researchers are generally looking for (Mathieu et al., 
2008), the present dissertation will focus on this particular dimension of team effectiveness. 
Scholars studying team performance tend to focus on either team performance outcomes or team 
performance behaviors – that is, behaviors that are relevant for achieving team goals (Mathieu et 
al., 2008) – depending on the type of teams studied and the context in which the teams operate. 
Given the different types of teams and organizations studied in this dissertation, I will sometimes 
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focus on team performance outcomes (see Chapters 2 and 3) and other times on team 
performance behaviors (see Chapter 4).  
 
Intrateam Trust 
Trust tends to be conceptualized differently by scholars from different disciplines. As 
such, trust has been viewed as a stable individual predisposition (Rotter, 1967), a feature of the 
institutional environment (Zucker, 1986), a rational decision to cooperate (Dasgupta, 1988), or 
an emergent psychological state (Kramer, 1999). Consistent with the latter view, scholars in the 
field of organization and management commonly conceptualize trust as a psychological state 
involving confident positive expectations about the actions of another, that is related to but 
distinct from dispositions, institutions, and rational decisions or behavioral manifestations 
(Mayer et al., 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). Scholars agree that positive 
expectations and uncertainty are central to the concept of trust. Positive expectations refer to the 
belief that the actions of another will be beneficial or at least not detrimental, despite the 
possibility of being disappointed or taken advantage of (Gambetta, 1988; Luhmann, 1988). 
While recognizing their own vulnerability, individuals are believed to reach a state of positive 
expectations based on knowledge of another’s trustworthiness and suspension of irreducible 
uncertainty about another’s actions (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Möllering, 2001).  
Scholars in the field of organization and management typically assume that trust 
essentially has the same meaning, dynamics and functionality across levels of analysis 
(Rousseau, 2004). This suggests that even though trust is experienced at the individual level, the 
concept can be meaningfully extended to higher organizational levels as well, including the team 
level (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). At the team level of analysis, a distinction can be 
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made between the aggregate perceptions of trust that team members have about their fellow 
teammates (Langfred, 2004; Simons & Peterson, 2000) and the aggregate perceptions of trust 
that team members have about external parties, such as the organization’s management (Clapp-
Smith, Vogelgesang, & Avey, 2009) or another team (Serva, Fuller, & Mayer, 2005). This 
dissertation focuses on trust among team members rather than trust in external parties. 
Henceforth, I will use the term ‘intrateam trust’ to refer to the aggregate perceptions of trust that 
emerge at the team level and that reflect positive confident expectations among members of the 
same team.  
 
Peer Control 
While control can be conceptualized in different ways, organization and management 
scholars commonly view organizational control as an activity, that is, as attempts by managers 
and workers to influence the behavior of others to achieve organizational objectives (Henderson 
& Lee, 1992; Jaworski, 1988; Kirsch, 1996). Organizational control scholars typically 
distinguish between two broad classes of control: formal control and informal control (Jaworski, 
1988). While formal control relies on mechanisms that are officially documented, informal 
control mechanisms are more implicit. Thus, whereas codified rules, procedures and policies are 
examples of formal control, socialization, norms and peer pressure are examples of informal 
control (Cardinal, Sitkin, & Long, in press). In addition to being either formal or informal in 
nature, controls can be distinguished based on whether they are initiated by the organization’s 
management or by the workers themselves (Loughry, in press).   
Peer control is a specific form of control that occurs among workers who have no formal 
authority over one another (Loughry, in press). Peer control is typically worker-initiated and 
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occurs even when managers do not actively encourage it (Jaworski, 1988; Loughry & Tosi, 
2008). While teams may sometimes initiate formal controls (Barker, 1993), they tend to rely on 
informal control mechanisms in order to regulate team member behavior (Jaworski, 
Stathakopoulos, & Krishnan, 1993). Peer control is a team effort: although peer pressure is 
enacted through individual team members, these members act on behalf of their team and often 
collaborate in exercising control onto their fellow teammates (Barker, 1993; Hackman, 1992). A 
variety of terms have been used in the literature to refer to team-level manifestations of control, 
such as ‘team-based clan control’ (Kirsch, Ko, & Haney, in press; Ouchi, 1980) and ‘concertive 
control’ (Barker, 1993). Because of the lack of a common terminology to denote the concept, I 
will simply use the term ‘peer control’ throughout this dissertation to refer to a form of informal 
control that manifests itself at the team level and that is enacted by members who have no formal 
authority over one another. Scholars have noted that the behaviors that peer control attempts to 
influence can either be functional or dysfunctional for achieving organizational goals (Loughry, 
in press). Consistent with the organizational control literature generally (Kreutzer, 2008) and 
peer control literature specifically (Barker, 1999; Ouchi, 1980), this dissertation will concentrate 
on peer control that is aimed at regulating behaviors that are – in principle – functional for the 
organization.  
 
CURRENT STATE OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 Although scholars have recognized that intrateam trust and peer control are related in 
complex yet fundamental ways (Khodyakov, 2007), the literatures on intrateam trust and on peer 
control have developed relatively independently and continue to remain remarkably separate. 
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Whereas intrateam trust has received most attention among quantitatively-oriented scholars 
interested in organizational behavior (e.g. Dirks, 1999; Langfred, 2004), peer control has 
received most attention among more qualitatively-oriented scholars interested in organizational 
control and design (e.g. Barker, 1993; Kirsch, 1997). The literatures on intrateam trust and peer 
control also differ in their focus and stage of development: while the literature on intrateam trust 
has a strong focus on empirical work and is developing more progressively, the literature on peer 
control has a strong tradition of conceptual work and is highly fragmented and non-cumulative 
(Kirsch, 1996; Loughry, in press). Furthermore, contrary to research on trust, research on control 
has paid very little attention to consequences and performance implications of control (Kirsch, 
Sambamurthy, Ko, & Purvis, 2002), focusing more on dynamics, antecedents, and typologies of 
control instead (Barker, 1993; Kirsch et al., in press; Ouchi, 1980). Given these differences in 
foci, development and research, it is no surprise that these two literature lack a unified theoretical 
framework that links intrateam trust and peer control to each other and to team performance. 
Hence, the following review of the current state of ‘the’ literature actually involves two 
relatively disparate bodies of literature.2  
 To summarize the current state of the intrateam trust literature, I first identified relevant 
studies reported in reviews and meta-analyses of the trust literature (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 
2007; Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Kiffin-Petersen, 2004). In addition, I searched through the numerous 
special issues and numerous edited volumes on trust (e.g. Bachmann & Zaheer, 2006; Kramer & 
Cook, 2004; Kramer & Tyler, 1996; McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003; Rousseau et al., 1998). 
Finally, to ensure that no relevant study was overlooked, I conducted an electronic search for the 
                                                            
2 The literature on team performance is incredibly vast and yet has little to say about issues regarding intrateam trust 
and peer control. For these reasons, reviewing this body of literature is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Readers 
are referred to Ilgen, Hollenbeck, Johnson and Jundt (2005), Kozlowski and Ilgen (2006), and Mathieu, Maynard, 
Rapp and Gilson (2008) for recent reviews of this literature.  
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years up to 2009, using ‘trust’, ‘team’ and ‘group’ as the main key terms. A total of 49 empirical 
studies were found that had published on trust and groups/ teams in a peer-rated organization and 
management journal. These studies are listed in Table 1.1 along with their foci. As my review 
concentrates on those studies that have looked at the issues of What, When and How, I will not 
review results from studies that have focused on other issues (see Other in Table 1.1), such as 
antecedents or dynamics of trust (e.g. Jarvenpaa, Knoll, & Leidner, 1998; Wilson, Straus, & 
McEvily, 2006), trust at the individual or dyadic level of analysis (e.g. De Jong, Van der Vegt, & 
Molleman, 2007; Peters & Karren, 2009), or trust in external parties (e.g. Deutsch Salamon & 
Robinson, 2008; Serva et al., 2005).  
To summarize the state of the peer control literature, I first identified relevant studies 
reported in two recent reviews of the control literature (Kreutzer, 2008; Loughry, in press). In 
addition, I searched through special issues and edited volumes on organizational control (e.g. 
Jermier, 1998; Sitkin, Cardinal, & Bijlsma-Frankema, in press), sampling a broad set of 
organization and management journals. Finally, because of their specific focus on peer control 
within teams, I included one monograph (Barker, 1999), one paper from the Academy of 
Management Conference Proceedings (Singh, 2008) and two unpublished dissertations (Crisp, 
2003; Hilgermann, 1998). A total of 24 studies were identified that adopted peer control as their 
main focus. These are listed in Table 1.2 along with their foci. Consistent with this dissertation’s 
focus, my review will concentrate on those studies that have looked at the issues of What, When 
and How. For this reason, I will not discuss studies that have looked at other issues (see Other in 
Table 1.2), such as antecedents or dynamics of peer control (e.g. Kirsch, 2004; Kirsch & 
Choudhury, in press), or hierarchical control – whether formal or informal (e.g. Barker, 1996; 
Ezzamel & Willmott, 1998; Piccoli & Ives, 2003).  
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Issue 1: What is the Nature of Intrateam Trust and Peer Control? 
My review of the trust literature reveals that relatively little attention has been paid to the 
issue of what  intrateam trust is. As Table 1.1 indicates, 10 studies included in this review have 
attempted to address this issue. The typical way scholars have addressed this issue is by 
identifying and examining different dimensions of intrateam trust (e.g. Costa, Roe, & Taillieu, 
2001). For instance, following McAllister’s (1995) multi-dimensional conceptualization of trust, 
several scholars have distinguished between affect- and cognition-based intrateam trust (e.g. 
Hempel, Zhang, & Tjosvold, 2009; Stewart & Gosain, 2006; Webber, 2008). This multi-
dimensional approach, however, has so far been limited in advancing understanding of intrateam 
trust for several reasons. First, a number of team-level studies have reported a lack of 
discriminant validity for their measures of affect- and cognition-based trust (e.g. Dirks, 1999; 
2000), raising the question whether this distinction is useful in team settings in the first place. 
Although alternative multi-dimensional measures have been developed (e.g. Costa, 2003; Costa 
et al., 2001), these measures confound intrateam trust with its antecedents and consequences (e.g. 
trustworthiness, cooperation). Second, multi-dimensional approaches to trust have not been very 
useful for resolving mixed findings regarding the trust-performance relationship. In fact, research 
on affect- and cognition-based intrateam trust has yielded an inconsistent pattern of significant 
and non-significant findings across trust dimensions (e.g. Hempel et al., 2009; Webber, 2008) 
and thus seems to have only contributed to the already existing mixed findings. Third, multi-
dimensional conceptualizations essentially treat intrateam trust as a straightforward extension of 
trust at the individual level and thus fail to capture the unique properties of trust that only 
emerges at the team level. In order to advance understanding of what intrateam trust is, 
alternative approaches to conceptualizing and measuring intrateam trust need to be explored.  
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TABLE 1.1 
Summary of Prior Studies on Trust and Groups/Teamsa 
What Whether How When Other
1. Friedlander (1970) X
2. Zand (1972) X
3. Kegan & Rubenstein (1973) X
4. Klimoski & Karol (1976) X
5. Boss (1978) X
6. Korsgaard, Schweiger & Sapienza (1995) X
7. Porter & Lilly (1996) X
8. Cohen, Ledford, Spreitzer (1996) X
9. Meyerson, Weick & Kramer (1996) X
10. Hyatt & Ruddy (1997) X
11. Jarvenpaa, Knoll & Leidner (1998) X
12. Dirks (1999) X
13. Jarvenpaa & Leidner (1999) X
14. Spreitzer, Noble, Mishra & Cooke (1999) X
15. Dirks (2000) X
16. Simons & Peterson (2000) X
17. Costa, Roe & Taillieu (2001) X X
18. Aubert & Kelsey (2003) X
19. Costa (2003a) X X
20. Costa (2003b) X
21. Kiffin-Petersen & Cordery (2003) X
22. Peterson & Behfar (2003) X
23. Shamir & Lapidot (2003) X
24. Edmondson (2004) X X
25. Jarvenpaa, Shaw & Staples (2004) X
26. Kiffin-Petersen (2004) X X
27. Langfred (2004) X X
28. Rau (2005) X
29. Serva, Muller & Mayer (2005) X
30. Choi (2006) X
31. Druskat & Pescosolido (2006) X
32. Kirkman, Tesluk, Rosen & Gibson (2006) X
32. McEvily, Weber, Bicchieri & Ho (2006) X
33. Stewart & Gosain (2006) X X
34. Wilson, Straus & McEvily (2006) X
35. De Jong, Van der Vegt & Molleman (2007) X
36. Langfred (2007) X
37. Rispens, Greer & Jehn (2007) X
38. Bijlsma-Frankema, De Jong & Van de Bunt (2008) X
39. Chou, Wang, Wang, Huang, Cheng (2008) X
40. Deutsch Salamon & Robinson (2008) X
41. Raes, Heijltjes & Glunk (2008) X
42. Roussin (2008) X
43. Staples & Webster (2008) X X
44. Webber (2008) X X
45. Clapp-Smith, Vogelgesang & Avey (2009) X
46. Hempel, Zhang & Tjosvold (2009) X X
47. Hill, Bartol, Tesluk & Langa (2009) X
48. Joshi, Lazarova & Liao (2009) X
49. Peters & Karren (2009) X
a Studies presented in chronological order.
Authors
Focus of Study
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TABLE 1.2 
Summary of Prior Studies on Informal Control and/or Control in Groups/Teamsa 
What Whether How When Other
1. Ouchi & Price (1978) X
2. Ouchi (1979) X X
3. Ouchi (1980) X
4. Henderson & Lee (1992) X
5. Barker (1993) X
6. Barker (1996) X
7. Kirsch (1996) X
8. Kirsch (1997) X
9. Ezzamel & Willmott (1998) X
10. Hilgermann (1998) X
11. Sewell (1998) X
12. Barker (1999) X
13. Wittek (1999) X
14. Lazega (2000) X
15. Kirsch, Sambamurthy, Ko & Purvis (2002) X
16. Towry (2003) X
17. Fitch & Ravlin (2004) X
18. Kirsch (2004) X
19. Piccoli, Powell & Ives (2004) X
20. Loughry & Tosi (2008) X X
21. Singh (2008) X
22. Kirsch, Ko & Hanley (in press) X
23. Kirsch & Choudhury (in press) X
24. Loughry (in press) X X X X
a Studies presented in chronological order.
Focus of Study
Authors
 
 
As discussed later, insights from the team literature may be helpful in advancing such an 
alternative approach (see Potential for Cross-Fertilization). 
The issue of what peer control is has received considerable attention in the literature (8 
studies). Peer control has been conceptualized in roughly two ways. The first of these is the 
typological approach, which views peer control as an ideal type. The most prominent example of 
this approach is Ouchi’s (1979; 1980) seminal work on ‘clan control’. Since his publications in 
the 70s and 80s, however, little progress has been made towards further conceptual 
understanding clan control. As Cardinal, Sitkin and Long (in press) conclude, the primary reason 
14 
 
for this is that this typological approach fails to delineate specific mechanisms of control or 
common characteristics across control types. As a consequence, scholars tend to build on 
Ouchi’s (1979:838) assertion that clan control relies upon “a deep level of common agreement 
between members on what constitutes proper behavior” and have focused almost exclusively on 
norms and values, as if these were the sole mechanisms through which peer control manifests 
itself (e.g. Kirsch et al., 2002; Singh, 2008). Moreover, recent attempts to move beyond this 
dominant focus on values and norms (e.g. Kirsch et al., in press) are flawed because they 
confound attempts to regulate team member behavior by means of peer control with the actual 
effectiveness of peer control in regulating behavior. In sum, the typological approach has not 
been very helpful in advancing understanding the nature of peer control.  
Others have adopted an alternative approach in which peer control is viewed as 
consisting of more specific control mechanisms (e.g. Barker, 1999; Crisp, 2003; Loughry & 
Tosi, 2008). This approach recognizes that team members often employ multiple control 
mechanisms at the same time and that these mechanisms may combine synergistically to elicit 
desirable behaviors (Jaworski, 1988). Consistent with this idea, Barker (1999) – in his 
ethnographic study of ‘concertive control’ within self-managing teams – identified three distinct 
mechanisms of peer control: shared norms, monitoring and peer pressure. This approach of 
decomposing peer control into specific control mechanisms has great potential, because it moves 
away from abstract ideal types and allows scholars to gain a more precise understanding of what 
peer control is. This dissertation will build on Barker and extends his work by examining more 
systematically how specific control mechanisms combine to exert influence on team members.  
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Issue 2: When Do Intrateam Trust and Peer Control Matter to Teams? 
 Dirks and Ferrin’s (2001) review of the research on trust revealed that findings on the 
main effects of trust on team performance were highly inconsistent. My updated review concurs 
with Dirks and Ferrin’s observation, despite the numerous studies that have been published since 
then. Findings across studies still seem to suggest that the impact of trust on performance can 
vary considerably, ranging from positive (e.g. Costa, 2003; Rispens, Greer, & Jehn, 2007) to 
negligible (e.g. Aubert & Kelsey, 2003; Jarvenpaa, Shaw, & Staples, 2004) or negative (e.g. 
Langfred, 2004; Rau, 2005). These mixed findings are suggestive of differential effects of trust 
and of the presence of contingency factors. Although calls for research on the contingencies of 
intrateam trust date back as far as the early 70s (Kegan & Rubenstein, 1973), scholars have only 
recently started to examine the conditions under which trust promotes or inhibits team 
performance (Langfred, 2004; Staples & Webster, 2008).  
 Research in this area – which constitutes only 2 of the 49 studies included in this review 
– has thus far focused on the role of team task characteristics (i.e. individual autonomy, task 
interdependence) as moderators that account for the differential effects of intrateam trust. 
Unfortunately, empirical findings have been inconsistent. Specifically, whereas Langfred (2004) 
found that trust was more detrimental to team performance when team members worked 
independently, Staples and Webster (2008) found that trust was more beneficial for team 
performance when team members worked independently. While both studies attest to the 
importance of exploring moderators that account for the differential effects of trust, their 
inconsistent findings regarding task characteristics suggest that other types of moderators may be 
worth exploring. Indeed, Langfred (2004) identified further examination of moderators as an 
important direction for future research.  
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Even though it has long been recognized that the impact of peer control may vary across 
contexts (Jaworski, 1988; Ouchi, 1980), research on the conditions under which peer control 
matters more or less to teams has only recently started and remains scarce (only 2 of the 24 
studies in this review). In fact, Loughry and Tosi’s study in 2008 is one of the first to 
systematically examine this issue by exploring the role of team cohesiveness, task 
interdependence and supervisory monitoring in moderating the relationship between different 
mechanisms of peer control and team effort. In short, their study showed that monitoring can be 
either helpful or harmful for the functioning of teams, depending on the specific control 
mechanisms and the contextual factors studied. While this initial attempt to move beyond main-
effect-models of control is encouraging, the control mechanisms and types of moderators 
included in this single study were obviously limited. More research is therefore needed to gain a 
better understanding of when peer control is likely to promote or hinder team processes and 
performance (Kreutzer, 2008; Loughry, in press).  
 
Issue 3: How do Intrateam Trust and Peer Control Affect Team Performance? 
 My literature review revealed that many scholars (19 studies, see Whether in Table 1.1) 
so far have focused on whether trust has a main effect on team performance, either as the 
primary objective of their study (e.g. Friedlander, 1970; Kegan & Rubenstein, 1973) or as part of 
demonstrating the mediating role of trust between another independent variable and team 
performance (e.g. Joshi, Lazarova, & Liao, 2009; Kirkman, Rosen, Tesluk, & Gibson, 2006). 
Compared to these main-effects models of trust, the mediated-effects models of trust – which 
specify the processes through which trust affects performance – have received relatively little 
attention (7 of the 49 studies). Fortunately, scholarly interest for the issue of how intrateam trust 
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affects team performance has been increasing in the last decade. Specifically, consistent with the 
common belief that trust affects performance through its behavioral consequences (Mayer et al., 
1995; McAllister, 1995), scholars have examined the role of team processes as mediators 
through which intrateam trust affects team performance (Dirks, 1999; Kiffin-Petersen, 2004). By 
now, a variety of team processes have been identified as potential mediators for the trust-
performance relationship, such as effort (Spreitzer, Noble, Mishra, & Cooke, 1999; Stewart & 
Gosain, 2006), reflexivity (Schippers, 2003), monitoring (Langfred, 2004), and knowledge 
sharing (Staples & Webster, 2008). While this progress is encouraging and useful, the dominant 
focus on studying team processes in isolation offers neither insight into whether different team 
processes actually represent distinct mediating mechanisms nor a guiding framework for 
choosing which team processes to include or exclude from models of intrateam trust. As such, 
more research on the mediating role of team processes regarding the trust-performance 
relationship is surely needed (Kiffin-Petersen, 2004).  
Research on control tends to be dominated by a focus on main-effects models (Jaworski, 
1988). This is true for research on peer control as well, with some studies offering support for a 
main effect of peer control on team performance (e.g. Hilgermann, 1998) while not providing 
much insight into processes through which peer control affects performance. As Table 1.2 
indicates, only 3 studies included in this review have attempted to address this issue. Moreover, 
Piccoli, Powell and Ives’ (2004) study is the only one to address this issue empirically, by 
examining the role of coordination and communication as mediators between peer control and 
team performance. Although no support was found for the mediating role of these particular 
team processes, their study is one of the first to recognize the importance of advancing 
understanding of how peer control affects performance. Given the non-significant study results, 
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however, other mediators may be worth exploring. Indeed, Loughry (in press) recently advocated 
further examination of mediating processes as an important direction for future research on peer 
control.  
Jaworski’s (1988) theoretical framework provides some guidance for addressing the issue 
of how peer control affects team performance. Specifically, his framework distinguishes between 
two broad classes of consequences of control: the psychological and the behavioral impact of 
control on those subjected to it. Furthermore, it suggests that the team performance implications 
of control may be explained through these psychological and behavioral consequences. 
However, although research findings on peer control within teams appear to be generally 
consistent with the idea of the behavioral and psychological impact of control (Barker, 1993), the 
specific nature of these behavioral and psychological processes has remained underspecified and 
their role as potential mediators has remained unclear. Moving this idea forward, the second 
study in this dissertation (Chapter 3) will focus on the role of specific behavioral and 
psychological processes in mediating the peer control-team performance relationship.  
 
Issue 4: Potential for Cross-Fertilization 
This review reveals potential for cross-fertilization between the different bodies of 
literature on intrateam trust, peer control and team performance. For instance, insights from the 
literature on intrateam trust and the literature on peer control seem complementary in helping to 
advance understanding of how trust and control affect team performance. Both bodies of 
literature clearly recognize that trust and control are somehow related and that each of these 
variables may play a mediating role in the relationship between the other variable and team 
performance. More specifically, several studies on intrateam trust have examined the role of 
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monitoring – a specific peer control mechanism – as a mediator that transfers the effects of trust 
to performance (e.g. Bijlsma-Frankema, De Jong, & Van de Bunt, 2008; Langfred, 2004). 
Likewise, studies on peer control have proposed trust as a mediator that transfers the effects of 
(combinations of) control to performance (e.g. Kirsch & Choudhury, in press). Despite the 
different causal orders among trust and control proposed, both bodies of literature point out the 
value of including both trust and control within a single mediated-effects model in order to 
advance understanding on the issue of How. Adopting this idea, each of the mediation models 
tested in this dissertation (Chapters 2, 3 and 4) will include both trust and control and take into 
account their interrelation.   
Insights from the team literature seem particularly useful for advancing the issue of how 
intrateam trust affects team performance. While various team processes have been identified as 
potential mediators of the trust-performance relationship (Langfred, 2004; Schippers, 2003; 
Spreitzer et al., 1999), the trust literature lacks a guiding framework to help organize this rather 
eclectic set of processes and determine which of these are most relevance for explaining the 
trust-performance relationship. The team literature, by contrast, offers several comprehensive 
and integrative frameworks of team processes that organize team processes based on similarities 
in level of specificity and the broader team process category under which they can be subsumed 
(e.g. Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001; Rousseau, Aubé, & Savoie, 2006). These frameworks 
may be helpful for selecting a parsimonious set of distinct team processes for studying the 
mediated effects of intrateam trust. Hence, in the first study of this dissertation (Chapter 2), I will 
build on such a framework to guide my selection of team processes among those identified in the 
trust literature.  
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Insights from the team literature may also help to clarify the nature of intrateam trust and 
peer control. Building on the work of multi-level theorists (Brown & Kozlowski, 1999; Chan, 
1998; Klein & Kozlowski, 2000), team researchers have come to recognize that team-level not 
only consist of the average or mean manifestation of a construct, but also of dispersion – the 
variation that exists between team members with respect to the focal construct. In recent years, a 
growing number of team researchers adopted the mean-dispersion distinction to help clarify the 
nature of several team-level constructs, such as team justice climate (Colquitt, Noe, & Jackson, 
2002; Gonzalez-Roma, Fortes-Ferreira, & Peiro, 2009), leader-member exchange in teams 
(Boies & Howell, 2006), team satisfaction (Dineen, Noe, Shaw, Duffy, & Wiethoff, 2007), team 
values (Kirkman & Shapiro, 2005), team conflict (Jehn, Rispens, & Thatcher, in press) and team 
cohesion (Cole & Hirschfeld, 2009). This approach seems to have great potential for advancing 
understanding of the nature of intrateam trust and peer control, because it captures the unique 
dispersion properties of trust and control that only emerges at the team level of analysis but not 
at the individual level. Additionally, this approach may be helpful for understanding when 
intrateam trust and peer control will have stronger or weaker impact on teams as well, as studies 
have consistently shown that within-team dispersion acts as a moderator that accounts for the 
differential effects of average manifestations of a team-level construct on team processes and 
performance (e.g. Cole & Hirschfeld, 2009; Colquitt et al., 2002; Dineen et al., 2007). Therefore, 
in the third study of this dissertation (Chapter 4), I will use this approach to advance 
understanding of what intrateam trust and peer control are and when they are more likely to be 
beneficial or detrimental to teams.  
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OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
In the preceding overview, I reviewed evidence for the implications of trust and control 
within teams. This review showed that, despite years of research on intrateam trust and peer 
control, relatively little progress has been made regarding the issues of What, When and How. At 
the same time, my review also revealed that several tentative insights and ideas have emerged 
from the literature on how these issues may be addressed. The present dissertation will build on 
these insights and ideas to move forward theory development and research on trust and peer 
control within teams. 
In the following chapters, I report three empirical studies (summarized in Table 1.3) that 
were designed to address the issues of What, When and How. All three studies were conducted in 
the field, among real-life work teams operating within an organizational context. In addition, all 
three studies followed a quantitative survey methodology, with each study representing a 
separate data collection effort. The first two empirical studies used a cross-sectional design and 
were each conducted among teams operating within a single organization. The third and final 
study used a cross-lagged panel design and was conducted among teams from 82 different 
organizations.  
The first study, reported in Chapter 2, aims to address the issue of how intrateam trust 
affects team performance by studying the role of team processes in mediating the trust-
performance relationship. Building on a typological framework of team processes (Marks et al., 
2001) and prior research on the mediated effects of intrateam trust (Langfred, 2004; Schippers, 
2003; Spreitzer et al., 1999), we propose an integrative multiple mediator model in which three 
team processes – team reflexivity, team monitoring and team effort – act as mediating 
22 
 
mechanisms that transmit the effects of trust to team performance.3 In theorizing and testing this 
model, we specifically focus on ongoing teams, a type of team that has received relatively little 
scholarly attention but where the effects of trust are likely to be particularly pronounced (Kiffin-
Petersen, 2004; Saunders & Ahuja, 2006). Accordingly, our empirical study was conducted 
among ongoing tax consulting teams operating at a large multinational consultancy firm. 
 The second study, reported in Chapter 3, aims to address the issues of what the nature 
peer control is, and when and how it affects team performance by investigating the processes 
through which and the conditions under which peer control promotes or hinders team 
performance. Drawing on the idea of decomposing peer control in specific mechanisms and of 
distinguishing between the behavioral and psychological impact of peer control (e.g. Barker, 
1999; Jaworski, 1988), we propose that peer control consists of two specific mechanisms – peer 
pressure and norm consensus – and that these mechanisms interact in affecting two processes – 
team effort and intrateam trust. These processes, in turn, are expected to mediate the peer 
control-team performance relationship. To test this mediated moderation model, an empirically 
study was conducted among self-managing teams operating at a mental health care organization. 
We specifically focused on self-managing teams because the literature suggests that the effects 
of peer control are particularly pronounced for this type of team (Barker, 1993; Fitch & Ravlin, 
2004).  
Studies 3a and 3b, reported in Chapter 4, aim to address the issues of what the nature of 
intrateam trust and peer control is and when they help or hurt teams by distinguishing between 
different team-level properties of trust and control and by examining their joint implications on  
                                                            
3 Whereas the team literature tends to use the term ‘team monitoring’ to refer to monitoring among team members, 
the peer control literature tends to use the term ‘peer monitoring’. To match the different bodies of literature that 
each of the chapters contribute to, we will use the former term in Chapter 2 and the latter term in Chapters 3 and 4.  
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TABLE 1.3 
Overview of the Empirical Studies in this Dissertation 
 
Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4
Study: Study 1 Study 2 Study 3a + 3b
Intrateam trust Peer control Peer control
Team performance Team performance Intrateam trust
Team performance
How What
When
What What
When When
How
Sample 73 teams 46 teams 82 teams +
45 teams
Student 
associations + 
mental health care 
organization
Issues regarding 
intrateam trust
Issues regarding 
peer control
Research setting
Key variables
A multinational 
consultancy firm
A mental health 
care organization
 
 
team functioning and performance. We extend insights from the team literature (e.g. Colquitt et 
al., 2002; Dineen et al., 2007) on the unique properties of team-level constructs to the study of 
trust and control. Specifically, we distinguish between the mean and dispersion levels of  
trust and monitoring – a critical peer control mechanism (Loughry & Tosi, 2008) – and propose 
that dispersion in monitoring and trust can help to account for the inconsistent findings regarding 
the monitoring-trust and trust-performance relationship. Connecting these two relationships 
suggests a more integrative model which specifies the processes through which and the 
conditions under which the mean level of monitoring affects team performance. The interactive 
effects of mean and dispersion levels were tested on cross-lagged panel data obtained from a 
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sample of student association boards (Study 3a), after which the integrative model was tested on 
data obtained from same the health care teams reported in Chapter 3 (Study 3b).  
In the last chapter (Chapter 5), the most important findings of the three empirical studies 
are summarized, followed by a general discussion of limitations, implications and opportunities 
for future research.  
 
Note on Publication Status of the Individual Chapters 
The Chapter 2 paper is currently in press at the Academy of Management Journal (De 
Jong & Elfring, in press). An earlier abbreviated version of this paper has been published in the 
Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings (De Jong & Elfring, 2007). An earlier version 
of the Chapter 3 paper has been published in the Academy of Management Best Paper 
Proceedings as well (De Jong & Bijlsma-Frankema, 2009). The paper has been invited for a 
revise-and-resubmit at an A-Journal. The Chapter 4 paper has been presented at the 5th EIASM 
Workshop on “Trust within and between Organizations” (De Jong & Dirks, 2010). The paper is 
currently in preparation for submission to an A-Journal.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
How Does Trust Affect the Performance of Ongoing Work Teams? 
The Mediating Role of Reflexivity, Monitoring and Effort 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeared as: De Jong, B. A., & Elfring, T. (in press). How Does Trust Affect the 
Performance of Ongoing Work Teams? The Mediating Role of Reflexivity, Monitoring 
and Effort. Academy of Management Journal, 53(3). An earlier, abbreviated version of 
this paper appeared as: De Jong, B. A., & Elfring, T. (2007). Mediated and Differential 
Effects of Trust on Team Performance: A Study of Ongoing Work Teams. Academy of 
Management Best Paper Proceedings. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
In this study, we investigate how trust affects the performance of ongoing teams. We 
propose a multiple mediator model in which different team processes act as mediating 
mechanisms that transmit the positive effects of trust to team performance. Drawing on a 
dataset of ongoing tax consulting teams, we found support for the mediated effects of 
trust via team monitoring and team effort. Our results did not support the mediating role 
of team reflexivity. These findings contribute to understanding how trust operates within 
ongoing teams in a way that is distinct from what we know from studies of short-term 
teams.     
 
Keywords: trust; team performance; team processes; ongoing teams 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
The realization that intrateam trust is critical to the functioning of teams has led to 
a proliferation of studies on the team performance implications of trust (Langfred, 2004; 
Porter & Lilly, 1996; Zand, 1972). Although the matter of whether trust affects team 
performance has received ample scholarly attention, little is still known about how trust 
affects team performance (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001). While examining the processes that 
transmit the effects of trust has been recognized as crucial for advancing understanding of 
this matter (Mayer & Gavin, 2005; McAllister, 1995), empirical examinations of such 
processes remain scarce. Moreover, the research that has been done tends to focus on one 
process at a time (e.g. Schippers, 2003) or on the way these processes operate within 
short-term teams (e.g. Dirks, 1999; Langfred, 2004), thus providing a piecemeal and 
incomplete understanding of how trust affects team performance, and insight that does 
not necessarily apply to ongoing teams. With this paper, we aim to advance this line of 
research by investigating the role of different team-level processes in transmitting the 
effects of trust and by examining this matter within the context of ongoing teams.  
Ongoing teams are one of the most prevalent types of team used in contemporary 
organizations (Devine, Clayton, Philips, Dunford, & Melner, 1999). Ongoing teams are 
distinct from short-term teams in terms of their team duration and their task duration 
(Bradley, White, & Mennecke, 2003). Whereas short-term teams are expected to disband 
after having worked together for a brief period of time, ongoing teams are teams whose 
tasks involve longer work cycles and whose members expect to be working together on 
future tasks. We focus here on ongoing teams, not only because of their prevalence and 
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importance in organizations, but also because explanations of the trust-performance 
relationship are lacking for this type of team in particular (Kiffin-Petersen, 2004). 
Moreover, the literature suggests that findings on trust within short-term teams – the type 
of team most studied in trust research – cannot necessarily be applied to ongoing teams. 
Theoretical work suggests that the effects of trust are likely to be more pronounced 
within ongoing teams than within short-term teams, because ongoing teams tend to be 
more focused on interpersonal relationships, which increases the impact of trust dynamics 
on team member interactions (Karau & Kelly, 2004; Saunders & Ahuja, 2006). 
Furthermore, the long-term nature of ongoing teams allows the effects of trust (or a lack 
thereof) to persist and materialize over an extended period of time. In line with these 
arguments, past studies of ongoing teams have reported results that differ systematically 
from those found in studies of short-term teams. Specifically, whereas studies of short-
term teams have reported either a negligible or conditional effect of trust on performance 
(e.g. Aubert & Kelsey, 2003; Dirks, 1999; Jarvenpaa, Shaw, & Staples, 2004), studies of 
ongoing teams have consistently found evidence of a positive main effect on team 
performance (e.g. Costa, 2003; Rispens, Greer, & Jehn, 2007; Spreitzer, Noble, Mishra, 
& Cooke, 1999). For these reasons, scholarly investigation of how trust affects the 
performance of ongoing teams is warranted.  
 In this paper, we focus on three team-level processes – team reflexivity, team 
monitoring, and team effort – and examine how these act as mediating mechanisms that 
together transmit the effects of trust to performance. While past studies on the mediated 
effects of trust have tended to focus on one of these processes at a time – as for instance 
Schippers (2003) did in one of her studies on team reflexivity – singling out a particular 
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process can lead to overstating the importance of that process as a mediating mechanism 
for trust. By contrast, examining the mediating role of multiple team processes not only 
provides a more accurate assessment of the mediating role of any one focal process, but 
also allows for integrating and testing alternative theories on how trust affects team 
performance (MacKinnon, 2000; Mathieu, DeShon, & Bergh, 2008). Furthermore, it 
seems realistic to assume that trust affects team performance through a variety of 
processes, particularly in ongoing teams where members are often engaged in multiple 
team processes at the same time (Marks, Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001; Saunders & Ahuja, 
2006), many of which are likely to be affected by trust. Drawing on the literature on trust 
and on team effectiveness, we therefore theorize about the role of these different 
processes in transmitting the effects of intrateam trust. The combination of these theories 
produces an integrative multiple mediator model (depicted in Figure 2.1), which we test 
on data obtained from 73 ongoing teams operating at a multinational consultancy firm.  
 
 
FIGURE 2.1 
Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Team 
performance 
Intrateam 
trust 
Team 
reflexivity 
Team   
effort 
Team 
monitoring 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Intrateam Trust and Team Performance 
Interpersonal trust can be defined as a psychological state held by individuals 
involving confident positive expectations about the actions of another (Dirks & Skarlicki, 
2004). Although there is no universally accepted definition of trust, scholars agree that 
positive expectations and uncertainty are central elements of the concept (Mayer, Davis, 
& Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). Positive expectations 
refer to the belief that the actions of another will be beneficial or at least not detrimental, 
despite the possibility of being disappointed by these actions (Gambetta, 1988; Luhmann, 
1988). While recognizing their vulnerability, individuals reach a state of positive 
expectations based on knowledge of another’s trustworthiness (‘good reasons’) and 
suspension of irreducible uncertainty about another’s actions. This suspension of 
uncertainty makes knowledge about another’s trustworthiness momentarily ‘certain’ and 
enables a leap towards positive expectations beyond that which good reasons alone would 
warrant (Möllering, 2001).  
We use the term ‘intrateam trust’ to denote shared generalized perceptions of trust 
that team members have in their fellow teammates. Consistent with most team-level 
conceptualizations of trust (e.g. Langfred, 2004; Simons & Peterson, 2000), our notion of 
intrateam trust refers to generalized expectations for all team members. While 
perceptions of trust reside at the individual level, the meaning of trust as a team-level 
construct comes from the sharedness among these individual-level perceptions. These 
shared perceptions are believed to emerge naturally from team membership and social 
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categorization processes (Williams, 2001), from collective sense-making of team 
members’ shared experiences (Shamir & Lapidot, 2003), and from contextual factors that 
provide reassurance and constrain team member interactions (McKnight, Cummings, & 
Chervany, 1998). In addition to being similar in nature to interpersonal trust, intrateam 
trust is also believed be similar in terms of its position within models across levels and in 
the way it affects outcomes (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007).  
Team performance is defined as “the extent to which the productive output of a 
team meets or exceeds the performance standards of those who review and/ or receive the 
output” (Hackman, 1987:323). Overall, we expect team performance to be positively 
affected by intrateam trust, because trust allows team members to interact with one 
another as if their uncertainty and vulnerability were favorably resolved. Team members 
who trust each other are therefore more likely to engage in productive interactions and 
teamwork processes that enhance team performance (Jones & George, 1998; Spreitzer et 
al., 1999). By contrast, without a foundation of trust, team members are more likely to 
avoid such interactions and processes to protect themselves from perceived vulnerability 
to the actions of fellow teammates (Dirks, 1999; Mayer & Gavin, 2005), thereby 
inhibiting their performance as a team. This general line of argument, that relies upon the 
notion of teamwork, serves as our starting point for theorizing more specifically about the 
team processes that mediate the relationship between intrateam trust and team 
performance.   
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Team Processes as Mediating Mechanisms 
Team processes can be defined as members’ acts that convert inputs to outcomes 
through cognitive, verbal, and behavioral activities directed towards achieving collective 
goals (Marks et al., 2001). In this paper, we focus on three specific team processes: team 
reflexivity, team monitoring and team effort. Team reflexivity is defined as “the extent to 
which team members overtly reflect upon the team’s objectives, strategies and processes, 
and adapt them to current or anticipated circumstances” (West, 2000:296). Team 
monitoring is defined as the process of observing actions of teammates and watching for 
errors or performance discrepancies so that suggestions or corrective feedback can be 
provided to assist team members (Marks et al., 2001). Team effort is defined as the extent 
to which team members devote their resources (i.e. energy, attention, time) to executing 
team tasks (Yeo & Neal, 2004). Our focus on these particular processes is based on 
evidence of their relevance as mediating mechanisms between trust and performance.   
The scant literature on how trust affects team performance (e.g. Dirks, 1999; 
Langfred, 2004; Schippers, 2003) suggest that team reflexivity, team monitoring and 
team effort play a crucial role in transferring the effects of trust. The mediating role of 
team reflexivity was recently examined by Schippers (2003). In one of her studies of 
ongoing teams, she found team reflexivity partially accounted for the direct effect of 
intrateam trust on team performance. In a similar vein, Edmondson’s (1999) seminal 
study showed that team learning (a concept closely related to reflexivity) mediated the 
effect of team psychological safety (a concept closely related to intrateam trust) on team 
performance. The relevance of team monitoring is highlighted by Langfred (2004). In his 
study of short-term teams, he found that high trust and high individual autonomy were 
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associated with lower levels of monitoring, which subsequently led to declining team 
performance. His results thus suggest that in teams with high autonomy, monitoring 
accounts for the relationship between trust and team performance. The mediating role of 
team effort was first proposed by Dirks (1999). He argued that trust might enhance 
performance by influencing the rational considerations that motivate team members to 
exert effort on team tasks. While this mediating role was not supported in his study of 
short-term teams, Spreitzer et al.’s (1999) study of ongoing teams did offer support for 
such a mediating effect. Specifically, they found that high-trust teams tended to perform 
better because team members were more likely to engage in and direct their effort 
towards team tasks. While the above review of the trust literature suggests that our focal 
team processes are relevant in their own right, the team processes typology literature (e.g. 
LePine, Piccolo, Jackson, Mathieu, & Saul, 2008; Marks et al., 2001) suggests that they 
are also meaningful as a set of processes. As we discuss in more detail below, our focal 
team processes each represent a specific process embedded within one of the three 
distinct superordinate process categories – transition phase processes, action phase 
processes and interpersonal processes – that constitute Marks et al.’s (2001) recurring 
phase model of team processes.  Our focus on team reflexivity, team monitoring and team 
effort is consistent with Marks et al.’s (2001) recommendation to represent each of the 
three superordinate team process categories with the process most relevant to a particular 
study.  
The concept of team reflexivity represents a transition phase process. Transition 
phase processes occur between performance episodes and are focused on  evaluation and 
planning activities.  Like other transition phase processes, team reflexivity has a ‘dual 
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focus’ (cf. LePine et al., 2008), in that it involves both reflection upon previous 
accomplishments and making adaptations to prepare for future actions. It is reflection that 
is especially likely to occur during transition phases. The specific processes involved in 
reflection, such as considering different objectives and developing alternative courses of 
action (West, 2000), closely match Marks et al.’s description of ‘strategy formulation and 
planning’, a specific process embedded within the transition phase process category. 
Indeed, a recent meta-analytical test of Marks et al.’s framework suggests that team 
reflexivity can be treated as a form of strategy formulation and planning (LePine et al., 
2008). Given that Schippers (2003) specifically points towards team reflexivity as a 
mediator between trust and performance, we focus on this variable rather than on other 
processes within Marks et al.’s (2001) transition phase process category. 
Team monitoring reflects an action phase process. Like other action phase 
processes, monitoring involves real time assessment that is most likely to occur during 
episodes where the team’s primary work is accomplished (Marks & Panzer, 2004). More 
specifically, our concept of team monitoring matches Marks et al.’s (2001) description of 
‘team monitoring and backup behavior’, a process within the action phase category that 
involves observing the actions of teammates, watching for performance discrepancies and 
providing feedback and assistance to those in need. While ‘team monitoring and backup 
behavior’ was initially conceptualized as a single construct, more recent work has tended 
to treat monitoring and backup behavior as distinct constructs (e.g. Marks & Panzer, 
2004). As research by Langfred (2004) specifically points towards monitoring as a 
potential mediating mechanism between intrateam trust and team performance, we chose 
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to focus on team monitoring rather than on other processes within the action phase 
process category.  
Team effort falls within Marks et al.’s (2001) third process category: interpersonal 
processes. Team effort is likely to be salient during both transition and action phases and 
can be viewed as a manifestation of interpersonal processes, such as motivation, 
confidence building and conflict management (LePine et al., 2008). Specifically, the 
notion of team effort is closely linked to processes of motivation (Yeo & Neal, 2004): 
team effort involves maintaining and demonstrating one’s motivation to exert effort 
towards team goal accomplishment, even when experiencing setbacks or when others are 
taking it easy.  Since past research points specifically towards team effort as a mechanism 
that transfers the effects of trust to team performance (e.g. Spreitzer et al., 1999), we 
chose to focus on this process rather than on other specific processes within Marks et al.’s 
(2001) interpersonal process category.  
 
The Mediating Role of Team Reflexivity  
Part of the reason why trust promotes team performance is because it enhances the 
team’s ability to reflect upon previous accomplishments and prepare for future actions 
during transition phases. Trust enhances reflexivity by affecting its underlying processes: 
reflection and action. First, trust encourages teams to reflect on potential or actual 
performance problems by creating a safe atmosphere in which team members feel 
comfortable talking about their own or others’ performance problems, without fear of 
being seen as incompetent (Edmondson, 2004) or damaging their relationship with others 
(Simons & Peterson, 2000). Second, trust increases team members’ willingness to initiate 
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actions that are aimed at performing more effectively. Following regulatory focus theory, 
McAllister et al. (2005) argue that the confident positive expectations underlying trust 
motivate team members to strive toward team goal attainment, because they make team 
members more sensitive to the positive outcomes associated with team accomplishment 
and less sensitive to the negative outcomes associated with being vulnerable to the 
actions of teammates. In doing so, this so-called ‘promotion focus’ motivates team 
members to actively seek ways to work more effectively together in order to help the 
team succeed.  
The increased levels of reflection and focus on actively improving performance 
are likely to translate into higher levels of team performance. Openly discussing errors 
and views about performance problems stimulates reframing of cognitive representations 
and allows for a comprehensive and systematic understanding of these problems (West, 
2000), which helps team members to come up with more effective ways to perform their 
tasks. Furthermore, while overly reflecting on performance problems can lead to a failure 
to initiate action (Schippers, 2003), team members’ focus on actively furthering team 
goal accomplishment increases the likelihood that processes of reflection will in fact 
materialize into action taken by the team. Prior studies have offered ample support for the 
team performance benefits of reflexivity (e.g. Carter & West, 1998; Hoegl & Parboteeah, 
2006). In addition, research has provided evidence for the positive impact of trust on 
team reflexivity as well as for the (partially) mediated effect of trust via reflexivity 
(Edmondson, 1999; Schippers, 2003).  
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Hypothesis 1: Team reflexivity partially mediates the positive relationship between 
intrateam trust and team performance. 
 
The Mediating Role of Team Monitoring 
Another reason why trust promotes team performance is because it enables teams 
to mitigate process losses that occur during action phases. We propose that these 
performance benefits of trust come about through increased levels of monitoring. While 
findings on the trust-monitoring relationship are mixed (e.g. Bijlsma-Frankema, De Jong, 
& Van de Bunt, 2008; Langfred, 2004), McAllister’s (1995) work suggests that the 
effects of trust on monitoring depend on the type of trust and monitoring under 
consideration. He argues that while some types of monitoring involve deliberate acts to 
control fellow teammates, other types of monitoring tend to be used in a more positive 
way, to help teammates in need of assistance. This latter type of monitoring is believed to 
be enhanced by a deep and affective form of trust that tends to develop between team 
members over time. This deeper level of trust induces an orientation towards the needs 
and goals of others in the relationship, which increases team members’ willingness to 
look out for their teammates and help them to get their performance back on track 
(McAllister, 1995). This positive orientation also enhances team members’ understanding 
that teammates who monitor them are in fact looking out for them rather than trying to 
control them in a distrustful manner (Salas, Sims, & Burke, 2005), thereby creating a 
team climate that encourages monitoring. We follow McAllister’s line of argument and 
propose a positive effect of intrateam trust on team monitoring within the context of 
ongoing teams. Members of ongoing teams tend to be more focused on interpersonal 
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relationships and tend to have more opportunity to experience the benevolence of fellow 
teammates than members of short-term teams (Jarvenpaa, Knoll, & Leidner, 1998; 
Saunders & Ahuja, 2006) and are therefore particularly likely to develop the deeper 
levels trust that encourages team members to look out for each other. In support of this 
notion, Jehn and Shah (1997) found that teams with well-developed interpersonal 
relationships showed higher levels of monitoring than those with less well-developed 
interpersonal relationships.  
The monitoring, that is brought about through deeper levels of intrateam trust, 
enhances performance by reducing process losses that keep teams from reaching their 
potential productivity (Langfred, 2004; Steiner, 1972). Firstly, monitoring reduces 
motivational losses by increasing the likelihood that free-riding and social loafing will be 
detected by others, which helps focus the team’s efforts on realizing team goals over 
individual interests (Jones, 1984). Secondly, monitoring reduces coordination losses, 
which increases the efficiency of the team’s operations. Monitoring can operate as an 
implicit coordination mechanism (Rico, Sanchez-Manzanares, Gil, & Gibson, 2008) by 
making team members more aware of the actions, timing and performance of others, thus 
increasing their ability to synchronize their contributions in ways that maximize team 
goal attainment (Marks & Panzer, 2004). Prior research offer support for both for the 
positive effect of monitoring on team performance (e.g. Marks & Panzer, 2004) and the 
mediating effect of monitoring between trust and performance (e.g. McAllister, 1995).  
 
Hypothesis 2: Team monitoring partially mediates the positive relationship 
between intrateam trust and team performance. 
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The Mediating Role of Team Effort 
The third reason why trust promotes team performance is because it keeps team 
members motivated to work hard on team tasks throughout both action and transition 
phases. We propose that these team performance benefits of trust are brought about 
through increased levels of effort. Within the context of short-term teams, Dirks (1999) 
theorized that trust promotes effort by influencing team members’ rational considerations 
about the dispensability of their efforts: team members who feel they cannot depend on 
others are more likely to expect that their own efforts will be mitigated by the poor 
performance of others. Such expectations will cause team members to expend less effort 
when performing team tasks (Dirks, 1999). While rational considerations are part of what 
motivates effort, theories of collective work motivation suggest that effort is also 
motivated by more social (i.e. normative and affective) considerations (Kidwell Jr. & 
Bennett, 1993; Shamir, 1990). These considerations are particularly likely to be salient in 
ongoing teams, where cooperative norms and affective interpersonal bonds have 
developed over time (Saunders & Ahuja, 2006).  
We therefore theorize that, in ongoing teams, trust promotes effort because it 
affects a combination of the rational, normative and affective considerations that co-
determine team members’ motivation to work hard on team tasks. In addition to rational 
considerations, trust is likely to influence the normative considerations that drive effort, 
because trust promotes recurrent cycles of successful cooperation among team members 
(Ferrin, Bligh, & Kohles, 2008). These recurrent cycles set standards for acceptable 
behavior within the team (Ferrin & Shah, 1997), which exert normative pressure on team 
members with respect to the level of effort expected of them (Kidwell Jr. & Bennett, 
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1993; Shamir, 1990). Furthermore, trust is likely to influence the affective considerations 
that drive effort because it strengthens the interpersonal bonds between team members. 
As teams mature over time and mutual trust increases, relationships among team 
members transcend formal work relationships and become increasingly characterized by 
a sense of identification with the team and its members (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). These 
affective considerations nurture team members’ desire to perform team tasks as a way to 
express and reaffirm their identification with their team (Shamir, 1990).  
The increased levels of team member effort brought about by trust serve to 
promote higher levels of team performance for a number of reasons. First of all, working 
hard and persistently on team tasks simply increases the likelihood of high levels of 
output being produced by the team. Second, team performance benefits from team effort 
because team members who see others working hard tend to set higher goals for 
themselves (Mulvey & Klein, 1998). Third, when team members work hard, teams can be 
more effective, because the efforts of team members who work hard can be used as a 
strategy to compensate for the poor performance of teammates (LePine & Van Dyne, 
2001). Empirical studies support the positive relationship between team effort and team 
performance, demonstrating the benefits of expending effort for team performance as 
well as the detrimental effects of withholding effort (e.g. Denison, Hart, & Kahn, 1996; 
Liden, Wayne, Jaworski, & Bennett, 2004). Furthermore, prior research has demonstrated 
the role of both cooperative norms and affective bonds (e.g. Bennett & Kidwell Jr., 2001; 
Chatman & Flynn, 2001) as drivers of team members’ contributions to their work team. 
Finally, studies offer support for the mediating role of effort between psychological states 
and performance (e.g. Brown & Leigh, 1996).     
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Hypothesis 3: Team effort partially mediates the positive relationship between 
intrateam trust and team performance. 
 
 
METHODS 
 
Research Setting 
Our research setting was the Dutch tax department of a major multinational 
consultancy firm. Its tax department served a range of clients, from small, local 
enterprises to large international corporations. The business acquired from these clients 
ranges from looking after annual financial reports and tax returns to advising clients on 
the fiscal and legal aspects surrounding takeovers, mergers and joint ventures. Working 
together in teams, the consultants needed to interact with one another on a daily basis. For 
instance, working on an upcoming merger for a client, some team members were 
assigned to develop different scenarios surrounding the merger, which would then be 
used by others to run a variety of models to examine the financial implications this 
merger. These team members, however, needed to take into account the legal 
(im)possibilities of these arrangements, for which still other team members were 
responsible. Depending on the results of these analyses, team members had to go back 
and check with the team members responsible for developing the scenarios and re-run 
their models again. Finally, other team members needed to check with their teammates 
about when these analyses would be finished in order for them to be able to complete 
their report for the client. Occasionally members of other teams would be brought in to 
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work on specific assignments, but aside from this, team membership was relatively 
stable. 
 
Sample and Procedure  
The initial sample consisted of 879 tax consultants working together in 92 teams. 
As the teams were located throughout The Netherlands, data were collected through a 
web survey. Following Dillman (2000), several measures were taken to maximize the 
response rate. All consultants received a personalized e-mail from one of the researchers, 
inviting them to participate in the study and ensuring the confidentiality of their answers. 
In addition, an e-mail was sent by the CEO of the tax department, encouraging employees 
to participate by stressing the importance of the study to the firm and by informing them 
of prizes that were raffled among those who completed the survey. Finally, a reminder e-
mail was sent by one of the researchers to non-respondents two weeks after the data 
collection started. To avoid common rater effects (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003), data on different variables were collected from different sources. While 
data on trust, effort, monitoring and reflexivity where gathered from the team members, 
data on team performance were collected from the team’s supervisors.   
The overall response rate from both of our web surveys was 82%, which included 
85 teams with matched team member-supervisor data. To test for non-response bias, we 
performed a one-way ANOVA using data from all 879 consultants included in our initial 
sample. The results indicated no significant differences between respondents and non-
respondents with respect to sex, age, tenure and employment status (i.e. full-time versus 
part-time). Consistent with other research in our area (e.g. Carter & West, 1998; 
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Langfred, 2004; Schippers, 2003), we used an intrateam response rate of 50% or higher 
as a criterion for including teams in our final sample. Applying this selection criterion 
resulted in a final sample of 73 teams, consisting of 565 team members and 73 
supervisors. To test for any bias that may have resulted from using this response criterion 
(Timmerman, 2005), we correlated intrateam response rates of the teams in our final 
sample with all of the team-level variables in our model. These correlations were all non-
significant (.03 ≤ r ≤ .07, ns), thus suggesting that bias due to intrateam non-response was 
not a major issue. The average respondent in our final sample was 35 years of age (sd = 
8.7 years) and had worked at the firm for 7.5 years (sd = 6.8 years). The average team 
consisted of 10.2 team members (sd = 5.9 members). 70% of the respondents were male, 
95% worked full-time, and 95% held Master’s degrees such as taxation and fiscal 
economics.   
 
Measures 
The multi-item scales used in this study can be found in Appendix A. Unless 
otherwise indicated, responses were obtained on a 5-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 
‘completely disagree’ (1) to ‘completely agree’ (5).  
Intrateam trust. Our five-item trust scale was developed using procedures 
outlined by Hinkin (1998). The first step involved generating items. An item pool was 
generated based on existing (Dutch) measures regarding trust in peers and team members 
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(e.g. Cook & Wall, 1980; Costa, 2003; Schippers, 2003) to ensure correspondence with 
existing research on trust. To ensure that these items accurately reflected our conceptual 
definition, they were worded in such as way as to reflect individual team members’ 
confident positive expectations by using phrases like ‘I am confident’ and ‘I am able to 
count on’. To capture the content domain of the trust concept, we made sure that the 
trust-related risks identified by Sheppard and Sherman (1998) were reflected in one or 
more items.The second step involved collecting survey data on trust and all the other 
concepts in our model from an independent sample of 116 social science faculty 
members. In the third step, we carried out an exploratory factor analysis to reduce the 
original number of items, resulting in short five-item trust measure.4 Consistent with 
other measures of intrateam trust (e.g. Langfred, 2004; 2007), a ‘direct measure’ of trust 
was also included in the scale. This direct measure has the advantage of ensuring that 
trust rather than trustworthiness is measured, while not producing systematically different 
results compared to ‘indirect measures’ (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007). As a final step, 
we carried out a confirmatory factor analysis on these items (see further down).  
Team reflexivity. The five items used to measure team reflexivity were derived 
from Carter and West (1998) and refer either to reflecting on team processes, team 
strategies and team goals or to making adaptations in these domains.  
Team monitoring. The five items used to measure team monitoring were based on 
Langfred (2004) and Costa (2003) and refer to the team’s observation of to extent to 
which teammates met certain standards such as obligations to the team and deadlines. 
Consistent with our conceptualization of monitoring, we revised the wording of 
Langfred’s items in a way that created a more positive connotation of monitoring. For 
                                                 
4 The cross-loading matrix of the EFA is available from the first author upon request. 
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example, we took out “to make sure” in Langfred’s item “We watch to make sure 
everyone in the team meets their deadlines” to de-emphasize its controlling connotation. 
We also replaced project team specific terminology, in this case “deadlines”, with the 
more general notion of “finishing one’s work on time”. As a result, our revised item now 
states “In this team we watch whether everyone completes their work on time”.  
Team effort. The measurement scale for team effort developed for this study 
consisted of five items, which refer to the intensity and persistence of team members’ 
efforts to realize team objectives. The items were based on those used by George (1992) 
and Mulvey and Klein (1998).  
Team performance. Consistent with our conceptual definition of team 
performance, our measure focused on the team’s task accomplishment as evaluated by 
their supervisor. The scale consisted of three items: one referring to the quality of output, 
one referring to the quantity of output and one overall assessment of team performance. 
Team supervisors were instructed to evaluate the performance of their team in the light of 
established performance standards on a scale of 1 (‘very poor’) to 10 (‘superb’).  
Control variables. Based upon prior research, we initially included trust in 
supervisors, individual autonomy, organizational tenure and team size as control 
variables in our model. In addition, because the teams in our study operated in one of four 
types of industries distinguished by the firm, industry type was also considered as a 
control variable. As the industry type variables were the only ones that had any bearing 
on our results, we excluded the other control variables from our model to conserve 
statistical power (cf. Stewart & Barrick, 2000). 
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Aggregation and Measurement Analyses  
To assess the appropriateness of aggregating individual-level data to the team 
level, we first computed within-group agreements, using James et al.’s (1984; 1993) 
formula. The rWG(j) values for all constructs and all teams exceeded the generally 
accepted .70 cut-off point for substantial interrater agreement (.79 ≤ rWG(j) ≤ 1.00). In 
addition, we calculated group-size corrected intraclass correlation coefficients, using 
Bliese and Halverson’s (1998) formula. Although the ICC(2)s were somewhat below .70 
(.62 ≤ ICC(2) ≤ .69), the ICC(1)s exceeded the generally accepted cut-off value of .12 
(.16 ≤ ICC(1) ≤ .18) (Glick, 1985). In addition, the F-tests for these values were all 
significant (1.49 ≤ F ≤ 1.64, p < .01), thus indicating that data aggregation was justified 
(Klein & Kozlowski, 2000).  
After aggregating the data, we performed a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to 
assess the convergent and discriminant validity of our team-level constructs: intrateam 
trust, team reflexivity, team monitoring, and team effort. The CFA yielded a significant 
chi-square (2 = 229.90, df = 164, p = 0.005) and an acceptable fit to the data (CFI = .97; 
RMSEA = .070; SRMR = .06) (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Furthermore, the results indicate 
that an alternative one-factor model, a two-factor model (in which the three team 
processes constitutes a single latent variable and trust represents another latent variable), 
and a three-factor model (in which team reflexivity and monitoring constitutes a single 
latent variable, and trust and effort represent the two other latent variables) do not provide 
a better fit to the data. To assess the reliability of each measurement scale, team-level 
Cronbach’s alphas were calculated. As shown in Table 2.1, the alpha coefficients for all 
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scales exceeded the .80 lower bound for reliable measures in applied research (.86 ≤  ≤ 
.92) (Nunnally, 1978). 
 
RESULTS 
 
OLS regression analyses were used to test our hypotheses. The mediating role of 
the three team processes was analyzed using procedures for testing multiple mediation 
outlined by MacKinnon (2000). As straightforward extension of Baron and Kenny’s 
(1986) ‘causal step approach’, this procedure involved estimating three separate 
regression equations. Since mediation presumes that there is a direct effect to be 
mediated, the first step in of the analysis involved regressing team performance on trust 
and the control variables. The results presented in Table 2.2 (Model 2) show that trust is 
significantly positively related to team performance ( = .27, p < .01), thus providing 
support for the direct effect of trust on performance.  
As our mediation hypotheses imply that trust is related to each of the three team 
processes, the first part of the second step in the mediation analysis involved regressing 
each of the team processes and the control variables on trust. The results in Table 2.2 
indicate that trust has a significant positive relationship with reflexivity ( = .54, p < 
.001), monitoring ( = .52, p < .001), and effort (= .58, p < .001), thus offering support 
for the main effects of trust on the team processes.  
In addition, our mediation hypotheses presume a positive relation between team 
reflexivity, team monitoring and team effort on the one hand and team performance on 
the other hand. The second part of the second step of the mediation analysis, therefore, 
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involved regressing team performance on all the team processes. Rather than performing 
a separate regression analysis for each team process, the team processes were 
simultaneously entered in a single regression analysis to correct for any multicollinearity 
among these variables. The results reported in Table 2.2 (Model 3) confirm two of the 
three presumed relationships. The results indicate that team monitoring has a significant 
positive relationship to team performance ( = .36, p < .001). The results also show that 
team effort is positively related to team performance ( = .25, p < .05). The positive 
relationship between reflexivity and team performance, however, is not supported. 
Although correlations suggest that team reflexivity is positively associated with team 
performance (r = .36, p < .01), the regression analysis shows that this relationship is, in 
fact, non-significant when controlling for team effort, team monitoring and the control 
variables ( = .11, ns).  
In the final step of the mediation analysis, team performance was regressed on 
trust, all the team processes and the control variables. As predicted, the results (Model 4)  
indicate that the significant relationship we found between trust and team performance 
becomes non-significant when the team processes are entered into the equation ( = .12, 
ns). At the same time, the effect of team monitoring ( = .29, p < .01) and team effort ( = 
.21, p < .05) on team performance remained significant. Complementing the ‘causal step 
approach’, we conducted a Sobel test to determine the significance of the mediated effect 
of trust on team performance via team processes. Since small samples rarely meet the 
distributional assumptions underlying the Sobel test, we used bootstrapping to generate a 
distribution based on the data. Following procedures outlined by Preacher and Hayes 
(2004), our results confirm the mediating effect of monitoring (z = 2.32, p < .01) and of  
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effort (z = 2.28, p < .01), but not of reflexivity (z = 1.81, ns). Together, these results 
suggest that the relationship between trust and team performance is mediated by team 
monitoring and team effort, which supports Hypotheses 2 and 3. The proposed mediating 
effect of reflexivity (Hypothesis 1) is, however, not supported. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Contributions and Implications for the Trust Literature 
Our research contributes to literature on trust in several ways. First of all, our 
study shows that studying multiple mediating mechanisms provides a more nuanced 
understanding of how trust affects team performance than when these are studied one at a 
time. Our study provides evidence that trust can and does affect team performance in 
different and distinct ways, via team monitoring and team effort. These results imply not 
only that there are multiple correct answers to the question of how trust affects 
performance, but also that each of these answers by itself is incomplete. It also suggests 
that if trust scholars want to advance understanding of the trust-performance relationship, 
they need to be more specific about the processes that mediate the effects of trust, rather 
than relying on overly broad constructs like ‘cooperation’ or ‘teamwork’ (e.g. Jones & 
George, 1998).  
Our study points out the risk of overstating the mediating effects of any single 
team process, when other team processes relevant to understanding the trust-performance 
relationship are left out of the equation. For instance, while studies adopting a single 
mediator approach have demonstrated a mediating role of team reflexivity (e.g. 
52 
 
Schippers, 2003), our results suggest that such studies may have overstated the role of 
team reflexivity as a mediating mechanism. While reflexivity correlated positively with 
trust as well as team performance, the results of our analyses did not point toward a 
mediating role of reflexivity when the other mediating effects were taken into account. 
This finding shows that considering a broad variety of processes not only helps to better 
understand the different ways in which trust does affect performance, but also the ways in 
which it does not (Mathieu, DeShon et al., 2008).  
Secondly, we advance knowledge on trust by examining how it operates within 
the context of ongoing teams, proposing that the way trust operates in these teams is 
different from the way it operates in short-term teams. Our results provide  initial support 
for this conjecture. For instance, in contrast to the negative effects of trust on monitoring 
found in Langfred’s (2004) study of short-term teams, we found a positive effect of trust 
on monitoring in our study of ongoing teams. Our results support the argument that the 
trust that develops within ongoing teams is likely to encourage a form of monitoring that 
enables team members to help out others in need (McAllister, 1995). This implies that 
thinking about monitoring as a control mechanism, as suggested in Langfred’s study, may 
not reflect the way monitoring is used by members of ongoing teams. Trust scholars thus 
need to broaden their view of the trust-monitoring relationship by considering the form of 
monitoring and the trust that develops within the teams studied.  
Furthermore, while Dirks (1999), in his study of short-term teams, found no 
evidence that trust directly motivated effort, our study shows that in ongoing teams, trust 
does have a direct impact on effort. Our theory suggests that since cooperative norms and 
affective interpersonal bonds are typically better developed in ongoing teams (Saunders 
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& Ahuja, 2006), normative and affective considerations are likely to be more salient 
ongoing teams than in short-term teams and thus more likely to be affected by trust and 
more likely to motivate effort. This line of reasoning sheds light on why the effects of 
trust on effort may be more pronounced in ongoing teams than they are in short-term 
teams. 
Finally, our results corroborate prior studies of ongoing teams that found a 
significant positive main effect of trust on team performance (e.g. Costa, 2003; Rispens et 
al., 2007; Spreitzer et al., 1999) and contrasts prior studies of short-term teams that tend 
to report a negligible effect or conditional effect (e.g. Aubert & Kelsey, 2003; Dirks, 
1999; Jarvenpaa et al., 2004). Our study seems to suggest along with other studies that 
the effects of trust on team performance may be more pronounced in ongoing teams than 
they are in short-term teams. The implication of this is that trust scholars who fail to 
appreciate the temporal nature of the teams they are studying run the risk of committing a 
Type I or Type II temporal error, that is, applying findings from short-term teams that 
may not hold for ongoing teams or vice versa (Saunders & Ahuja, 2006). We therefore 
encourage researchers to abandon the aim of achieving one universal model of intrateam 
trust in favor of developing models tailored to these particular types of teams. 
 
Contributions and Implications for the Team Effectiveness Literature 
First, our research contributes to the team effectiveness literature by highlighting 
the importance of trust, an often-neglected variable in this area of research (Kiffin-
Petersen, 2004). While many team studies focus on work design, team composition and 
team context variables as predictors of team processes and performance (Mathieu, 
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Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson, 2008), our findings suggest that team researchers should 
consider emergent states, like trust, when studying team effectiveness in general and 
ongoing teams in particular. Our study suggests that trust can be positioned within the 
input-process-output framework as an input variable that is converted into team 
performance outcomes via team-level processes. 
Second, we contribute to the validity of Marks et al.’s (2001) framework. The 
discriminant validity of the team processes we chose to represent Marks et al.’s team 
process categories and their distinct mediating effects within the trust-team performance 
relation point out the usefulness of Marks et al.’s distinction among three team process 
categories: transition phase processes, action phase processes and interpersonal processes. 
In addition, the discriminant and predictive validity we found for trust on the one hand 
and team processes on the other hand lends support to Marks et al.’s distinction between 
team processes and emergent states and contributes to understanding the way emergent 
states and team processes are associated. Finally, our study confirms the worth of using 
Marks et al.’s framework as a starting point for selecting team processes. While we agree 
with Marks et al. that output variables should be considered when selecting team 
processes, we submit that in order to arrive at a meaningful set of team processes, 
scholars interested in how team processes convert team inputs to team outputs should 
take into account the input variables that relate to these various team processes as well.  
 
Implications for Management 
Our finding, that intrateam trust has a positive impact on team performance, 
implies that, in order to promote team performance, team supervisors need to actively 
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engage in managing interpersonal relationships and fostering trust among team members. 
This would involve monitoring the level of trust within the team, managing team 
members’ perceptions of threat when intrateam trust is low (Williams, 2007), and 
initiating trust-building activities where needed (Long & Sitkin, 2006). Our results seem 
to suggest that these managerial activities can serve as an effective means of improving 
performance, particularly within the context of ongoing teams. At the same time, our 
conjecture, that the effects of trust are more pronounced in ongoing teams than in short-
term teams, implies that investing time and energy in improving trust may not be as an 
effective means for improving the performance of short-term teams as it would for 
ongoing teams. Managers therefore need to take into account the temporal nature of their 
teams in making decisions about whether trust-building interventions are likely to be a 
worthwhile investment. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
We acknowledge several limitations in this study. While our multiple mediator 
approach implies a specific causal order among phenomena, the cross-sectional nature of 
our data  does not allow us to make causal inferences regarding chains of effects. Despite 
this limitation, the pattern of relationships we found in this study is consistent with the 
specific causal understanding presented in this paper, thus providing initial support for 
the mediated effects of trust on team performance. Nevertheless, it is important for future 
research to provide a more rigorous test of these mediated effects, for instance by 
adopting a cross-lagged panel design (e.g. Langfred, 2007) and/or testing this model 
using some form of structural equations analysis (e.g. Costa, 2003). 
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While our sample is relatively large for team research standards, it nevertheless 
provides modest statistical power to detect our hypothesized effects (Hoyle & Kenny, 
1999). In addition, the zero-order correlations between our measures of team reflexivity, 
team monitoring and team effort tended to be relatively high (see Table 2.1), which 
limited our ability to detect distinct mediating effects. These statistical issues may help to 
explain why we did not find a significant mediating effect for team reflexivity. However, 
the fact that we did find mediating effects for team monitoring and team effort, despite 
modest power and strong correlations, suggests that these mediating effects are relatively 
robust. As such, our study is an important step towards a better understanding of the 
relations between trust, team processes and team performance. 
We acknowledge that our study was limited in the number of team processes we 
examined as mediating mechanisms. We expressed this earlier as a limitation of prior 
research, but it may apply to our own study as well. However, we agree with Marks et al. 
(2001) that examining an exhaustive set of team processes is not a particularly 
worthwhile undertaking in and of itself. Rather, we think it may be more fruitful to focus 
on a parsimonious set of processes that provides a good balance between explanatory 
relevance and mutual distinctiveness. Our results suggest that we were relatively 
successful in our attempt: we established discriminant validity of our focal team 
processes and found that two of the three processes each explained a substantial part of 
the relationship between trust and team performance. With respect to our choice of team 
processes, we focussed on team processes that each represented one of Marks et al.’s 
distinct processes categories and that we believed would complement one another in 
helping to explain the mediated effects of trust. Consistent with Marks et al.’s 
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recommendations, we suggest that a next logical step in advancing understanding of the 
trust-performance relationship is to adopt a more narrow focus on different team 
processes within the same team process category.  
Finally, as our study focussed exclusively trust within ongoing teams, we were 
unable to directly test our conjecture that the way in which trust operates in ongoing 
teams is distinct from the way it operates in short-term teams. Nevertheless, the results 
we found in this study are consistent with the pattern of findings across a larger body of 
studies, that jointly seem to suggest that the effects of trust within ongoing teams are 
distinct from those in short-term teams. We acknowledge a more direct test of our 
conjecture as an important step for future research. Comparative research designs, 
sampling teams that are more heterogeneous in longevity, and using longitudinal data 
from the same team sample seem useful ways to address this matter more directly. 
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, this paper advances our theoretical and empirical understanding of 
how trust affects team performance within ongoing teams. The results presented here 
highlight the importance of team processes as materializations of trust and as mechanisms 
that transmit the effects of trust to team performance. This paper illustrates that trust 
affects performance in a variety of ways and that some of the ways in which trust is 
believed to affect performance may have been overstated in prior research. Furthermore, 
our results suggest the need for more context-specific theories of intrateam trust by 
corroborating prior research findings that together suggest that the way trust operates 
within ongoing teams is different from what we know from studies of short-term teams. 
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We hope that this paper will encourage others to take a closer look at how intrateam trust 
affects team performance.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
When and How Does Peer Control Affect Team Performance? A 
Study of Peer Pressure and Norm Consensus in Self-Managing 
Teams  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper has been invited for a revise-and-resubmit at an A-Journal. An earlier, 
abbreviated version of this paper appeared as: De Jong, B. A., & Bijlsma-Frankema, K. 
M. (2009). When and How Does Norm-Based Peer Control Affect the Performance of 
Self-Managing Teams? A Model of Peer Pressure, Norm Consensus, Effort and Trust. 
Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we present and test a model of when (i.e. under which conditions) and how 
(i.e. through which processes) peer control affects team performance. We focus on peer 
pressure and norm consensus, two critical peer control mechanisms that can vary in their 
level of intensity. We propose that norm consensus acts as a moderator that enhances and 
(in its absence) limits the effects of peer pressure on two processes – effort and trust – 
that in turn are expected to mediate the relationship between peer pressure, norm 
consensus and team performance. A study of 45 self-managing health care teams largely 
supported our model, although the actual pattern of mediation was more complex than we 
anticipated.  
 
 
Keywords: control; norms; effort; trust; team performance; self-managing teams  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Organizational control – broadly defined as any process by which managers and 
workers direct attention, motivate, and encourage others to act in ways desirable for 
achieving organizational objectives (Cardinal, 2001) – has been widely recognized as 
critical to the performance of organizational units (Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990; 
Henderson & Lee, 1992; Tannenbaum, 1962). Among the different types of control 
identified in the literature, peer control has been advocated as an effective means of 
regulating behavior and performance in settings where clearly specified standards are 
lacking and adherence to these standards is difficult to determine (Ouchi, 1980). Peer 
control refers to a form of lateral control that is exercised by members who have no 
formal authority over one another (Loughry, in press). This form of control is often 
introduced by management through the implementation of self-managing teams (SMTs) 
(Barker, 1993), a work arrangement in which team members assume many of the 
responsibilities reserved for managers, including the responsibility for regulating team 
member behavior and performance (Polley & Van Dyne, 1993). With the growing use of 
teams and self-management in contemporary organizations, peer control is becoming an 
increasing relevant topic for both managers and scholars.  
Surprisingly, the broad recognition of the pervasiveness of peer control and its 
relevance for the functioning of teams is only matched by the lack of systematic scholarly 
attention for this topic. With a few exceptions (e.g. Barker, 1993), organizational control 
scholars have neither treated peer control as a core variable in their studies nor focused on 
the way it operates within teams, thereby inhibiting the development of a coherent and 
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cumulative body of research on this topic (Leifer & Mills, 1996; Loughry & Tosi, 2008). 
With this paper, we aim to advance understanding of the way peer control operates in 
teams by presenting and testing a model that specifies what peer control is and when (i.e. 
under which conditions) and how (i.e. through which processes) it affects team 
performance. In doing so, we will primarily focus on SMTs, where the effects of peer 
control are likely to be particularly pronounced (Fitch & Ravlin, 2004).   
Our contribution to the organizational control literature is three-fold. First, we 
clarify what peer control is by identifying and describing its underlying components. 
Drawing on past research in this area (e.g. Argote, 1989; Barker, 1993), we focus on peer 
pressure and norm consensus, two critical mechanisms of peer control that can vary in 
their level of intensity. Peer pressure is defined as the extent to which team members 
attempt to direct the behavior of fellow teammates by openly expressing their disapproval 
of behavior they consider inappropriate, whereas norm consensus is defined as the extent 
to which team members collectively agree with organizationally-defined norms. In 
focusing on these two mechanisms, we move beyond the dominant conceptualization of 
peer control (e.g. Das & Teng, 2001; Kirsch, 1996; Ouchi, 1979), which has focused 
exclusively on norms as a mechanism of control and which implicitly assumes that these 
norms are shared by all teams.  
Second, we contribute to understanding when peer control helps and when it hurts 
teams. Consistent with scholarly recognition that controls combine and interact to 
influence team member behavior (Jaworski, 1988), we examine the role of norm 
consensus as a moderator that enhances and (in its absence) limits the effects of peer 
pressure on team processes and performance. Beyond the observation that peer control 
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can be both beneficial and detrimental to teams, little is known so far about the factors 
that account for the differential effects of peer control (Loughry, in press). Our focus on 
norm consensus as a contingency factor allows us to reconcile the dominant view of peer 
control that emphasizes its benefits (e.g. Leifer & Mills, 1996; O'Reilly, 1989) with the 
growing scholarly recognition that these benefits have limits for teams (e.g. Barker, 1993; 
Loughry & Tosi, 2008).  
Third, we advance understanding of how peer control affects team performance 
by examining the role team effort and intrateam trust as mediating mechanisms that 
transmit the effects of peer pressure and norm consensus to performance. We focus on 
effort and trust because the literature suggests that these variables are particularly 
relevant for understanding how the effects of peer control come about (Jaworski, 1988; 
Piccoli & Ives, 2003; Sitkin & Roth, 1993). By examining the mediating role of these 
processes, we contribute to a more substantive interpretation of how peer control affects 
team performance, as called for by Loughry (in press). The three contributions discussed 
above can be summarized in a conceptual model of the way peer control operates in 
teams (depicted in Figure 3.1), which we test on data from 45 self-managing health care 
teams.  
FIGURE 3.1  
Conceptual Model 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Peer Control as the Combination of Norm Consensus and Peer Pressure 
Although scholars have used a variety of terms to denote the concept,5 they 
commonly agree that peer control is a form of lateral control that is exercised by 
members who have no formal authority over one another (Loughry, in press). Much of 
the control literature have focused on norms as critical mechanisms of control in team 
settings. Norms refer to standards of appropriate behavior that prescribe how members of 
a team ought to behave (Argote, 1989). Interestingly, many norms that teams use to guide 
their actions do not originate from the teams themselves (Goodman, Ravlin, & 
Schmincke, 1987). Instead, management often plays a major role in setting norms for 
their teams in order to align team member behavior with the goals of the organization 
(Feldman, 1984), particularly in organizations where SMTs are being implemented and 
peer control is management-induced (Barker, 1996). In these settings, management has 
been known to actively engage in ‘explicit norm structuring’ (Spich & Keleman, 1985), 
whereby norms are introduced through written statements that express the central values 
of the organization.  
Illustrating this point, Barker’s (1993) ethnographic study describes how the 
management of a small manufacturing company crafted a vision statement that articulated 
a set of core norms and goals, which all teams were to use to guide their daily actions. 
These norms prescribed how team members were expected to act for the team to be able 
to work together effectively, promoting commitment to the team, responsibility, and 
                                                 
5 Alternative terms used by scholars to refer to peer control are: ‘social control’, ‘informal control’, 
‘normative control’, ‘clan control’ and ‘concertive control’ (Das & Teng, 1998; Leifer & Mills, 1996). 
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quality of team member contributions. As this study illustrates, norms crafted by 
management naturally favor organizationally-defined goals and operate as ‘ambient 
stimuli’ (Hackman, 1992) to which all teams are exposed. 
While we do not discount the importance of norms for the effective exercise of 
peer control, we contend that the scholarly emphasis on shared norms unnecessarily 
restricts our understanding of peer control. Ever since Ouchi (1979) asserted that peer 
control (or ‘clan control’ as he called it) relies upon “a deep level of common agreement 
between members on what constitutes proper behavior” (p. 838), organizational control 
scholars (e.g. Das & Teng, 2001; Kirsch, 1996) have tended to equate peer control with 
norms, as if these were the only mechanism through which peer control manifests itself, 
and have tended to assume that norms are always shared within and between teams, as if 
consensus with norms were a constant. This view of peer control is unnecessarily 
restrictive for two reasons. First, research has shown that agreement with norms can vary 
substantially within and between teams (Argote, 1989). Second, it has long been 
recognized that groups and teams often employ more deliberate enforcement strategies in 
addition to shared norms in their attempt to regulate group member behavior (Feldman, 
1984; Hackman, 1992; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). For these reasons, we propose a less 
restrictive conceptualization that treats norm consensus as a variable and that recognizes 
peer pressure as an additional mechanism of peer control. 
The fact that management introduces norms for their teams does not necessarily 
mean that all teams will agree with these norms (O'Reilly, 1989). Therefore, the first peer 
control mechanism we focus on in this study is norm consensus, which we define as the 
66 
 
extent to which team members collectively agree with organizationally-defined norms.6 
This definition suggests that while the content of the norms does not vary across teams – 
as it originates from the organization’s management – the degree to which there is 
agreement with these norms does vary across teams. Norm consensus is thus 
conceptualized as a team-level variable that can range from high to low. Whereas high 
consensus describes a situation where all team members have identical perceptions about 
the importance of organizationally-defined norms, low consensus describes a situation 
where half of the team members perceive the organization’s norms to be very 
unimportant and half of the team members perceive these norms to be very important (see 
Harrison & Klein, 2007). Argote’s (1989) study of norms in hospital teams clearly 
illustrates not only that levels of consensus can vary considerably across teams, but also 
that this variation has important implications for the performance of these teams. 
The second peer control mechanism we focus on is peer pressure, defined as the 
extent to which team members attempt to direct the behavior of their teammates by 
openly expressing their disapproval of behavior they consider inappropriate (Druskat & 
Kayes, 2000). Among the different enforcement strategies identified in the literature 
(Crisp, 2003; Loughry & Tosi, 2008; Wittek, 1999), peer pressure is one of the most 
prevalent enforcement strategies used within the context of SMTs (Barker, 1993; , 1999). 
Peer pressure is a team effort: although peer pressure is enacted through individual team 
                                                 
6 Other terms used by scholars to refer to this phenomenon are ‘norm distribution’ and ‘norm 
crystallization’ (Goodman, Ravlin, & Schmincke, 1987; Jackson, 1965). Interestingly, the notion that 
strong norm consensus cannot be assumed was already implicit in Ouchi’s (1980) work. He pointed out that 
his concept of ‘clan control’ should be viewed as an ideal type and that the high levels of norm consensus 
implied in this ideal type are only rarely obtained in real organizations and teams. Horwitz (1990) 
expressed this notion even more explicitly, stating that “the normative conception of social control does not 
require the existence of consensus regarding definitions of appropriate behavior. Depending on the 
situation, social norms are more or less deeply rooted and widely shared. […] I make no assumptions about 
the extent to which the norms that social control defends are consensual or conflictual but regard this as an 
empirical question” (p. 9-10). 
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members, these members act on behalf of their team and often collaborate in exercising 
pressure onto their fellow teammates (Barker, 1993; Hackman, 1992). Peer pressure can 
vary in intensity, ranging from subtle signalling of disapproval to openly communicating 
dissatisfaction with deviants in the presence of others (Barker, 1993; 1999). 
Research has shown that teams often rely on multiple control mechanisms to 
regulate team member behavior and that teams vary in the extent to which they employ 
certain control mechanisms (Crisp, 2003). The latter will be particularly true for SMTs, 
who enjoy high levels of discretion in deciding on the extent to which they will employ 
different control mechanisms (Polley & Van Dyne, 1993). It therefore seems reasonable 
to expect that SMTs will vary in the levels of peer pressure and norm consensus they 
employ. The realization that peer control can manifest itself through different levels of 
peer pressure and norm consensus is important, because it highlights the possibility that 
particular combinations may produce positive or negative synergies (Jaworski, 1988). 
Indeed, scholars commonly recognize that control systems, like peer control, consist of 
combinations of control mechanisms that interact and jointly exert influence on 
organizational members (Cardinal, Sitkin, & Long, in press; Jaworski, Stathakopoulos, & 
Krishnan, 1993; Kirsch, 1997). Consistent with this idea, we contend that peer pressure 
and norm consensus interact in directing attention and motivating team members to 
achieve organizationally-defined team goals. More specifically, we propose that norm 
consensus acts as a moderator that enhances and (in its absence) limits the effects of peer 
pressure on team processes and performance. Before theorizing about these interactive 
effects, we first introduce two important consequences of peer control: team effort and 
intrateam trust. 
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Team Effort and Intrateam Trust as Consequences of Peer Control  
In his seminal article, Jaworski (1988) identified two broad classes of 
consequences of control: its behavioral impact and its psychological impact on those 
subjected to control. Following this distinction between the behavioral and psychological 
impact of control, we focus on team effort and intrateam trust as two distinct 
consequences of peer control. Team effort is defined as the extent to which team 
members devote their resources (i.e. energy, attention, time) to executing team tasks (Yeo 
& Neal, 2004), whereas intrateam trust refers to the extent to which team members hold 
confident positive expectations about the actions of fellow teammates (De Jong & 
Elfring, in press). The literature suggests that these two variables in particular help to 
understand how the effects of peer control come about. Effort has been identified as an 
intended consequence of peer control. As explained by Leifer & Mills (1996), much of 
peer control exercised by teams is intentionally aimed at regulating the effort put forward 
by team members as a way to further team goal attainment. Besides intended 
consequences, trust has been recognized as an important unintended consequence of 
control in teams. Picolli and Ives’ (2003) study of virtual project teams, for instance, 
revealed a decrease in intrateam trust as an unintentional consequence of team control 
structures. Likewise, Barker’s (1999) study on self-managing manufacturing teams 
revealed that peer pressure, while aimed at enhancing team member effort, also came at 
the expense of the trust that team members had in one another. In sum, both the literature 
on the intended and unintended impact of control and the literature on the behavioral and 
psychological impact of control point toward the importance of effort and trust for 
understanding the consequences of peer control.   
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Although no study so far has systematically examined the interactive effect of 
peer pressure and norm consensus on team effort and intrateam trust, the literature does 
provide some indications to extrapolate from. First, there is some support for the 
proposition that control may either promote or hinder effort depending upon whether 
members consider effort as an appropriate response to the control they are subjected to. 
Loughry and Tosi’s (2008) recent study, for instance, demonstrated that the effects of 
peer monitoring – another mechanism of peer control – on team members’ cooperative 
effort varied substantially, ranging from positive to negative effects. In addition, 
Tenbrunsel and Messick’s (1999) findings suggest that the impact of sanctioning – an 
enforcement strategy – on team member cooperative effort could either be positive or 
negative, depending upon whether a normative decision frame is induced that makes team 
members feel that they ought to cooperate.  
More support for the differential and interactive effects of peer control comes 
from research on the relationship between peer monitoring and intrateam trust. Research 
findings in this area are inconsistent, ranging from a negative relationship (e.g. Costa, 
2003; Langfred, 2004) to a positive relationship (e.g. Bijlsma-Frankema, De Jong, & Van 
de Bunt, 2008), which is suggestive of differential effects. In light of these findings, 
Ferrin et al. (2007) recently proposed that the effects of monitoring on trust may be 
contingent upon whether there are norms in place that are conducive of monitoring. 
Based upon this literature, we submit that the effects of peer pressure on effort and trust 
may be dependent upon the level of norm consensus.  
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Peer Pressure and Effort: The Moderating Role of Norm Consensus  
Based on the literature on legitimacy of control (Dornbusch, Scott, & Busching, 
1975; Tyler & Blader, 2005), we propose that the effect of peer pressure on effort is 
contingent upon the level of norm consensus within the team. Literature on the legitimacy 
of control suggests that enforcement strategies, such as peer pressure, may not necessarily 
translate into higher levels of effort being exerted by those subjected to it. Rather, it 
suggests that the willingness of team members to accept peer pressure and exert effort on 
behalf of the team depends on whether they view the exercise of pressure by their 
teammates as legitimate. Legitimacy of peer pressure is a socially constructed 
interpretation which arises within a collective context. Barker (1993; 1999) argues that in 
SMTs, the primary source of legitimacy for the exercise of peer pressure lies with team 
members’ shared consensus about organizationally-defined norms and values. When 
team members recognize that peer pressure serves to enforce norms that are supported by 
management and that they themselves agree with as well, they are likely believe that their 
teammates have the right to confront them about not exerting sufficient effort and that 
they ought to comply with these requests for effort, because it represents the will of the 
team and the organization as a whole. By serving as a source of legitimacy, norm 
consensus enables team members to exercise peer control at will and increases the 
willingness of those subjected to it to submit to these pressures and increase their efforts. 
By contrast, when norm consensus is low, team member compliance to peer pressure will 
suffer because of a lack of legitimacy, resulting in lower levels of effort. In support, 
recent research has demonstrated the differential effects of peer control on team 
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members’ effort (Loughry & Tosi, 2008) and the relevance of legitimacy for regulating 
effort (Tyler & Blader, 2005). 
 
Hypothesis 1: Peer pressure and norm consensus interact such that the effect of 
peer pressure on team effort is stronger for higher levels of norm consensus than 
for lower levels of consensus. 
 
Peer Pressure and Trust: The Moderating Role of Norm Consensus  
Regarding the effect of peer pressure on trust, we also posit that norm consensus 
acts as a moderator, such that the negative effect of peer pressure on trust grows more 
positive with the level of norm consensus within a team. Attribution theory (Malhotra & 
Murnighan, 2002) and relational signaling theory (Wittek, 2003) provide useful 
frameworks for explaining the moderating role of norm consensus. These theories 
suggest that the effects of peer pressure on trust depends on whether team members 
subjected to peer pressure view these acts as conveying either positive or negative signals 
about the trust that exists in their relationship with fellow teammates. When norm 
consensus is low, the exercise of peer pressure by teammates is likely to lead to 
unfavorable attributions and interpretations by those subjected to it. Because low 
consensus is not very conducive for the exercise of peer pressure, team members are 
likely to infer that their teammates do not trust them to do a good job and do not wish to 
maintain trusting relationships. This lack of trust signaled by peer pressure tends to be 
naturally reciprocated by team members, thus resulting in lower levels of trust among 
team members (Bijlsma-Frankema, De Jong, & Van de Bunt, 2008; Ferrin, Bligh, & 
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Kohles, 2007). By contrast, when norm consensus is high, the likelihood of more 
favorable attributions and interpretations of peer pressure is increased. As high consensus 
supports the exercise of peer pressure, team members are more likely to view teammates 
who exercise peer pressure as wanting to maintain the solidarity that exists within the 
team (Barker, 1999; Wittek, 2003). Such an interpretation makes it easier for team 
members to trust their teammates.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Peer pressure and norm consensus interact such that the effect of 
peer pressure on intrateam trust is negative for lower levels of norm consensus 
and positive for higher levels of consensus. 
 
Peer Pressure, Norm Consensus and Team Performance: The Mediating Role of 
Effort 
Since peer control is commonly thought of as a means to direct team members’ 
effort towards the achievement of organizationally-defined team goals (Leifer & Mills, 
1996), team effort is likely to act as a mediator in the relationship between peer pressure, 
norm consensus and team performance. As we argued earlier, peer pressure enhances the 
level of effort within the team, particularly when norm consensus is high. High norm 
consensus serves as a source of legitimacy that enhances their willingness to comply with 
pressures by others to exert more effort. Here, we extend this argument by hypothesizing 
that effort acts as a mediator that transmits the effect of peer pressure and norm consensus 
to team performance.  
 73 
 
Increased levels of effort are likely to enhance team performance. The first reason 
for this is simply that working hard and persistently on team tasks increases the 
likelihood of high levels of output being produced by the team. Second, because team 
member who work hard can compensate for the poor performance of others, the team as a 
whole can be more effective (LePine & Van Dyne, 2001). Third, team members who see 
others working hard tend to set higher goals for themselves as well (Mulvey & Klein, 
1998). Consistent with these arguments, empirical studies have provided ample support 
for the team performance benefits of expending effort and the detrimental effects of 
withholding effort (e.g. Hoegl & Gemuenden, 2001; Liden, Wayne, Jaworski, & Bennett, 
2004). Together, the interactive effect of peer pressure and norm consensus on effort 
(Hypothesis 1) and the performance benefits of effort suggest that effort mediates the 
interactive effect of peer pressure and norm consensus on team performance.     
 
Hypothesis 3: Team effort mediates the interactive effect of peer pressure and 
norm consensus on team performance. 
 
Peer Pressure, Norm Consensus and Team Performance: The Mediating Role of 
Trust 
We previously argued that peer pressure would have a negative impact on trust, 
particularly when norm consensus is low. High norm consensus induces more favorable 
interpretations about the status of the relationship between team members and more 
favorable attributions about the intentions of team members to exercise peer pressure 
onto others, thereby reducing the potential negative effects of peer pressure on trust.  
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Here, we extend this argument by hypothesizing that trust acts as a mediator that 
transmits the effect of peer pressure and norm consensus to team performance.   
Intrateam trust is considered an essential precursor of team performance because 
of its positive impact on interpersonal relationships and interactions among team 
members (Jarvenpaa & Leidner, 1999; Joshi, Lazarova, & Liao, 2009). Trust suspends 
uncertainty about fellow team members’ actions, thereby allowing team members to 
interact with one another as if social uncertainty was favorably resolved (Jones & 
George, 1998). Team members who trust each other are therefore more likely to engage 
in productive interactions that contribute to their team’s performance – such as 
information sharing and helping behavior (Choi, 2006; Zand, 1972) – than those who do 
not. In fact, without a common foundation of trust, team members are more likely to 
avoid such interactions to protect themselves from perceived vulnerability to the actions 
of fellow teammates. In addition, a lack of trust prevents the transformation of a focus on 
personal interests to a focus on the goals and interests of the collective (Dirks, 1999), 
thereby further inhibiting team members’ motivation to contribute to the team. Consistent 
with this line of reasoning, many studies by now have provided evidence for the team 
performance benefits of intrateam trust (e.g. Costa, 2003; Joshi, Lazarova, & Liao, 2009; 
Spreitzer, Noble, Mishra, & Cooke, 1999). Together, the interactive effect peer pressure 
and norm consensus on trust (Hypothesis 2) and the performance benefits of trust suggest 
that trust mediates the interactive effect of peer pressure and norm consensus on team 
performance.     
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Hypothesis 4: Intrateam trust mediates the interactive effect of peer pressure and 
norm consensus on team performance. 
 
METHODS 
 
Research Setting, Procedure and Sample 
The research setting for our empirical study was a Dutch health care organization 
for people with mental disabilities, consisting of 55 nursing homes which are 
geographically dispersed across 5 regions in The Netherlands. Each of these nursing 
homes was operated by a team of health care workers. The management of the 
organization played a major role in introducing peer control among its employees. First, 
eight years ago they initiated a transformation from a more traditional bureaucratic work 
structure to work organized around SMTs, thereby effectively shifting the responsibility 
of control to the teams themselves (cf. Barker, 1993). In addition, the CEO of the 
organization wrote a book (Bax, den Hollander, & van Limpt, 2006), in which detailed 
the core values of the new organization and which all employees received.  
Despite the various forms of support made available by the organization – for 
instance, a region manager who helped the teams develop the skills needed to self-
manage their work – the teams were now responsible for operating their health care 
home. Being a SMT meant that team members were not only collectively responsible for 
the primary task of providing care to the residents, but also that they were responsible for 
managing their own work processes – which involved monitoring team members’ 
progress, managing resources, addressing performance problems and regulating team 
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member behavior. Even though one member of each team acted as a ‘team coordinator’, 
this member had no formal authority over the other members. Moreover, all roles within 
the team, including that of team coordinator, were deliberately rotated on a regular basis 
to avoid the emergence of informal leaders. At the time of data collection, the 
organization employed 605 health care workers who worked together in 55 teams. 
Questionnaire data were collected using a web survey. Following Dillman (2000), 
we sent out an e-mail inviting all teams to participate in the study and ensuring them 
confidentiality of their responses. The e-mail also included a link to access the web 
survey. Several steps were undertaken to maximize response rates, such as publishing an 
advance notice in the organization’s newsletter and sending two rounds of reminder e-
mails. In addition, at the beginning of the data collection, an e-mail was sent by the 
organization’s CEO, encouraging team members to participate and stressing the 
importance of the research for the organization. To avoid potential carryover response 
bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), the team member questionnaire 
items were sequenced in such a way that the response anchors differed across the 
measured constructs. In addition, data on different variables were collected from different 
sources to avoid common rater effects. Whereas data on peer pressure, norm consensus, 
trust and effort were obtained from team members, team performance ratings were 
collected from the team’s region manager.  
Consistent with other SMT research (e.g. Langfred, 2004; 2007), we used an 
intrateam response rate of 50% or higher and as a criterion for including teams in our 
analyses. In addition, one team was discarded from the analysis because of a lack of data 
on peer pressure. Applying this selection criteria resulted in a final sample of 45 teams, 
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consisting of 535 team members and 5 region managers. The average respondent in this 
sample was 37.9 years of age and had worked at the firm for 7.7 years and within his/her 
team for 3.9 years. The average health care team consisted of 12 to 13 team members, 
18% of the respondents were male. 
 
Measures 
Peer pressure. Given the lack of a well-validated, pre-existing measure for peer 
pressure, a new measure was developed for this study. To ensure consistency with related 
research, however, we examined Druskat and Kayes’ (2000) measure for ‘confronting 
team members who break norms’ and Welbourne et al.’s (1995) measure for ‘mutual 
monitoring’ (subscale: ‘acting on other’s behavior’) prior to developing our measure for 
peer pressure. Sample items of our four-item peer pressure scale are “If a team member 
behaves in a way we consider unprofessional, we confront him/her directly” and “We 
openly express our dissatisfaction with team members who behave inappropriately”. 
Respondents indicated their agreement with these items on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1 
= strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). The team-level Cronbach’s alpha was .88.  
Norm consensus. A new measure was developed for norm consensus as well. Our 
primary source in developing items was the book published by the CEO of the 
organization (Bax, den Hollander, & van Limpt, 2006). In addition, we conducted 
interviews with several region managers and team members to get a sense of whether 
they were aware of these norms and whether these were salient. Finally, to ensure 
consistency with the peer control literature, we revisited Barker’s (1993; 1999) seminal 
work and compared the norms described in his ethnographic study of SMTs at ISE with 
78 
 
those found in our research setting. Based on these different data sources, we derived 
eight standards of productive work behavior: taking responsibility for team work, being 
prepared to work overtime, helping other team members in need, active participation in 
group meetings, demonstrating commitment to the team, doing one's fair share of the 
work, putting clients' needs first and striving for excellence.  
As norms reflect the degree of importance placed on certain behaviors (Chatman 
& Flynn, 2001), we asked respondents to indicate on a 5-point scale how important they 
felt each of the work behaviors was for the functioning of their team (1 = very 
unimportant; 5 = very important). Team-level scores for norm consensus were obtained 
by calculating the mean over item standard deviations (cf. Klein, Conn, Smith, & Sorra, 
2001) and then multiplying this score by -1, so that higher scores indicate higher rather 
than lower levels of norm consensus. Both Harrison and Klein (2007) and Roberson et al. 
(2007) recommend the standard deviation as an appropriate index for 
separation/dispersion-type constructs like norm consensus.  
Team effort. The five items used to measure team effort were based on George 
(1992) and Mulvey and Klein (1998). The items referred to the intensity and persistence 
of team members’ efforts to realize team objectives (e.g. “To what extent do members of 
your team work as hard as they can to achieve the team's objectives?”, “To what extent 
do your team members try their best to realize team goals, even when experiencing 
setbacks?”) and were rated on a 5-point scale (1 = to a very small extent; 5 = to a very 
large extent). Cronbach’s alpha was .93. 
Intrateam trust. To measure intrateam trust, we used four items based on pre-
existing measures of trust in peers and team members (Cook & Wall, 1980; Costa, 2003). 
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Items include “I am able to count on my team members for help if I have difficulties with 
my job” and “I am confident that my team members will take my interests into account 
when making work-related decisions”. Respondents indicated their agreement with these 
items on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). Cronbach’s alpha was 
.92. 
Team performance. Because the organization was unable to provide us with 
performance measures that were comparable across teams, we relied on team 
performance ratings by region managers. Given that one of the mains goals of these 
teams was to provide high-quality health care to their residents, our measure of team 
performance consisted of three items: one referring to the quality of care provided by the 
team, one referring to the quantity of care, and one overall assessment of the extent to 
which the team was able to meet their residents’ demands. We asked region managers to 
indicate on a 6-point scale how well their teams performed on these criteria (1 = poor; 6 = 
very well). The Cronbach’s alpha was .94. 
Control variables. As recommended by Harrison and Klein (2007), we included 
the team’s mean score on the norm consensus items as a control variable in our analyses. 
Consistent with Jackson’s (1965) work on norms, we label this variable ‘norm intensity’. 
Norm intensity and norm consensus are likely to be correlated for both substantial and 
statistical reasons. Therefore, including norm intensity in our analyses allows us to more 
accurately determine the effects of norm consensus above and beyond those attributed to 
norm intensity. To control for common rater effects (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & 
Podsakoff, 2003) which may result from asking region managers to rate the performance 
of all the teams within their region, we included four dummy-coded region variables in 
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our hypothesis tests. Finally, based on prior research, we initially explored individual 
autonomy, task interdependence, and team size and team tenure as control variables. 
However, as none of the latter variables had a significant effect on our results, we 
excluded these control variables from our subsequent analyses to conserve statistical 
power.  
 
Aggregation and Measurement Analysis 
To assess whether data aggregation was justified, we calculated interrater 
agreements for peer pressure, team effort and intrateam trust, using James et al.’s (1984) 
formula. The mean rWG(j) values for these constructs all exceeded the generally accepted 
.70 cut-off point for substantial interrater agreement (.86 ≤ rWG(j) ≤ .98). Complementing 
these statistics, group-size corrected intraclass correlation coefficients were estimated, 
using Bliese and Halverson’s (1998) formula. This procedure yielded acceptable 
intraclass correlations (.70 ≤ ICC(2) ≤ .79, .23 ≤ ICC(1) ≤ .31) and significant F-tests 
(3.41 ≤ F ≤ 4.69, p < .001), thus confirming the appropriateness of aggregating 
individual-level data to the team level (Bliese, 2000).7 
After aggregating the data, we assessed the convergent and discriminant validity 
of our measures by performing a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The measurement 
model included four latent variables – peer pressure, norm consensus (raw scores), team 
effort and intrateam trust. The CFA yielded a significant chi-square (2 = 199.20, df = 
164, p = 0.000) and an acceptable fit to the data (CFI = .94; RMSEA = .070; SRMR = 
.08), with no alternative one-factor, two-factor and three-factor models providing a better 
                                                 
7 As these statistics are not meaningful for separation/dispersion-type constructs (Bliese, 2000), data on 
norm consensus were aggregated (by taking the standard deviation) without the need for any such statistical 
justification. 
 81 
 
fit (see Table 3.1). The reliability of our multi-item measures was assessed through 
Cronbach’s alpha. As reported in Table 3.2, the team-level alpha coefficients for all 
measurements exceeded the .80 lower bound for reliable measures in applied research 
(.83 ≤  ≤ .94) (Nunnally, 1978). The measurement scales are reported in Appendix B. 
 
TABLE 3.1 
Results of Confirmatory Factor Analyses for Measurement Model 
Models  2 df CFI RMSEA SRMR
4-factor model 199.20 ** 164 0.94 0.070 0.08
3-factor model 323.63 *** 167 0.88 0.146 0.14
2-factor model 407.34 *** 169 0.81 0.179 0.19
1-factor model 498.46 *** 170 0.79 0.210 0.16
a N = 45 teams. 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; one-tailed.
CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation; SRMR = Standardized 
Root Mean Residual
Results for Peer Pressure, Norms, Effort and Trusta
  
 
RESULTS 
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2: Conditional Direct Effects 
OLS regression was used to test our hypotheses. We mean-centered the 
independent variables prior to creating the cross-product terms to reduce non-essential 
multicollinearity (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). The variance inflation factors 
for all variables fell below 6, indicating that multicollinearity was not a major concern. 
To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we first regressed the control variables on the dependent 
variable, then entered the lower-order terms and finally the cross-product term into the 
model. 
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Hypothesis 1 posited that the effect of peer pressure on team effort would be 
stronger for higher levels of norm consensus than for lower levels of consensus. To 
support this type of interaction, the results need to show a positive coefficient for both 
lower-order terms and a positive and significant coefficient for the cross-product term 
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Consistent with this specification, the results of 
our analyses (see Table 3.3, Model 3) show a positive effect for both peer pressure and 
norm consensus and a significant positive interaction between peer pressure and norm 
consensus ( = .33, p < .05). The results also indicated a significant increase in explained 
variance  the above and beyond the control variables and lower-order terms that were 
included in the model (R2 = .08, p < .05). Graphing these results confirms that teams 
with high peer pressure and high consensus display more effort than teams with low peer 
pressure and low consensus (see Figure 3.2a). Complementing this visualization 
technique, we used a tool by Preacher, Curran and Bauer (2006) to determine the exact 
critical values of the moderator at which the effect of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable becomes significantly positive or negative: the so-called ‘regions of 
significance’. The actual range of norm consensus scores in our sample (centered scores 
ranged between .32 and -.32) only exceeded the upper but not the lower critical value 
(respectively -.01 and -.82), suggesting the presence of only significant positive effects (p 
< .05) and no significant negative effects of peer pressure on team effort in our data. 
Together, these results provide support for Hypothesis 1.  
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the effect of peer pressure on intrateam trust would be 
negative for lower levels of norm consensus and positive for higher levels of consensus. 
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To support this type of interaction, the results need to show negative coefficients for the 
lower-order terms and a positive significant coefficient for the interaction term (Cohen, 
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Our results, reported in Table 3.3 (Model 3), indicate a 
negative coefficient for both peer pressure and norm consensus and significant positive 
interaction effect between peer pressure and norm consensus (= .40, p < .01). The 
results also show a significant increase in explained variance after the interaction term 
was entered into the model (R2 = .10, p < .01). The interaction plot follows the pattern 
of effects proposed in Hypothesis 2. As shown in Figure 3.2b, teams with low peer 
pressure and low consensus display lower levels of trust than teams with high peer 
pressure and high consensus. Analysis of regions of significance further confirm the 
presence of both significant positive and negative effects of peer pressure on intrateam 
trust: the lowest (centered) norm consensus score of -.32 in our sample exceeds the 
critical lower value of -.02, while the highest norm consensus score of .32 exceeds the 
critical upper value of .25 (p < .05). These results confirm Hypothesis 2.   
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4: Conditional Indirect Effects 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 stated that team effort respectively intrateam trust would mediate the 
conditional effect of peer pressure (as moderated by norm consensus) on team performance. To 
test these conditional indirect effects, we first used statistical procedures outlined by Muller, Judd 
and Yzerbyt (2005). This approach involved estimating a series of separate regression equations. 
The first step in the analysis involved regressing team performance on the cross-product term 
between peer pressure and norm consensus. The results in Table 3.4 (Model 3) show a significant 
positive interaction effect between peer pressure and norm consensus on team performance ( =
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FIGURE 3.2  
Interaction Plots 
 
(3.2a) Peer Pressure by Norm Consensus on Effort 
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.35, p < .05) and an increase in explained variance (R2 = .08, p < .05) above and beyond 
the control variables and lower-order terms that were entered into the model. The second 
step, which involved regressing team effort and intrateam trust on the cross-product term 
between peer pressure control and norm consensus, was already confirmed in our test of 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 (see above). The third step involved regressing team performance on 
the cross-product term between peer pressure and norm consensus first and then adding 
both effort and trust simultaneously into the model. The results in Table 3.4 (Model 4) 
show that the effect of peer pressure and norm consensus on team performance becomes 
non-significant ( = .10, ns) after entering effort and trust into the model. At the same 
time, the direct effect of team effort on performance remains significant ( = .49, p < 
.01). These findings indicate support for the mediating role of team effort (Muller, Judd, 
& Yzerbyt, 2005), as proposed in Hypothesis 3.  
To test the significance of the conditional indirect effect more directly, we relied 
on Preacher, Rucker and Hayes (2007) statistical routine, which estimates the indirect 
effect of peer pressure on team performance through each of the mediators at different 
levels of norm consensus. These estimations produce z-statistics for the indirect effects, 
along with their respective level of significance. For Hypothesis 3, the pattern of results 
show that the conditional indirect effect is lowest for low-consensus teams (z = -.37, p = 
.71) and grows stronger as consensus increases to moderate consensus (z = 2.01, p = .04) 
and further on to high consensus (z = 2.59, p = .01),8 thus indicating that the direct effect 
of peer pressure on performance is indeed moderated by the level of consensus and 
mediated by effort.
                                                 
8 The moderator values for ‘moderate’, ‘high’ and ‘low’ are the sample mean +/- 1 standard deviation. 
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TABLE 3.4 
The Conditional Indirect Effects of Peer Pressure on Team Performancea 
-0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.00
0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.04
-0.21 -0.18 -0.19 -0.02
0.08 0.11 0.05 0.18
0.35 * 0.43 * 0.56 ** 0.02
0.18 0.10 -0.16
0.19 0.12 -0.01
0.35 * 0.10
0.49 **
0.28
0.08 0.11 0.19 0.40
0.03 0.08 * 0.21 **
1.72 1.77 2.29 * 3.96 **
a Standardized regression coefficients.
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, all two-tailed.
Dummy region 1
Independent variables
Dummy region 3
Dummy region 2
Model 4Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
F
Intrateam trust
Norm intensity
Dummy region 4
Norm consensus (N)
 R 2
Peer pressure (P)
Adjusted R 2
P*N
Team effort
 
 
Results for Hypothesis 4 were mixed. Although earlier analysis did not support 
the conditional indirect effect through trust (Table 3.4, Model 4:  = .28, ns), the pattern 
of results from these additional analyses do support the hypothesis, indicating that the 
conditional indirect effect is lowest for low-consensus teams (z = -.12, p = .91) and grows 
stronger as consensus increases to moderate consensus (z = 2.03, p = .04) and further on 
to high consensus (z = 2.26, p = .02).  
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DISCUSSION 
 
Supplementary Analyses 
The results from our regression analyses did not support the mediating role of 
intrateam trust (Hypothesis 4) because of a non-significant relationship between trust and 
team performance. This is rather surprising in light of prior evidence for a significant 
positive relationship (e.g. Costa, 2003; Joshi, Lazarova, & Liao, 2009). While we so far 
both theoretically and statistically assumed distinct mediator roles for trust and effort,9 De 
Jong and Elfring (in press) found a mediating role of team effort between intrateam trust 
and team performance, which suggests that the mediator role of trust in our model may in 
fact be played out through effort. Given that we found a significant effect of effort on 
team performance and no significant effect for trust when controlling for effort, this more 
complex pattern of mediation seems plausible.  
To test this post-hoc hypothesis, we slightly altered the sequence of OLS 
regression estimations we initially used to test Hypotheses 3 and 4. Specifically, we 
entered trust first to test its mediating effect and then added effort to the equation. As 
shown in Table 3.5, the results of this analyses suggest that intrateam trust does have a 
strong significant effect on team performance (Model 4:  = .56, p < .01) and accounts 
for the effect of peer pressure and norm consensus. In addition, the initial effect of trust 
becomes non-significant when effort is entered into the equation (Model 5:  = .28, ns), 
while the effect of effort itself remains significant (Model 5:  = .49, p < .01), thus 
supporting the mediator role of effort between trust and team performance.  
                                                 
9 We were unable to test Hypothesis 3 and 4 simultaneously as Preacher et al.’s (2007) statistical routine 
does not allow for testing conditional indirect effect models that involve more than one mediator. 
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Another mediator role implied in our revised model is that of trust in the relationship between 
peer pressure, norm consensus and effort. In support of this idea, the results of the analyses 
show that the significant conditional effect of peer pressure on effort (Model 3:  = .33, p < 
.05) becomes non-significant when trust is entered into the model (Model 4:  = .15, ns). 
Together, these results confirm the more complex pattern of mediated effects.    
 
Contributions and Implications for the Organizational Control Literature  
Our study offers several contributions to the organizational control literature. Our 
study responds to Kirsch’s (1996) call for a clearer conceptualization and more reliable 
measures of peer control. Our conceptualization of peer control as the combination of peer 
pressure and norm consensus suggests identifying the underlying mechanisms of peer control 
as an useful way of unpacking this complex phenomenon. Doing so means moving beyond 
the restrictive view of peer control that has so far dominated the literature on this topic. 
Specifically, our study suggests that to fully appreciate the nature of peer control, scholars 
need to broaden their view and consider the role of additional, more deliberate enforcement 
strategies, like peer pressure (cf. Barker, 1993; 1999), next to the norms that operate within 
teams. Our study corroborates Argote’s (1989) study in showing that norm consensus varies 
across teams and that this variability is meaningful for understanding differences in team 
functioning and performance. These findings thus point out the need for treating norm 
consensus as a variable rather than as a constant, as is reflected in many conceptualizations 
and measurements to date (e.g. Das & Teng, 2001; Kirsch, 1996). By distinguishing between 
peer pressure and norm consensus and providing reliable measures for both of these 
constructs, we hope to spur more research on what many scholars consider to be a poorly 
understood and seriously understudied phenomenon (e.g. Leifer & Mills, 1996; Loughry & 
Tosi, 2008).  
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Second, we respond to Loughry’s (in press) call for more research on the conditions 
under which peer control is more beneficial or harmful for teams. Consistent with our 
predictions, the results show that norm consensus acts as a moderator for peer pressure, 
enhancing the positive effect of peer pressure on team effort and inhibiting its negative 
effects on intrateam trust. These results help to reconcile the dominant view of peer control 
that emphasizes its benefits (e.g. Leifer & Mills, 1996; O'Reilly, 1989) with a growing body 
of literature that stresses the need to recognize the limits and potential harmful effects of peer 
control (e.g. Barker, 1993). Our findings corroborate Loughry and Tosi’s (2008) study in 
pointing out the relevance of understanding the differential effects of peer control. 
Specifically, our study highlights the team’s level of consensus as a important contingency 
factor that drives the differential effects of peer pressure. This factor shapes the way team 
members interpret and respond to enforcement strategies used by fellow teammates, which 
subsequently feeds into the way they perform as a team.  
  Thirdly, we extend current research on the team performance implications of peer 
control by responding to Loughry’s (in press) call for more research on the mediating 
processes through which the effects of peer control come about. The results of our study 
suggest that peer control mechanisms affect team performance via two team-level processes. 
One of these is team effort, which makes sense given that control is deliberately aimed to 
promote such behaviors in order to further goal attainment (Henderson & Lee, 1992; Leifer & 
Mills, 1996). Our findings, moreover, corroborate prior studies (e.g. Barker, 1999; Piccoli & 
Ives, 2003; Sitkin & Roth, 1993) in identifying  trust as an unintended consequence of 
control, although the mediator role of trust was somewhat different from what we anticipated. 
The results of our supplementary analyses show that the mediating role of intrateam trust is 
played out through team effort, thus providing a further specification of our original model. 
Together, our results highlight the importance of considering both intended/ behavioral 
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consequences (e.g. effort) and unintended/ psychological consequences (e.g. trust) for 
advancing understanding of how peer control affects team performance.  
 
Contributions and Implications for the SMT Literature  
Our study highlights an often overlooked responsibility of SMTs (Polley & Van 
Dyne, 1993), namely their responsibility for regulating team member behavior. Our study is 
one of the few to provide empirical insights the way this responsibility is enacted by SMTs. 
Our finding, that the effects of peer pressure are attenuated or even negative in teams where 
norm consensus is low, suggests that SMTs frequently operate on a paradox. That is, 
although members of SMTs are collectively responsible for regulating and controlling team 
member behavior, effective exercise of peer control is often inhibited by a lack of consensus 
among team members about what constitutes appropriate work behavior. This finding 
corroborates Langfred’s (2007) observation that SMTs are not always good at managing 
themselves. That is, our study suggests that shifting responsibility for exercising control to 
members of SMTs can become a liability, because some SMTs achieve the norm consensus 
that is necessary for the effective exercise of peer pressure. In identifying this liability, we 
contribute to the literature on the limits and liabilities of SMTs (e.g. Langfred, 2007; Polley 
& Van Dyne, 1993).  
Our study also has implications for the literature on the external leadership of SMTs 
(e.g. Manz & Sims, 1987; Morgeson, 2005). This literature suggests that while the need for 
external leadership is reduced with the implementation of SMTs, it can nevertheless play a 
vital role in promoting SMT effectiveness. Our study suggests that external leadership may 
be particularly useful in helping SMTs overcome the problems they may experience with the 
exercise of peer control. As SMTs not seldom fail to foster a normative climate that is 
conducive to the exercise of peer pressure, problems with peer pressure may persist and 
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worsen over an extended period of time without the active involvement of external leaders 
(cf. Polley & Van Dyne, 1993). Explicit norm structuring processes initiated by external 
leaders therefore are crucial for helping team members delineate and maintain a coherent set 
of shared values and norms about how members should act for the team to be able to work 
together effectively (Spich & Keleman, 1985). 
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The strengths and contributions of this paper should be appreciated in light of its 
weaknesses. First, as we focused on peer pressure and norm consensus, peer monitoring – a 
third mechanism of peer control (Barker, 1999) – was neglected in our study. Even though 
peer monitoring is assumed in our model – as peer pressure can only occur when norm 
violations have been observed – future research could examine the role of monitoring more 
directly, thereby advancing a more complex understanding of how different mechanisms of 
peer control interact in affecting team processes and performance. Furthermore, in following 
Barker’s (1993; 1999) focus on peer pressure based on deviation elimination and disapproval 
of other team member’s behavior, we neglected approval and reward-based reinforcement 
strategies. In addition, we focused on norm pertaining to productive work behavior, thereby 
ignoring counter-productive norms that might develop within the teams (Walton & Hackman, 
1986). We believe that future comparisons between different forms of peer pressure and 
consensus will further broaden scholarly understanding of peer control. 
Second, we acknowledge that our findings may not generalize to other types of teams. 
While the effects of peer control are likely to be pronounced within SMTs because they lack 
close external supervision (Fitch & Ravlin, 2004), other types of teams may be subjected to 
more intense external supervision and control than those studied here. As formal control 
becomes a more dominant mode of control, it may produce ‘ceiling effects’ that attenuate the 
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effects of peer control on team functioning and performance (Loughry & Tosi, 2008). We 
submit that future research should consider including external supervision as a variable in 
their model and examine how peer control and formal control co-exist and interact in 
affecting team processes and outcomes (cf. Cardinal, 2001).  
Third, the cross-sectional nature of the data does not allow us to make strong 
inferences about causality or rule out the possibility of reversed causality. Despite this 
limitation, the pattern of relationships we found in this study is largely consistent with the 
specific causal understanding presented in this paper, thus providing initial support for our 
(revised) model. Nonetheless, it remains important for future research to provide a more 
rigorous test of our hypothesized relationships, for instance by adopting a cross-lagged panel 
design (e.g. Langfred, 2007) and/or testing our model using some form of structural equations 
analysis (e.g. Costa, 2003). 
Finally, we did not find as much variation in peer pressure and norm consensus across 
teams as we had hoped. The relatively low response range for these variables may be 
indicative of range restriction. As such, our study essentially examined the effects of peer 
pressure at moderate and high levels of norm consensus, as opposed to low and high levels of 
consensus. However, this does not invalidate our findings. By contrast, the fact that our 
hypothesized relationships were confirmed despite the low variance in these variables 
suggests that these relationships are actually quite robust. Our study thus provides an 
important step towards a better understanding of the joint effects of peer pressure and norm 
consensus on team processes and performance.  
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Conclusion  
In conclusion, this paper advances theoretical and empirical understanding of the way 
peer control operates in teams. We propose an alternative and less restrictive 
conceptualization of peer control and provide a conceptual framework that delineates its 
implications for team processes and team performance. Our study provides new insights into 
the beneficial and harmful effects of peer control and the team-level processes (i.e. effort and 
trust) through which the team performance consequences of peer control come about. 
Supplementary analyses offer additional insights into the role of these team-level processes in 
transmitting the effects of peer control mechanisms to performance. Together, our theory and 
findings provide an empirically-validated model of peer control that can serve as a foundation 
for the development of a cumulative body of research on this increasingly relevant topic.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Trust and Monitoring in Teams: 
Joint Implications of Mean and Dispersion Levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper is being prepared for submission to an A-Journal. An earlier version of this paper was 
presented at the 5th EIASM Workshop: De Jong, B. A., & Dirks, K. T. (2010, January 28-29). 
Control and Trust within Teams: Joint Implications of Mean and Dispersion Levels. The paper 
has been presented at the 5th EIASM Workshop on “Trust within and between Organizations”, 
Madrid, Spain.  
98 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we argue that one of the reasons for the inconsistent findings regarding the 
relationships between peer monitoring, intrateam trust and team performance is that past research 
has neglected within-team dispersion. We introduce ‘trust asymmetry’ and ‘monitoring 
consensus’ as critical dispersion properties of trust and monitoring and hypothesize that these 
moderate the relationships between mean monitoring, mean trust and team performance. 
Findings from a cross-lagged panel study strongly support our hypotheses. A second cross-
sectional study largely replicates these findings and offers support for an integrative model 
involving mean and dispersion levels of both trust and monitoring.  
 
Keywords: trust, monitoring, team performance, dispersion, asymmetry, consensus. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is widely assumed that trust will facilitate team performance, either directly or 
indirectly (Dirks, 1999). Of course, in few work relationships are organizational members 
willing to rely completely on trust, and thus simultaneously establish controls or monitoring to 
limit opportunistic behavior (Long & Sitkin, 2006). Indeed, commenting on this issue, Langfred 
concluded that “a certain level of monitoring is necessary no matter how high the trust within a 
team becomes” (2004:387) and that to do otherwise would be ‘naïve’. Given the recognition that 
teams may rely upon both trust and controls, there has been a growing interest in how trust and 
control are related and operate at the team level. For example, scholars have recently examined 
how control affects intrateam trust (Piccoli & Ives, 2003), how intrateam trust affects team 
performance (De Jong & Elfring, in press), and when peer control is helpful or harmful for team 
performance (Loughry & Tosi, 2008). Unfortunately, research in this area has not only produced 
key insights, but has also yielded inconsistent and sometimes contradictory results with respect 
to the nature of the relationships between peer control, intrateam trust and team performance.  
One area where contradictory findings are pronounced concerns research on the 
relationship between intrateam trust and team performance. Although intrateam trust has long 
been assumed to promote performance, empirical findings in this area have been inconsistent 
(Dirks & Ferrin, 2001). Some studies provide support for a positive effect of trust on 
performance (e.g. Costa, 2003; Rispens, Greer, & Jehn, 2007) while others offer no support for 
an effect (e.g. Aubert & Kelsey, 2003; Jarvenpaa, Shaw, & Staples, 2004) or even demonstrate a 
negative effect (e.g. Langfred, 2004; Rau, 2005). Equally contradictory have been findings on 
the relationship between peer monitoring – a critical component of peer control (Loughry & 
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Tosi, 2008) – and intrateam trust. There has been discussion in the literature about the idea that 
monitoring may undermine trust, but empirical evidence is mixed. While some studies provide 
evidence for a negative relationship (e.g. Langfred, 2004; Webber, 2008), others offer support 
for a positive relationship (e.g. Bijlsma-Frankema, De Jong, & Van de Bunt, 2008). Although 
suggestive of differential effects of trust and monitoring, these mixed findings thus far have 
remained unresolved. On top of these mixed findings, scholars disagree considerably about how 
monitoring and trust combine – both analytically and temporally – to influence team 
performance (Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2008; Langfred, 2004). Given the fundamental role these 
concepts hold in teams, it is important to resolve these puzzles.  
We propose that one of the reasons for these inconsistent findings is that past research 
has focused exclusively on average or mean levels of trust and monitoring within teams and has 
thereby neglected dispersion or variation in trust and monitoring among team members. As 
several scholars have pointed out (Brown & Kozlowski, 1999; Lindell & Brandt, 2000), 
however, mean and dispersion levels represent distinct yet equally relevant properties of any 
group-level construct. Given that some level of dispersion almost certainly exists in all teams, 
models that do not incorporate dispersion may be underspecified (Dineen, Noe, Shaw, Duffy, & 
Wiethoff, 2007). In addition, a growing body of research has demonstrated that, beyond 
improved model specification, dispersion can help to account for the differential effects of team-
level attitudes and behaviors on team-level outcomes by moderating this relationship (e.g. Boies 
& Howell, 2006; Cole & Hirschfeld, 2009; Colquitt, Noe, & Jackson, 2002; Dineen et al., 2007). 
While researchers on trust and control have started to recognize the relevance of examining 
contingency factors for advancing understanding of the differential effects and inconsistent 
101 
 
findings pertaining to intrateam trust and peer monitoring (e.g. Langfred, 2004; Loughry & Tosi, 
2008), the moderating role of within-team dispersion has not been examined so far. 
Thus, in the present paper, we explore the joint implications of mean and dispersion  
levels of trust and monitoring within teams. We introduce two concepts – trust asymmetry and 
monitoring consensus – that capture important dispersion properties of trust and monitoring and 
we propose that these dispersion properties may act as moderators that account for the 
differential effects of mean levels of trust and monitoring. We start by examining the theoretical 
underpinnings and findings on the relationship between mean intrateam trust and team 
performance relationship and we discuss why trust asymmetry will moderate this relationship 
(Hypothesis 1). We then consider conflicting theoretical predictions and findings for the 
relationship between mean peer monitoring and intrateam trust and we theorize how monitoring 
consensus can help to resolve these different perspectives by moderating this relationship 
(Hypothesis 2). Finally, integrating these ideas (see Figure 4.1), we propose a conditional 
indirect effect model in which the effect of mean monitoring on team performance is partially 
mediated by mean trust and moderated by both asymmetry and consensus (Hypothesis 3). We 
test our hypotheses in two field studies. Hypotheses 1 and 2 were tested first on two-wave panel 
data obtained from student association boards. A second cross-sectional study of professional 
health care teams was used to cross-validate these findings and to test Hypothesis 3. 
 Our paper contributes to the literature in theoretical, methodological and practical terms. 
Theoretically, we highlight the importance of examining both mean and dispersion levels of trust 
and monitoring to more fully understand how these phenomena operate within teams and to 
reconcile contradictory views with respect to their implications. Methodologically, we provide a 
more rigorous test of the direction of causality among peer monitoring, intrateam trust and team 
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performance by adopting a cross-lagged panel design and controlling for the possibility of 
reversed causality, a test that is “rare in the field of trust and even rarer in team research” (Kiffin-
Petersen & Cordery, 2003:110). Finally, our findings have important implications for practice, 
suggesting that it is not only important to try to foster high average levels of trust and monitoring 
within teams, but also to effectively manage the dispersion that exists among team members.  
 
FIGURE 4.1 
Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES  
 
Intrateam Trust and Team Performance 
Trust can be defined as the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive 
expectations of the intentions or behavior of another (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). 
The term ‘intrateam trust’ is commonly used by scholars to refer the aggregate perceptions of 
trust that team members have in their fellow teammates (De Jong & Elfring, in press; Langfred, 
2004). Despite mixed empirical results, there remains a widespread belief among scholars that 
intrateam trust will have a positive main effect on team performance (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001). 
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Trust has been broadly recognized as an essential precursor of productive interactions and 
effective social exchange relationships, because trust increases team members’ willingness to 
share their resources with others (Dirks & Skarlicki, 2009). Consistent with this notion, intrateam 
trust research has found that higher levels of trust within teams result in more knowledge and 
information sharing and helping behavior among team members (Staples & Webster, 2008).   
One limitation of current research on the trust-team performance relationship is that it 
focuses exclusively on the mean or average level of trust within the team, thereby adopting a 
rather undifferentiated view of trust among team members. That is, by averaging trust 
perceptions of individual team members, any variation in trust that exists between team members 
is effectively lost (Burke, Sims, Lazzara, & Salas, 2007). This neglect of variation in trust is 
surprising since empirical evidence suggests that team members often vary considerably in how 
much they trust their fellow teammates. Gillespie’s (2005) examination of shared trust among 
team members, for instance, revealed that as much as one-third of the teams in her sample 
showed substantial dispersion in the amount of trust that team members had in their teammates. 
Likewise, Peters and Karren (2009) found such high levels of within-team variation in trust in 
their sample that they concluded that data aggregation to the team-level was no longer justified. 
Finally, Ferrin, Dirks, and Shah (2006) in their study of co-worker trust found only a moderate 
correlation between co-workers’ level of trust (r = .25), which again is indicative of variation in 
trust. Considering this evidence and the multitude of factors that may lead team members to 
develop different levels of trust in each other – such as differences in propensity to trust (Rotter, 
1967), personal attributes associated with trustworthiness (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995), 
and subgroup membership (Polzer, Crisp, Jarvenpaa, & Kim, 2006) – it is no surprise that 
considerable dispersion in trust frequently exists among members of the same team.  
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We argue that variation or dispersion in trust can have important implications for team 
functioning and performance. More specifically, we contend that dispersion in trust is important 
because it affects the quality of social exchange between team members. A social exchange 
perspective suggests that team members who trust others are more willing to share their 
resources with them, while members who are perceived as more trustworthy are more likely to 
receive resources from others (Dirks & Skarlicki, 2009). Because social exchange implies 
reciprocation of valued resources (Blau, 1964), the development of effective, high-quality 
exchange relationships does not merely require high mean levels of trust among team members, 
but also high mutuality of trust (i.e. low dispersion). Low mutuality of trust in a relationship (i.e. 
high dispersion) is likely to hamper reciprocity in social exchange because of asymmetry in how 
resources are exchanged.  
Consider the following example from a service organization in which the group is better 
off when members share information to deliver better service to clients and when members refer 
clients to one another, based upon their respective areas of expertise. Assume group member ‘B’ 
trusts group member ‘A’, but group member ‘A’ does not trust group member ‘B’. Social 
exchange theory would predict that in this situation, A is likely to receive information and client 
referrals from B, but is unlikely to share his/her information and refer clients to B. This is 
because low trust raises A’s concerns about being taken advantage of by his/her untrustworthy 
teammate B. In addition, the low level of trust that A has in B is likely to reduce her/his sense of 
obligation to honor the trust and resources that B has vested in her/him (Brower, Lester, 
Korsgaard, & Dineen, 2009). Furthermore, A is unlikely to utilize the information received from 
B, because low trust makes A question the quality of the information  provided by B. Moreover, 
A may even see asymmetry as an opportunity to exploit B by trying to gain information and 
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clients that put him at a personal advantage (Graebner, 2009). By contrast, because B trusts A, 
(s)he should be motivated by expectations of future benefits to is engage in information sharing 
and referring clients (Brower et al., 2009; Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2009). Furthermore, B 
is likely tolerate temporal imbalances in the social exchange relationship with A, because trust 
provides him/her with initial assurance that the social exchange process will balance out in the 
long run. Moreover, if B is aware that (s)he is not trusted by A, this could motivate her/him to 
share even more information and clients referrals with A in order to demonstrate her/his 
trustworthiness. Paradoxically, such actions only serve to sustain the unbalanced pattern of social 
exchange between the two team members. 
To capture the notion of mutuality in trust (or rather, the lack thereof), we introduce the 
concept of trust asymmetry, defined as the extent to which team members differ in the level of 
trust they have for one another. Trust asymmetry can range from low to high, with ‘low’ 
describing a situation where team members A and B have identical levels of trust in each other 
and ‘high’ describing a situation where team member A has no trust in B at all while team 
member B trusts A completely. Because trust asymmetry is inherently dyadic (e.g. Tomlinson et 
al., 2009; Zaheer & Harris, 2006), any particular team member can have multiple symmetric and 
asymmetric trust relationships with different teammates at the same time. While acknowledging 
its inherent dyadic nature, we contend that trust asymmetry can be meaningfully extended to the 
team level, where it describes the configuration of dyadic trust relationships within a team (Klein 
& Kozlowski, 2000). Following Van der Vegt, De Jong, Bunderson and Molleman’s (in press) 
team-level conceptualization of power asymmetry, we conceptualize trust asymmetry as an 
additive function of the differences in trust for all pairs of team members. As a team-level 
construct, trust asymmetry follows a dispersion composition model in which within-group 
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variation reflects a substantively meaningful construct (Chan, 1998). In this paper, we treat trust 
asymmetry as a substantive phenomenon that impacts exchange processes in teams.10  
Building on the ideas outlined above, we argue that trust asymmetry moderates the effect 
of mean intrateam trust on team performance. When trust asymmetry is at a low level, mean 
intrateam trust will have a strong positive impact on team performance because symmetric 
relationships enable a more balanced pattern of social exchange among team members (Seibert, 
Sparrowe, & Liden, 2003), characterized by mutual sharing and receiving of resources required 
to perform effectively. When asymmetry in trust is high, by contrast, the positive impact of mean 
intrateam trust will be weakened, because high asymmetry leads to more unbalanced exchange 
structures that inhibit reciprocation of important resources. Thus, rather than discounting the 
possibility that average levels of trust can have a positive effect on team performance, our 
argument suggests that the positive effect of average trust will be weaker when trust asymmetry 
is high than when asymmetry is low.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Mean intrateam trust and trust asymmetry interact such that the positive 
effect of mean intrateam trust on team performance is weaker for higher levels of trust 
asymmetry than for lower levels of asymmetry. 
 
                                                            
10 The earlier example illustrated how trust asymmetry might play out in a single dyad in the group. Although 
asymmetric dyads could be configured in different ways within the group (e.g., asymmetry distributed across dyads, 
asymmetry involving multiple group members not trusting one single member), to simplify the analysis, we assume 
that the different configurations of asymmetric dyads operate in a similar manner. In other words, an asymmetry in a 
given dyad will negatively impact exchange that occurs within the group. For an example of dyads only, see 
Tomlinson, Dineen and Lewicki’s (2009) paper on how trust asymmetry within negotiation dyads might interact 
with average levels of trust to affect joint outcomes. 
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Peer Monitoring and Intrateam Trust 
Peer monitoring occurs when team members keep track of fellow teammates’ work to 
ensure that everything is running as expected and to ensure that they are following procedures 
correctly (Salas, Sims, & Burke, 2005). Monitoring is considered a critical element of control, 
because it provides members of a way to determine whether others have conformed to agreed-
upon rules (Ferrin, Bligh, & Kohles, 2007). We point out that while monitoring is naturally 
associated with control, this does not mean that monitoring is inherently motivated by 
malevolent intentions or that it will always be interpreted negatively by those subjected to it. We 
make no a priori assumptions about why team members engage in monitoring or about how it 
will be interpreted (e.g., as opposed to McAllister, 1995). 
Although scholars agree that the relationship between monitoring and trust is important to 
understand, they disagree considerably about the nature of that relationship. Some have argued 
that controls generally, and monitoring specifically, can undermine trust. One reason is that 
monitoring limits opportunities for trust development by causing individual to draw external, as 
opposed to internal, attributions when they see others behaving cooperatively (e.g. Malhotra & 
Murnighan, 2002; Strickland, 1958). A second reason, discussed by Ferrin, Bligh and Kohles 
(2007), involves self-perception theory, which posits that individuals use their own past behavior 
as a source of information for understanding their own attitudes and beliefs towards others. This 
theory predicts that individuals who monitor others may draw the conclusion that this behavior is 
indicative of their lack of trust. The authors argue that this logic may extend to individuals 
drawing conclusions from others’ monitoring behaviors as well. That is, to the extent that 
monitoring involve an attempt by others to check on whether individuals are behaving in a 
trustworthy manner, these individuals may infer that monitoring is occurring because there is a 
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question about their trustworthiness. Consistent with these ideas, a recent study by Webber 
(2008) found that teams with higher average levels of control-based monitoring tended to 
develop lower average levels of trust.  
Other scholars, however, have questioned the assumption that monitoring will always 
have a negative impact on trust. Salas, Sims and Burke (2005), for instance, argued that if 
monitoring is commonly accepted and understood by team members as an appropriate way of 
conduct within their team, they need not necessarily respond to monitoring in a negative way. In 
addition, Coletti, Sedatole, and Towry (2005) point out that monitoring can increase trust by 
ensuring cooperation. More specifically, they argued and found that even when cooperation is 
control-induced, team members observing such cooperative behavior have a tendency to 
(over)attribute this behavior to the benevolent intentions of fellow teammates rather than to mere 
compliance to the control system. Consistent with this positive view, a recent study by Bijlsma-
Frankema, De Jong and Van de Bunt (2008) found that teams with higher average levels of 
monitoring tended to develop higher average levels of trust.  
Despite diverging predictions and contradictory evidence, both the positive and negative 
view point towards attribution and interpretation processes as key to understanding how 
monitoring affects trust (Ferrin et al., 2007). Moreover, both views suggest that the process of 
attribution or interpretation involves an evaluation of actual monitoring behavior against some 
base-line expectation. The negative view assumes that team members a priori do not expect 
monitoring to occur and will therefore interpret monitoring in a negative way – for example, as a 
sign of a lack of trust. The positive view, by contrast, assumes that team members do expect 
monitoring to occur and therefore may not necessarily interpret monitoring behavior in a 
109 
 
negative way and may even interpret it in a positive way. Despite apparent similarities, the 
positive and negative view have not been reconciled so far.  
One important limitation of both views is that they do not recognize the possibility of 
within-team differences in perceptions and attributions. That is, by focusing exclusively on 
average perceptions of monitoring in relation to trust, these views implicitly assume that team 
members perceive the same amount of monitoring within the team and will therefore make the 
same (positive or negative) attributions about the trustworthiness of their fellow teammates. This 
is surprising since it has long been recognized that attributions among team members do not 
necessarily converge (Moussavi & Evans, 1993). Indeed, it is possible and even likely that team 
members, based on differences in perceptions of monitoring, will draw different (either positive 
or negative) attributions about monitoring behavior and trustworthiness (Young, 2003). As a 
result of such diverging attributions, some team members may develop higher trust in response 
to monitoring while others develop lower levels of trust. Recognizing this issue explicitly, we 
will argue that certain team contextual factors can induce similar interpretations and attributions 
by serving as a common base-line against which monitoring behavior may be evaluated.  
Although there can be a variety of contextual factors that provide individuals with 
common base-line expectations about monitoring (Ferrin et al., 2007), we propose that within 
team contexts monitoring consensus – i.e. agreement about the amount of monitoring that is 
occurring within the team – constitutes an important source of common expectations among 
team members. Monitoring consensus is a dispersion property of peer monitoring that refers to 
the extent to which team members hold similar perceptions about the level of monitoring that 
occurs within the team. Rather than assuming near perfect agreement among team members, we 
treat consensus as a continuous variable that can range from low to high consensus, with ‘high’ 
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describing a situation where all team members have identical perceptions about monitoring and 
‘low’ describing a situation where half of the team members perceive very low levels of 
monitoring while the other half perceives very high levels of monitoring (see Harrison & Klein, 
2007).11 Monitoring consensus reflects a lack of dispersion: the greater the level of consensus 
among team members, the less dispersion in team members perceptions of monitoring within the 
team. Following a dispersion composition model (Chan, 1998), this concept recognizes that team 
members often differ in their perceptions of the team context and that there are substantive 
implications of those differences.  
Building on the notion that interpretations and attributions about monitoring involve an 
evaluation of monitoring behavior against some base-line expectation, we argue that monitoring 
consensus is likely to induce similar interpretations and attributions by serving as a common 
base-line against which monitoring behavior may be evaluated. When monitoring consensus is 
high, team members agree about the level of monitoring that occurs and there is a common 
understanding about the monitoring behavior that is typical or normal within the team. By 
serving as a common base-line expectation regarding monitoring, high consensus thus induces 
more consistent (positive or negative) interpretations and attributions about monitoring when it 
occurs, thereby strengthening the impact of average levels of monitoring on trust among team 
members. When monitoring consensus is low, however, there is no common base-line 
expectation regarding monitoring behavior within the team. This is likely to give rise to more 
diverging attributions, with some team members interpreting monitoring as the normal operating 
                                                            
11 Monitoring consensus reflects a somewhat different form of dispersion than trust asymmetry in that trust 
asymmetry reflects variation in actual levels of trust for across multiple dyads, while monitoring consensus refers to 
variation in perceptions about a single team-level phenomenon, namely the level of monitoring that occurs within 
the team. 
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procedure – which does not damage his/ her trust – and others interpreting it as signaling a lack 
of trust. As a result of such diverging interpretations, the impact of monitoring behavior on trust 
at the team level will be weakened.  
To illustrate, we return to the service organization example described earlier in which 
group members refer clients to each other. For simplicity, consider a situation of low monitoring 
consensus where group members A and B hold diverging views on what monitoring behavior is 
typical within the group. Whereas A perceives high levels of monitoring occurring within the 
group and B perceives low levels of monitoring. Based on their views, A will be inclined to 
monitor others and will expect others to do likewise, whereas B will be quite reluctant to monitor 
others and will expect that others will refrain from monitoring as well. As a consequence of a 
lack of common base-line expectations, both group members will arrive at diverging 
interpretations of monitoring when it occurs. When others refer a client to B and closely monitor 
how B is working with this client, she/he may see this as inappropriate and a signal of a lack of 
trust. By contrast, when others refer a client to A and closely monitor his/her actions, A may 
perceive this as normal behavior or even as a sign that others are looking out for her/him.  
Extending this logic to the team level, we propose that because monitoring consensus 
induces more consistent (positive or negative) interpretations among team members, the effects 
of average monitoring behavior on intrateam trust will be stronger under high-consensus 
conditions than under low-consensus conditions.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Mean peer monitoring and monitoring consensus interact such that the 
effect of mean peer monitoring on mean intrateam trust is stronger for higher levels of 
monitoring consensus than for lower levels of consensus. 
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Peer Monitoring and Team Performance 
So far, we argued that mean levels of trust will enhance team performance, particularly 
when trust asymmetry is low (Hypothesis 1), and that the effect of mean monitoring will be 
particularly strong when monitoring consensus is high (Hypothesis 2). Together, the combined 
pattern of relationships proposed in Hypotheses 1 and 2 link peer monitoring to team 
performance. Specifically, it suggests an conditional indirect effect of mean monitoring on team 
performance, in which trust mediates the relationship between monitoring and performance and 
in which monitoring consensus and trust asymmetry co-determine the strength of this mediated 
effect. When monitoring consensus is high, mean peer monitoring is expected to have a stronger  
indirect effect on team performance because high consensus induces more converging 
interpretations about monitoring. This effect becomes even stronger when trust asymmetry is 
low, because symmetry in trust promotes reciprocation in the social exchange process. When 
monitoring consensus is low, by contrast, monitoring is likely to have a weak indirect effect on  
performance because low consensus fails to induce converging interpretations of monitoring 
behavior by team members. Its impact is even further weakened in the presence of high 
asymmetry in trust, as high asymmetry inhibits reciprocation of important resources. 
Although there is considerable scholarly disagreement about how monitoring and trust 
combine – both analytically and temporally – to influence team performance (Bijlsma-Frankema 
et al., 2008; Langfred, 2004; Webber, 2008), no study so far has systematically examined the 
conditional indirect effect of monitoring on performance through trust. Prior research does, 
however, provide some findings to extrapolate from. In support of the indirect effect of 
monitoring on performance, a recent study by Bijlsma, De Jong and Van de Bunt (2008) found 
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that intrateam trust partially mediated the relationship between peer monitoring and team 
performance. Likewise, another study by these authors found that the effect of peer pressure – 
another component of peer control besides peer monitoring – on team performance was both 
mediated by intrateam trust and moderated by consensus among team members (De Jong & 
Bijlsma-Frankema, 2009). Given that other variables besides trust have been proposed as 
mediating mechanisms in the monitoring-team performance relationship (Marks & Panzer, 
2004), however, it seems unlikely that this relationship would be fully explained by trust alone. 
Based on these findings and the logic presented above, we tentatively propose that trust partially 
mediates the relationship between monitoring and performance.  
 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between mean peer monitoring and team performance is 
partially mediated by mean intrateam trust. This mediated effect is stronger for higher 
levels of monitoring consensus and lower levels of trust asymmetry than for lower levels 
of consensus and higher levels of asymmetry. 
 
METHODS  
 
STUDY 3A 
Given that there is considerable disagreement among scholars about the causal order 
between monitoring, trust and team performance (Langfred, 2004; Webber, 2008) and given 
speculations about the possibility of recursive causal relationships (Ferrin et al., 2007), the 
direction of causality was a particularly important issue in testing our hypotheses. The primary 
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purpose of this first study was therefore to put Hypotheses 1 and 2 to a rigorous test, with special 
attention for the direction of causality implied in these hypotheses.  
 
Research Setting and Procedures 
The participants in Study 3a were 682 board members of 117 Dutch student associations. 
A student association represents a ‘special interest organization’ (Blau & Scott, 1962), of which 
political parties, medical associations and labor unions are other examples. The main purpose of 
these student associations is to satisfy the needs of its members in particular areas of interest, 
such as religion, sports, leisure and international orientation. The members of the board were 
collectively responsible for managing their organization. Their work involved a broad variety of 
tasks, such as policy making, strategic planning, fiscal management, and maintaining 
relationships with internal and external stakeholders (e.g. the association’s general members, 
universities, sponsors, suppliers). In the Netherlands, being a board member is typically a full-
time job for which students are appointed for the duration of one year and for which they receive 
monetary compensation by university funds.  
In addition to the meaningfulness of the work for the board members and general 
association members, these teams had several advantages for the purposes of our study. One 
advantage is that these particular teams are likely to yield high response rates across multiple 
data collection waves (see Raes, Heijltjes, & Glunk, 2008), which was crucial for testing the 
direction of causality implied in our hypotheses. Another advantage was that these teams were 
highly homogenous in terms of the tasks they performed, the date of formation and termination, 
and the stability of the team’s composition during the academic year. This allowed us to control 
for a number of factors that might have otherwise affected our results.  
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For this study, we adopted a cross-lagged panel design, which involved collecting data on 
all variables at two points in time (hereafter referred to as ‘T1’ and ‘T2’). The two-wave data 
were collected over a four month period using a web survey. Besides collecting data at different 
measurement moments, data were also collected from different sources in order to avoid 
common method bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Whereas the team 
members themselves provided ratings of trust and monitoring, the general members of the 
association (who were not a member of the board) provided ratings on team performance through 
a separate and anonymous web survey.  
The general members survey yielded 1,770 responses at T1 and 784 responses at T2. The 
response rates for the other survey, the board member survey, were 83.0% (T1) and 64.2% (T2). 
The average intrateam response rates for this survey were 83.7% (T1) and 65.8% (T2). Board 
member panel attrition from the first to the second data wave was 22.6%. To determine if panel 
attrition had any non-random sampling effect on respondents’ trust and monitoring scores 
(Goodman & Blum, 1996), we performed a multiple logistic regression, in which a dummy 
variable (0 = respondent left the sample; 1 = respondent remained in the sample) was regressed 
on the individual-level scores for monitoring and trust. The results indicated that panel attrition 
did not have a significant sampling effect on the monitoring scores (B = -.25, SE = .26, ns) or on 
the trust scores (B = -.10, SE = .31, ns).  
Teams were dropped from the analysis if less than half the board members had responded 
or if they lacked external performance ratings from the association’s general members. Applying 
these exclusion criteria yielded a final sample of 82 teams across both waves (intrateam response 
rate: M = 90.4%, SD = 13.3%). The average board member respondent in this sample was 22.6 
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years of age and had been a member of the association for 3.5 years. Fifty-one percent of the 
board member respondents were male. 
 
Measures  
Direct consensus and referent-shift consensus models essentially treat dispersion among 
team members as error variance (Chan, 1998), thereby contradicting our argument that within-
team dispersion is substantively meaningful. For this reason, mean intrateam trust and peer 
monitoring were therefore conceptualized under Chan’s additive composition model and were 
operationalized as the mean level of trust/ monitoring among team members. Monitoring 
consensus and trust asymmetry were conceptualized under Chan’s dispersion composition 
model. Trust asymmetry and monitoring consensus were operationalized in different ways to 
match the distinct forms of dispersion they represent (see below).  
Mean peer monitoring. We used De Jong and Elfring’s (in press) scale to measure mean 
peer monitoring. Their five-item scale was adapted from Langfred (2004) and Costa (2003). The 
items refer to the extent to which team members keep track of their fellow teammates’ work (e.g. 
“In this team we carefully monitor each other's progress on his/ her work”, “In this team we 
check whether everyone meets their obligations to the team”). Respondents indicated their 
agreement with these items on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree). 
The team-level Cronbach’s alphas were .92 (T1) and .89 (T2).  
Monitoring consensus. Following Klein et al. (2001), we obtained a team-level score for 
monitoring consensus by calculating the standard deviation of respondents’ scores on each of the 
peer monitoring items and then averaging the item standard deviations. This average score was 
multiplied by -1,so that higher scores indicate higher rather than lower levels of consensus. This 
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operationalization is consistent with Harrison and Klein’s (2007) recommendations regarding 
appropriate indexes for separation or dispersion-type constructs.  
Mean intrateam trust. De Jong and Elfring’s (in press) five-item scale was used to 
measure mean intrateam trust. Their recently validated measure was adapted from pre-existing 
scales by Costa (2003) and others. Sample items are “I can count on my teammates for help if I 
have difficulties with my job” and “I am confident that my teammates will keep me informed 
about issues that concern my work”. The items followed a 5-point Likert-type format with 
anchors ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. Alpha coefficients were .85 (T1) 
and .89 (T2). 
 Trust asymmetry. As traditional Likert-type measures of intrateam trust do not 
adequately capture dispersion between team members (Burke et al., 2007), we used a peer rating 
approach to measure trust asymmetry.12 Our scale consisted of five descriptions of trust, running 
from ‘no trust’ to ‘complete trust’, and a list of all the members that made up the team. Each 
respondent (A) was asked to indicate for each of her/his fellow teammates (B) which of the 
descriptions best characterized her/his level of trust in B. Recognizing that respondents may not 
have sufficient information to respond to our question, we included a ‘neutral’ option: “I don’t 
know this teammate well enough to be able to say whether I trust him/her or not”. The neutral 
scores comprised less than 1% of the total responses in the data. Consistent with Ferrin et al. 
(2006), we coded the neutral scores as 3, reflecting neither low nor high trust in the focal 
teammate. We adapted Van der Vegt et al.’s (in press) operationalization of power asymmetry to 
obtain team-level scores for trust asymmetry. This adapted procedure involved computing the 
                                                            
12 Running the analyses using the mean score of the dyadic trust measure as an alternative measure for mean 
intrateam trust yielded similar results. 
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absolute difference between team member A’s trust in B and B’s trust in A for each pair of team 
members, then averaging these difference scores for each team member, and then averaging 
these individual scores across team members. This procedure can be summarized in the 
following formula: 
 
∑ ൤൬∑ ሾ|Tab െ Tba|ሿ
௥௜ୀଵ ݎ ൰ j൨௞௝ୀଵ
݇  
 
where Tab is A’s trust in B and Tba is B’s trust in A, r is the number of relationships which team 
member j has and k is the number of team members. Contrary to Van der Vegt et al. (in press) 
original operationalization of asymmetry, we decided against averaging scores from team 
member A and team member B as a way of determining team member A’s and B’s individual 
scores, based on Brower et al.’s (2000) argument that the most appropriate source for measuring 
trust is the trustor (not the trustee).  
Team performance. Since boards of student associations do not produce tangible and/or 
easily quantifiable outputs which could be used as team performance indicators, we focused on 
team performance behaviors instead (Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson, 2008). Based on prior 
research on boards in non-profit organizations (e.g. Iecovich, 2004; Inglis, Alexander, & 
Weaver, 1999), we developed a four-item scale that reflected essential responsibilities enacted by 
these boards, which included: ensuring mission and vision for the organization, long-range 
planning and budget allocation, maintaining relationships with internal stakeholders and 
maintaining relationships with external stakeholders. We asked the association’s general 
members to indicate on a 6-point scale how well their board performed these responsibilities (1 = 
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very poor; 6 = very well). These scores were averaged across items and respondents to form a 
composite score of team performance. Cronbach’s alphas were .70 (T1) and .82 (T2).  
A team-level confirmatory factor analysis, in which mean intrateam trust and peer 
monitoring were allowed to freely correlate with each other, indicated a good fit and supported 
convergent validity for a two-factor model at both measurement moments (T1: 2 = 46.84, df = 
34, p = .07, CFI = .97, SRMR = .07, RMSEA = .068; T2: 2 = 46.70, df = 34, p = .07, CFI = .97, 
SRMR = .06, RMSEA = .068, all item-factor loadings were significant (p < .05)). A series of 
discriminant analyses indicated that the hypothesized two-factor model fitted the data 
significantly better than the more parsimonious one-factor model, thus providing evidence of the 
discriminant validity of our two-factor model. 
Control variables. To control for the possibility of systematic differences between the 
four types of student associations that were represented in our sample (i.e. religious, sports, 
leisure and international), we included three dummy-coded variables as control variables in our 
model. We also controlled for team size to partial out any artificial variance in the dispersion 
scores that were due to differences in team size across cases.  
 
Analytic Strategy 
In order to explicitly test the direction of causality implied in Hypotheses 1 and 2, we 
used cross-lagged regression analysis (Rogosa, 1980). In short, this analysis involves estimating 
two cross-lagged regression coefficients: one representing the path of the independent variable X 
at T1 to the dependent variable Y at T2 controlled for the lagged effect of Y on itself, and one 
representing the path of Y at T1 to X at T2 controlled for the lagged effect of X on itself. A 
significant value for these cross-lagged coefficients is indicative of a causal effect. By allowing 
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for explicit modeling of the temporal order among the independent and dependent variables, 
controlling for autocorrelation, and testing the possibility of reversed causality, this analysis 
substantially strengthens our ability to make causal inferences.  
Because prior research suggested that curvilinearity was a possibility in the relationships 
examined (e.g. Ferrin et al., 2007; Langfred, 2004), we included squared terms for both our mean 
and dispersion variables as covariates in our analyses.13 As Cortina (1993) explains, adding in 
these squared terms prevents researchers from erroneously concluding a significant interaction 
effect when this is actually an artifact of shared variance between the cross-product term and the 
squared terms. We mean-centered the independent variables prior to creating the higher-order 
terms to reduce non-essential multicollinearity (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). Inspection 
of variance inflation factors suggested that multicollinearity was not a problem in our analyses.  
For each hypothesis, we estimated four models to isolate the contribution of the different 
terms. The first model involved regressing the control variables and the dependent variable at T1 
on the dependent variable at T2. In the second model, the lower-order terms were added to the 
model, which effectively controls for any covariance between the mean and dispersion measure. 
Model 3 added the squared term and Step 4 added the interaction term (see Cortina, (1993)).  
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 4.1 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations among the team-level 
variables in this study. Hypothesis 1 posited that the positive effect of mean intrateam trust on 
team performance decreases as the level of trust asymmetry increases. This hypothesis was  
                                                            
13 Running the analyses without the squared terms yielded similar results. 
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supported by our analyses. As shown in Table 4.2, adding the cross-product term of mean 
intrateam trust and trust asymmetry at T1 in Model 4 resulted in a significant increase in 
explained variance (R2 = .04, p < .05) with a negative and significant lagged interaction effect 
on team performance at T2 ( = -.22, p < .05).  
To assess the nature of the interactive effect, we plotted simple slopes at one standard 
deviation above and below the mean value of the moderator (Cohen et al., 2003). The simple 
slop plot (depicted in Figure 4.2a) confirms that the positive effect of mean intrateam trust is 
stronger for the low-asymmetry condition than for high-asymmetry condition. Complementing 
this visual inspection technique, we also used a tool by Preacher, Curran and Bauer (2006) to 
determine the regions of significance: the exact critical value of the moderator at which the effect 
of the independent variable on the dependent variable becomes significantly positive or 
negative.14 The actual range of trust asymmetry scores in our sample (noncentered raw scores 
ranged between .00 and 1.20 at T1) only exceeded the lower but not the upper critical value 
(respectively .73 and 2.08), suggesting the presence of only significant positive effects and no 
significant negative effects of mean intrateam trust on team performance in our data.  
As a part of our cross-lagged regression analysis, we also examined the possibility of 
reversed causality by estimating the effect of team performance at T1 on mean levels of trust at 
T2 (cf. Van der Vegt & Bunderson, 2005). The results indicate that this relationship is non-
significant ( = -.01, ns), thereby further strengthening our confidence that the direction of 
causality runs from trust to performance, rather than vice versa. Together, these results strongly 
support Hypothesis 1.  
                                                            
14 As Preacher et al.’s (2006) tool does not allow for taking into account squared terms in additional to cross-product 
terms, the test results of our regions of significance analyses should be considered approximations. 
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Hypothesis 2 predicted that mean peer monitoring would have stronger effect on mean 
intrateam trust for higher levels of monitoring consensus than for lower levels of consensus. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, the results (see Table 4.3, Model 4) show a significant lagged 
interaction effect of mean peer monitoring and monitoring consensus at T1 on mean intrateam 
trust at T2 ( = .28, p < .001). Also, adding in the cross-product term results in a significant 
increase in explained variance (R2 = .09, p < .01), above and beyond the control variables and 
the lower-order terms and squared terms included in the model.  
Plotting these results confirms that the effects of mean monitoring levels tend to be 
stronger for higher values of monitoring consensus than for lower values of consensus (see 
Figure 4.2b). Surprisingly, however, analysis of regions of significance indicates that the actual 
range of monitoring consensus scores in our sample (noncentered raw scores ranged between -
1.07 to .00 at T1) exceeds both the lower and upper critical values (-.55 and -.28), suggesting the 
presence of both significant negative and positive effects of mean monitoring levels on trust in 
our data (p < .05). Together, these results support for Hypothesis 2.  
As with our Hypothesis 1 test, we also explored the possibility of reversed causality for 
Hypothesis 2. Interestingly, the results of the analysis shows that the effect of mean trust at T1 
on mean monitoring at T2 remains significant ( = .20, p < .01), even after controlling for mean 
monitoring at T1. This result suggests a reciprocal causal relationship between monitoring and 
trust. We will discuss the implications of this finding in more detail later.  
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FIGURE 4.2  
Study 3a: Interaction Plotsa 
 
(4.2a) Mean Intrateam Trust by Trust Asymmetry on Team Performance 
 
 
(4.2b) Mean Peer Monitoring by Monitoring Consensus on Trust    
 
a Moderator values for ‘high’ and ‘low’ are the sample mean +/- 1 standard deviation.
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METHODS 
 
STUDY 3B 
Encouraged by the strong support for Hypotheses 1 and 2, we conducted a second study 
to explore two additional issues. First, we wanted to test the generalizability of the Study 3a 
findings to other settings. Although Study 3a did involve natural teams operating in a real 
organizational setting, the type of non-profit organization the teams operated in and the duration 
of the teams’ appointment may be considered particular. We conducted our second study among 
teams operating within a professional for-profit organization with longer tenure and no 
predefined disbanding date. The other reason to conduct Study 3b was to test our third 
hypothesis. While the Study 3a results did support several critical parts of the conditional 
indirect effects model proposed in Hypothesis 3, the hypothesis itself was not tested directly. In 
doing just that, Study 3b extends Study 3a by enhancing understanding of the mediating 
mechanisms and contingencies underlying the monitoring-performance relationship. 
 
Research Setting and Procedures 
The participants in our second study were 605 members of a Dutch health care 
organization for people with mental disabilities, who worked together in 55 self-managing teams. 
Each team operated a nursing home in which their clients typically lived permanently. As a self-
managed team, team members were collectively responsible for providing care for their residents 
as well as for managing their own work processes. Cross-sectional data on trust and monitoring 
were collected among team members using a web survey. The individual-level response rate was 
68.4% and the average intrateam response rate was 72.5%. Team performance ratings were 
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obtained from region managers through a separate web survey. All managers completed the 
survey for the teams with their region. Applying the same exclusion criteria as Study 3a yielded 
a final sample of 46 teams (intrateam response rate: M = 70.4%, SD = 23.7%). The average team 
in this sample consisted of 11.6 team members. Team tenure and organizational tenure for the 
average respondent was 4.1 years and 7.9 years respectively. The average respondent was 38.2 
years of age and 18% was male.  
 
Measures  
 Our measure for mean peer monitoring was a three-item version of the Study 3a scale ( 
= .94). Monitoring consensus scores were again obtained by calculating the mean of item 
standard deviations, multiplied by -1. Measures for mean intrateam trust ( = .94) and trust 
asymmetry were identical to those used in Study 3a. This time, the ‘neutral’ scores in the trust 
asymmetry data comprised 11.5% of the responses in our sample. Although this percentage was 
higher than in Study 3a, it is not uncommon for research in larger organizations (see for example 
Ferrin et al., 2006). External team performance ratings were obtained from the team’s region 
manager. Given that providing high-quality health care to residents was one of the mains goals of 
the teams studied, our global measure of team performance consisted of three items: one 
referring to the quality of care provided by the team, one referring to the quantity of care, and 
one referring to extent to which the team was able to meet their residents’ demands. Region 
managers were asked to indicate on a six-point scale how well the teams within their region 
performed on these criteria (1 = poor; 6 = very well). Cronbach’s alpha was .91. 
A confirmatory factor analysis, in which the team-level variables of mean intrateam trust 
and peer monitoring were allowed to freely correlate with each other, indicated an adequate fit 
129 
 
and supported a two-factor model (2 = 23.92, df = 19, ns; CFI = .99; SRMR = .046; RMSEA = 
.075, all item-factor loadings were significant (p < .05)), with no one-factor model providing a 
better fit to the data. We included team size and squared terms as control variables in our model. 
To control for systematic differences in the performance of teams across the five geographical 
regions in which they operated, we also included four dummy-coded region variables. 
 
Analytic Strategy 
As with Study 3a, we again estimated four models to isolate the contribution of the 
different terms and we also mean-centered the independent variables prior to creating the higher-
order terms. Inspection of the variance inflation factors revealed no major multicollinearity 
problems. We tested Hypotheses 1 and 2 using conventional OLS regression.15 To test the 
conditional indirect effect proposed in Hypothesis 3, we relied on statistical routines developed 
by Preacher, Rucker and Hayes (2007). In short, their routine involves estimating the indirect 
effect from a set of equations that predict the independent variable (Y) from an independent 
variable (X) through a mediator (M) at different values of the moderator variable(s). The 
significance of these conditional indirect effects are determined through bootstrapped standard 
error estimation. Bootstrapping estimation is recommended because the products of regression 
coefficients for the XM and MY paths are rarely normally distributed, even when the 
variables that constitute the product are normally distributed (Edwards & Lambert, 2007).   
 
                                                            
15 Because diagnostics plots suggested that heteroskedasticity might be present in our data, we complemented our 
conventional OLS regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error (HCSE) estimation (Hayes & 
Chai, 2007). However, because both of these analyses yielded similar results, we only report the results of the 
conventional regression analyses here. The HCSE results can be obtained from the first author upon request. 
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RESULTS 
 
Table 4.4 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations for all team-level 
variables of Study 3b. The results (Table 4.5, Model 4) indicate significant interaction effect of 
mean intrateam trust and trust asymmetry on team performance (B = -.42, p < .05) and a 
significant increase in explained variance (R2 = .03, p < .05). The interaction plot (Figure 4.3a) 
follows the pattern of effects proposed in Hypothesis 1: the positive effect of mean intrateam 
trust is stronger for the low-asymmetry condition than for the high-asymmetry condition. 
Analysis of regions of significance further confirm the presence of significant positive effects of 
mean level trust on team performance: the lowest asymmetry score of .17 in our sample exceeds 
the critical lower value of .93 (p < .05). At the same time, no significant negative effects are 
found: the highest asymmetry score of 2.00 in our sample does not exceed the upper critical 
value of 4.64. These results confirm Hypothesis 1. 
In support of Hypothesis 2, the results show that adding the cross-product between mean 
peer monitoring and monitoring consensus in Model 4 (Table 4.6) significantly increases the 
explanatory power of the model (R2 = .06, p < .05), with a significant interaction effect on 
intrateam trust (B = .41, p < .05). Plotting these test results (Figure 4.3b) reveals that the effect of 
mean monitoring is stronger under high-consensus conditions than under low-consensus 
conditions. The plot also seems to indicate that the effects of mean monitoring do not become 
significantly negative under low-consensus conditions. To verify this observation, we calculated 
the regions of significance of the simple slopes. This analysis confirms the presence of 
significant positive effects of monitoring on trust in our data (p < .05), but also indicates that the 
negative effects of monitoring do not reach significance: the actual range of monitoring 
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consensus scores in our sample (between -1.22 and -.17) only exceeds the upper but not the 
lower critical value (-2.47 and -.78). Overall, the results thus support Hypothesis 2.    
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the effect of mean peer monitoring (X) on team performance (Y) 
would be partially mediated by mean intrateam trust (M) and that this mediated effect would be 
stronger for higher levels of monitoring consensus and lower levels of trust asymmetry than for 
lower levels of consensus and higher levels of asymmetry (Zs). As the conditional effects of X on 
M and of M on Y have already been demonstrated in the tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2, we 
proceeded straight away with testing the indirect effect XMY at ‘low’, ‘moderate’ and ‘high’ 
levels of the Zs. For this test we relied on the Preacher et al. (2007) statistical routine discussed 
earlier, which produces z-statistics of the conditional indirect effects at each of these levels of Zs, 
along with their respective level of significance. Consistent with the predictions in Hypothesis 3, 
the pattern of results in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.4 indicate that the mediated effects of mean 
monitoring levels (through mean intrateam trust) are weaker and non-significant for the low-
consensus high-asymmetry condition (z = -.01, ns, -1 SD for consensus, +1 SD for asymmetry) 
and stronger and significant for the high-consensus low-asymmetry condition (z = 1.63, p < .05, 
+1 SD for consensus, -1 SD for asymmetry). This confirms Hypothesis 3. Because the Study 3a 
results had revealed a lagged mean-level effect of trust on monitoring, we also estimated an 
alternative conditional indirect effects model, in which monitoring mediated the moderated effect 
of mean trust levels on team performance. The bootstrapping analysis did not support this 
alternative model, thus increasing our confidence in the model proposed in Hypothesis 3.       
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FIGURE 4.3  
Interaction Plotsa 
 
(4.3a) Mean Intrateam Trust by Trust Asymmetry on Team Performance 
 
 
(4.3b) Mean Peer Monitoring by Monitoring Consensus on Trust    
 
 
a Moderator values for ‘high’ and ‘low’ are the sample mean +/- 1 standard deviation.
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TABLE 4.7 
Study 3b: Conditional Indirect Effects of Peer Monitoring on Team Performancea 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4.4  
Summary of Test Results of Combinations of  
Monitoring Consensus and Trust Asymmetry 
 
 
 
SE z
Low High 0.00 0.10 0.00
Low Moderate 0.00 0.16 0.01
Low Low 0.00 0.33 0.01
Moderate High -0.03 0.17 -0.19
Moderate Moderate 0.21 0.17 1.25 †
Moderate Low 0.46 0.31 1.48 *
High High -0.06 0.32 -0.19
High Moderate 0.42 0.31 1.35 *
High Low 0.91 0.56 1.63 *
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, all one-tailed.
a Moderator values are the sample mean +/- 1 SD .
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DISCUSSION 
 
Existing research on intrateam trust and peer control continues to be important for 
understanding how mean levels of trust and control within teams relate and operate. The present 
study, however, shows that substantial dispersion in trust and control exists within teams and that 
this dispersion further advances understanding this issue. In two field studies, we found that trust 
asymmetry moderates the relationship between mean levels of trust and team performance, such 
that the effects of trust on team performance becomes more positive as asymmetry decreases.  In 
addition, both studies found that monitoring consensus moderates the relationship between mean 
peer monitoring and mean intrateam trust. Finally, Study 3b provided evidence that mean trust 
partially mediates the relationship between mean monitoring and team performance, with the 
mediated effect becoming stronger as asymmetry decreases and consensus increases.  
Although both Studies 1 and 2 showed a significant interaction effect between mean 
monitoring and monitoring consensus, the negative effects of mean monitoring at low levels of 
consensus did reach significance in Study 3a, but it did reach not significance in Study 3b. We 
attribute these different findings to differences in organizational contexts. Interviews with the 
CEO, several region managers and team members of the health care organization (Study 3b) 
revealed that a strong culture existed within the organization that promoted accountability, which 
may have caused teams to become more similar in their monitoring behaviors and perceptions. 
Moreover, given the high stakes of client health, one could speculate that the health care sector 
may tend to have some necessary level of monitoring involved. These monitoring norms 
naturally restrict team members’ responses to monitoring. By contrast, we do not expect student 
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association board members (Study 3a) to be accustomed to such norms and we therefore expect 
them to be more sensitive to monitoring and more varied in their responses.  
 
Implications for the Intrateam Trust Literature 
Our study offers several contributions to the literature on intrateam trust. This study is 
one of the first to critically examine the team-level properties of trust. In distinguishing between 
mean and dispersion levels of trust, we move beyond the singular mean-level focus that has thus 
far dominated the literature. By showing that members of the same team can differ significantly 
in how much they trust each other, our results corroborate other studies (e.g. Gillespie, 2005) and 
reinforces Brower et al.’s (2009) conclusion that symmetry in trust between parties may be more 
the exception than the rule. Indeed, ignoring dispersion in trust among team members is clearly 
at odds with the reality of many teams and unnecessarily limits our understanding of intrateam 
trust. Our theory and results suggest that trust dispersion is not just a “statistical hurdle” (Chan, 
1998) to be overcome in team-level studies of trust, but rather a substantively meaningful 
property of teams that deserves equal attention as the mean level of trust. In order to advance 
understanding and avoid underspecified models, scholars thus need to consider both mean and 
dispersion levels in their studies of intrateam trust.  
Our study advances the notion of trust asymmetry, a dispersion property of trust that has 
been recognized by some as having important implications for team performance (e.g. Rispens et 
al., 2007), but that has received limited attention so far. This paper is one of the first to examine 
the implications of trust asymmetry, thereby addressing “a significant gap in extant theory” 
(Graebner, 2009:35). Whereas scholars have primarily discussed trust asymmetry from a dyadic-
level perspective (Tomlinson et al., 2009; Zaheer & Harris, 2006), our paper demonstrates that 
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this concept can be meaningfully extended to the team level, where it describes the configuration 
of dyadic trust relationships within a team. The conceptualization of trust asymmetry advanced 
in this paper suggests that in order to fully capture the total amount of asymmetry within a team, 
one must consider all the dyadic trust relationships within that team.     
In demonstrating that trust asymmetry weakens the positive effect of mean intrateam trust 
on team performance, our findings help to reconcile the dominant view of intrateam trust that 
emphasizes its benefits (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001) with the growing scholarly recognition that these 
benefits have limits (e.g. Langfred, 2004). Our empirical evidence challenges the prevailing 
assumption that higher mean levels of trust will always result increased team performance. In 
fact, our results suggest that it is quite possible for mean levels of trust to have no meaningful 
influence on performance at all, particularly under conditions of high asymmetry. Our study 
joins that of Langfred (2004) in highlighting the relevance of contingency factors to account for 
the differential effects of mean levels of trust. At the same time, our focus on trust asymmetry as 
a moderator extends Langfred’s work by suggesting that the contingencies that drive the 
differential effects of trust need not be exogenous, as his study suggests, but may be inherent to 
the phenomenon of intrateam trust itself. 
 Kiffin-Petersen and Cordery’s (2003:110) observation that robust tests of directions of 
causality, are “rare in field of trust and even rarer in team research” is still true to date. With a 
few exceptions (e.g. Langfred, 2007), most studies on intrateam trust are still cross-sectional 
(e.g. Costa, 2003; Rispens et al., 2007). Our study provides a more robust test of the causal 
relationship between trust and team performance by adopting a cross-lagged panel design. The 
results of our analysis show a lagged effect of intrateam trust on team performance but no lagged 
effect of performance on trust, suggesting that the causal direction runs from trust to 
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performance, rather than vice versa. These findings strengthen our confidence in the causal order 
underlying the trust-performance relationship.  
 
Implications for the Peer Control Literature 
Our study offers several contributions to the peer control literature as well. First, it 
advances understanding of the nature of peer control by zooming in on one critical component – 
peer monitoring – and examining its team-level properties. Challenging the dominant mean-level 
approach to studying monitoring, our paper stresses the need to consider both mean and 
dispersion levels in order to gain a better understanding of monitoring as a team-level construct. 
Furthermore, our paper introduces the notion of monitoring consensus as an important dispersion 
property of monitoring. In studying monitoring consensus empirically, we not only show that 
team can vary in their level of consensus, but also that this variation is meaningful for predicting 
intrateam trust and team performance.  
We found that the effect of mean peer monitoring on mean intrateam trust becomes 
stronger as the level of monitoring consensus increases. By demonstrating the moderating role of 
consensus, our study helps to integrate the dominant view of the negative impact of monitoring 
(e.g. Webber, 2008) with recent recognition that monitoring need not always be detrimental to 
team member trust (e.g. Salas et al., 2005). Our study joins that of Loughry and Tosi (2008) in 
underscoring the importance of contingency factors in accounting for the differential effects of 
peer monitoring on performance and substantiates Ferrin et al.’s (2007) proposition about the 
role of contextual factors in moderating the monitoring-trust relationship.  
Our study provides insight into the complexity of the peer monitoring-team performance 
relationship by jointly examining the explanatory mechanisms and contingencies underlying this 
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relationship. Specifically, the results offer a substantive interpretation of how the effects of 
monitoring come about by demonstrating that mean trust partially mediates the relationship 
between mean peer monitoring and team performance. Furthermore, our findings indicate that 
this mediated effect is stronger as trust asymmetry decreases, which suggests that the mediating 
process varies systematically with the specific configuration of dyadic trust relationships within a 
team. Our integrative approach to examining mediators and moderators extends current research 
that has looked at either the moderated or the mediated effects of monitoring on team 
performance (e.g. Bijlsma-Frankema et al., 2008; Loughry & Tosi, 2008). 
Finally, we advance understanding of the causal order among monitoring and trust, an 
issue that has remained unclear so far (Ferrin et al., 2007). The results of our study not only 
demonstrate a lagged effect of mean peer monitoring on mean intrateam trust, but also a lagged 
effect of mean intrateam trust on mean peer monitoring. These findings substantiates Ferrin et 
al.’s (2007) recent assertion that the monitoring-trust relationship may be recursive. Our 
empirical evidence simultaneously validates the causal direction we hypothesized and the 
reversed causal direction proposed by others (e.g. Langfred, 2004), thus suggesting that different 
causal directions are equally plausible. As such, these results stress the importance of theoretical 
considerations for guiding researchers’ choice to focus on any one of these causal directions.   
 
Strengths, Limitations and Future Research 
Our study includes a number of strengths. First, we took several measures to alleviate 
potential concerns about common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003), such as using different 
sources, different measurement moments, and different measurement methods (i.e. constructed 
scores for our dispersion measures). Another strength is that we explicitly controlled for prior 
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theoretical explanations that suggested main and curvilinear effects in order to demonstrate the 
added explanatory value of the interactive effect of mean and dispersion levels of trust and 
monitoring. Finally, because of the cross-lagged panel design of the Study 3a and because the 
pattern of results was largely cross-validated in Study 3b, our conclusions regarding Hypotheses 
1 and 2 are particularly robust.  
Besides these methodological strengths, there are limitations as well. First, the cross-
sectional nature of Study 3b does not allow us to make strong causal inferences regarding the 
chains of effects implied in Hypothesis 3. Despite this limitation, the pattern of relationships we 
found in Study 3b is consistent with the specific causal understanding we hypothesized. 
Furthermore, realizing the tentative nature of our conclusions regarding Hypothesis 3, we 
actively sought and tested alternative models and found no support for this model in our 
analyses. Furthermore, the cross-lagged regression analyses of Study 3a provide strong evidence 
for critical parts of the conditional indirect effects model proposed in Hypothesis 3. 
Nevertheless, we acknowledge that further validation would be useful.  
Second, relative to the potential range in our dispersion variables, the actual range of 
these variables in our data was limited. As a consequence, we essentially examined the effects of 
mean peer monitoring at moderate and high levels of monitoring consensus, as opposed to low 
and high levels of monitoring consensus. This does not invalidate our findings, by contrast: the 
fact that significant interaction effects were found despite the low variation suggests that these 
effects are quite robust. Nevertheless, we echo Harrison and Klein (2007) in stressing the 
importance of ensuring sufficient range in future studies of within-group dispersion.  
Third, by drawing on social exchange theory in formulating our argument for the trust-
performance relationship, we implicitly incorporated the assumption of team member 
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interdependence in our theoretical argument (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). While this 
assumption seems reasonable in team contexts, teams can of course vary in their level of 
interdependence. This suggests that our theory may not necessarily generalize to teams with 
relatively low levels of interdependence. Future research can help to advance understanding of 
this matter by examining the role of interdependence in relation to trust more directly. 
 
Practical Implications 
Our results suggest that in order to foster team performance, managers not only need to 
attend to the average level of trust within teams, but also to the dispersion or asymmetry that 
exists between team members. In order to deal with asymmetry in trust, managers may need to 
identify and alter the causes underlying these asymmetric perceptions of trust. For instance, if 
trust asymmetry is caused by asymmetry in task dependence between team members, managers 
can introduce a more interdependent work structure within the team to try to stimulate the 
formation of more symmetric trust relationships. Alternatively, if the causes of trust asymmetry 
cannot be identified or altered, managers may seek to reduce the detrimental consequences.  
Despite the fact that monitoring can be functional for team performance, monitoring is 
often a sensitive issue in teams because it can undermine solidarity and because it is easily 
interpreted by team members as a lack of trust (Langfred, 2004). Active involvement by 
managers is thus necessary to bring the issue of monitoring into the open so that it can be 
discussed and agreed upon by team members.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Trust and Control in Teams: General Discussion 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation has focused on intrateam trust and peer control and their implications 
for team performance. Trust and peer control have become increasingly important as 
organizations have become flatter and more team-centered and as managers’ capacity to exercise 
formal control has diminished (Devine, Clayton, Philips, Dunford, & Melner, 1999; Jones & 
George, 1998; Lawler, Mohrman, & Ledford, 1995; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Ouchi, 
1980). While trust and peer control have both been recognized as pervasive phenomena that can 
have a profound impact on the functioning of teams (Kiffin-Petersen, 2004; Loughry, in press), 
there is a lack of systematic scholarly attention for the joint implications of trust and peer control 
within teams. As a consequence, many important issues are still unclear, as the literature review 
in Chapter 1 shows. In order to fill these gaps, the present dissertation has been aimed to advance 
theoretical and empirical understanding of intrateam trust and peer control within teams by 
addressing the following questions:  
 
1) What is the nature of intrateam trust and peer control? That is, what are their underlying 
components or properties?  
2) When do intrateam trust and peer control matter to teams? That is, under which 
conditions do they promote or inhibit team processes and performance?   
3) How do intrateam trust and peer control affect team performance? That is, through which 
processes do they affect team performance?  
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To address these questions, we conducted three empirical studies, the details of which are 
reported in the preceding chapters. In the next sections, the main findings of each of these studies 
are summarized, followed by a reflection on the major strengths and potential weaknesses of 
these empirical investigations. In the subsequent section, the theoretical and practical 
implications of our findings are discussed. We conclude this chapter by identifying several 
opportunities for future research. Both the implications and future research sections will be 
organized around the issues of What, When and How that this dissertation set out to address. 
 
SUMMARY OF THE MAIN FINDINGS 
 
  The main findings of the three studies are summarized in Table 5.1 and described in 
more detail next. In the first study, reported in Chapter 2, we focused on the implications of 
intrateam trust for team performance. Prior research on trust and teams suggested that (1) the 
effects of trust on team performance may be transferred by team processes that act as mediating 
mechanisms, and (2) teams are often simultaneously engaged in multiple team processes, many 
of which are likely to be affected by the level of trust within the team (Langfred, 2004; Marks, 
Mathieu, & Zaccaro, 2001; Schippers, 2003; Spreitzer, Noble, Mishra, & Cooke, 1999). We 
drew on these ideas to advance understanding of how intrateam trust affects team performance. 
Building on a typological framework of team processes and prior research on intrateam trust, we 
focused on three team processes – team reflexivity, team monitoring and team effort – and found 
that each of these processes is positively influenced by trust. We also showed that trust is 
positively related to the performance of ongoing teams. Additionally, we showed that trust has 
distinct indirect effects on performance through monitoring and effort; both team processes 
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partially mediated the trust-performance relationship. Contrary to prior research, we did not find 
support for the mediating role of team reflexivity.    
Chapter 3 reports the second study we conducted, which focused on the team 
performance implications of peer control within teams. Past research in this area suggested that 
(1) peer control may involve multiple peer control mechanisms, (2) these control mechanisms 
may interact to affect outcomes, and (3) control can have both a psychological and behavioral 
impact on those subjected to it (Barker, 1999; Jaworski, 1988). In this study, we drew on these 
ideas to move forward understanding of what peer control is, and when and how it affects team 
performance. We focused on two specific peer control mechanisms – peer pressure and norm 
consensus – and demonstrated that teams vary in the extent to which they rely on these 
mechanisms, yielding different combinations of high/low peer pressure and of low/high norm 
consensus across teams. Additionally, we showed that peer pressure has contingent effects on 
team processes and outcomes, depending upon the level of norm consensus within the team. 
More specifically, peer pressure was found to become more beneficial for the amount of effort 
put forward by team members as norm consensus increases and less detrimental for the amount 
of trust among team members. Finally, we found that the relationship between peer pressure and 
norm consensus on the one hand and team performance on the other hand is mediated by trust. 
Consistent with Study 1, we found evidence for the mediating role of effort in intrateam trust-
team performance relationship, but in contrast to our predictions, we did not find support for the 
mediating role of effort in peer pressure-norm consensus-team performance relationship.  
Study 3a and 3b, reported in Chapter 4, focused on the implications of both trust and peer 
control for teams. Past research suggested that (1) trust is likely to have differential effects on 
team performance, (2) peer monitoring – a central component of peer control – is likely to have 
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differential effects on intrateam trust, and (3) there is likely to be within-team dispersion in trust 
and monitoring and this may have a moderating effect (Bijlsma-Frankema, De Jong, & Van de 
Bunt, 2008; Colquitt, Noe, & Jackson, 2002; Langfred, 2004). We built on these ideas to 
advance understanding of what trust and peer control is and when their relationship with each 
other and with team performance may be stronger or weaker. We distinguished between mean 
and dispersion levels of trust and monitoring and demonstrated that team members can differ 
substantially in their perceptions of trust and monitoring. We also showed that within-team 
dispersion acts as a moderator that accounts for the differential effects of mean levels of 
monitoring on trust as well as for the differential effects of mean levels of trust on team 
performance. Specifically, we found that the relationship between monitoring and trust becomes 
weaker for lower levels of dispersion in monitoring. We also found that the positive relationship 
between mean trust and team performance becomes stronger as dispersion in trust decreases. 
Finally, we provided initial evidence that relationship between mean monitoring and team 
performance is partially mediated by mean levels of trust and moderated by dispersion in both 
monitoring and trust. 
   
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
 
Our empirical studies include a number of strengths. One major strength is the cross-
lagged panel design adopted in Study 3a, which allowed us to explicitly test the direction of 
causality underlying the relationships between our monitoring, trust and team performance. In 
particular, the Study 3a design helped to resolve scholarly disagreement about the causal 
direction between intrateam trust and peer monitoring by simultaneously validating the effect of 
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trust on monitoring proposed in Chapter 2 and the effect of monitoring on trust proposed in 
Chapter 4. Furthermore, the design helped to alleviate concerns about the possibility of reversed 
causality between trust and team performance by providing strong support for the effect of 
intrateam trust on team performance, but no support for the effect of performance on trust. As 
Kiffin-Petersen and Cordery (2003:110) observe, these robust tests of causality are “rare in the 
field of trust and even rarer in team research”. 
Besides contributing to issues of causality, the results of our studies were also 
strengthened by the substantial amount of data we collected for each study. In total, data were 
obtained from 1,701 individual team members, 78 supervisors, and 1,770 other organizational 
members. As a result, we were able to achieve an average sample size of 67 teams per study, 
which is quite large for team research standards. Furthermore, sampling teams from a single 
organization – as we did in Studies 1, 2 and 3b – allowed us to control for a variety of 
organizational factors otherwise that may have affected our results. 
From her review of the intrateam trust literature, Kiffin-Petersen (2004:47) recently 
concluded that “most trust studies have been conducted in experimental groups” and that 
“studying trust in ongoing work teams is preferable because the findings are more readily 
generalized to other work settings”. Consistent with these recommendations, all the studies in 
this dissertation were conducted in field settings, involving natural teams operating within real 
organizational contexts (i.e. tax consulting, health care and special interest). This not only 
enhances the external validity of our findings, but also allowed us to validate (patterns of) 
findings across the different studies. In Study 2, for instance, we were able to replicate both the 
positive effect of intrateam trust on team performance as well as the mediating role of effort in 
the trust-performance relationship found in Study 1. We also cross-validated the interactive 
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effects of mean monitoring and monitoring consensus on trust in the two studies reported in 
Chapter 4.  
Despite these strengths, there are also some weaknesses that should be taken into account 
when interpreting our results. The first of these is the use of cross-sectional data in Studies 1, 2 
and 3b, which prevents us from making strong assertions about causal chains of effects. For 
instance, although the indirect effect of peer control on team performance through trust we found 
in Study 2 did support our hypothesis, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that team 
performance affects peer control through its effects on trust. At the same time, however, we did 
test for several alternative explanations but found no support. Specifically, we did not find 
support in Study 2 for an alternative model in which the order between peer control and team 
performance was reversed, nor did we find support in Study 3a for a cross-lagged effect of team 
performance on trust. Together, these results alleviate at least some of the concerns about 
alternative chains of effects.  
A second weakness is that our studies primarily relied on questionnaire data. 
Consequently, some of the main effects reported in these studies might be influenced by 
common method variance (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). At the same time, 
we took of a variety of recommended counter-measures to alleviate these concerns, such as using 
different data sources (e.g. team members and supervisors), different measurement methods (e.g. 
using constructed scores for our dispersion measures), different item response formats, and 
different measurement moments. Furthermore, Evans (1985) demonstrated in a simulation study 
– in which the correlation between the measurement errors of different variables was 
systematically manipulated – that interaction effects, such as those reported in Studies 2 and 3, 
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cannot be an artifact of common method variance. Consequently, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that common method variance is not a major concern in our studies.  
 
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
 
The above findings have several important implications for theory and practice relating to 
the issues of What, Where and How, as discussed next. In addition, the findings reveal potential 
for cross-fertilization between the previously disparate literatures on peer control, intrateam trust 
and team performance (see Chapter 1).  
 
Issue 1: What is the Nature of Intrateam Trust and Peer Control?  
 This dissertation not only testifies to the idea that intrateam trust and peer control are 
complex phenomena, but also sheds light on why these phenomena are so complex. The findings 
suggest that one of the reasons for this is that peer control and intrateam trust consist of multiple 
components or properties. Specifically, Study 2 showed that teams often employ multiple peer 
control mechanisms (i.e. peer pressure and norm consensus) simultaneously and Study 3 showed 
that trust among team members can be described along multiple team-level properties (i.e. mean 
and dispersion levels). Another reason for the complexity of intrateam trust and peer control is 
that their components and properties combine and manifest themselves at different levels of 
intensity. Indeed, Study 2 revealed variation in combinations of high/low peer pressure and norm 
consensus across teams. Likewise, Study 3 revealed variation combinations of high/low mean 
and dispersion levels of trust and monitoring across teams. In demonstrating this complexity, our 
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results point out that rather than relying on simplistic conceptualizations of intrateam trust and 
peer control, scholars need to appreciate the inherent complexity of these phenomena.  
 So far, scholars have tended to equate peer control with norms, as if these were the only 
mechanisms through which peer control manifests itself, and have tended to assume high norm 
consensus across teams, as if norm consensus was a constant. By showing that peer control 
involves additional mechanisms besides norms, the Study 2 results imply that a better 
understanding of the nature of peer control requires a more configurational approach (cf. 
Cardinal, Sitkin, & Long, in press), in which peer control is recognized as consisting of multiple 
specific control mechanisms that combine in different ways to exert influence on team members. 
In addition, by showing that teams vary in their level of norm consensus, our results imply that 
the dominant assumption of high norm consensus often cannot be maintained. Scholars thus need 
to abandon Ouchi’s (1979) ideal-typical view on peer control, which incorporates this 
assumption, in favor of a more realistic view which recognizes that norm consensus is a variable 
rather than a fixed characteristic of peer control. As our study shows, treating norm consensus as 
a variable is not just important because more accurately captures differences across teams, but 
also because doing so substantially increases the explanatory power of models of peer control 
(also see next paragraph on ‘When’).  
Our findings also point toward the need to extend current conceptualizations of intrateam 
trust and peer monitoring. Current conceptualizations tend to focus exclusively on mean-level 
manifestations of trust and monitoring, thereby neglecting within-team dispersion. While the 
Study 3 findings do not discount the importance of mean levels of trust and monitoring, they do 
clearly demonstrate that within-team dispersion is an equally relevant team-level property that 
captures substantially meaningful variation in team members’ perceptions of trust and 
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monitoring. In doing so, these findings suggest that the limitations of the dominant mean-level 
conceptualization can be overcome by adopting a more multi-level approach, in which both 
mean and dispersion levels are acknowledged as important for characterizing the nature of these 
team-level phenomena.  
 
Issue 2: When do Intrateam Trust and Peer Control Matter to Teams?  
Despite contradictory findings, many scholars still assume that trust, control and team 
performance are related in a straightforward manner, thereby ignoring the possibility of 
differential effects as well as the contingency factors that account for these effects. This 
dissertation makes an important contribution by offering insight into the differential effects of 
trust and control as well as insight into the contingency factors that drive these effects. Study 2, 
for example, showed that the effects of peer pressure on team processes and performance ranged 
from negative to positive and that norm consensus accounted for these effects by moderating the 
relationship. Furthermore, Study 3a – in which we distinguished between mean and dispersion 
levels of monitoring and trust – revealed that the effects of mean monitoring on mean trust 
ranged from negative to positive and that monitoring consensus accounted for these differential 
effects. The latter study also showed that the effects of mean trust on team performance ranged 
from no effect to a strong positive effect and that trust asymmetry accounted for these effects. By 
providing evidence for the moderating role of norm consensus, monitoring consensus and trust 
asymmetry, Studies 2 and 3 suggest that the contingency factors that drive these differential 
effects need not be exogenous to trust and control, as prior studies tend to suggest (e.g. Langfred, 
2004; Loughry & Tosi, 2008), but can also be inherent to these phenomena. Furthermore, by 
offering insight into the conditions under which trust and control promote or inhibit team 
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functioning and performance, our findings help to reconcile the dominant view, that emphasizes 
the benefits of trust and control for teams, with growing recognition that these benefits have 
limits.  
Besides helping to resolve inconsistent empirical findings, this dissertation also informs 
theory development in this area. In particular, Study 3 informs theory on trust and social 
exchange by introducing trust asymmetry as a contingency factor in social exchange 
relationships. Ever since Blau’s (1964) seminal work, trust and social exchange have been 
closely linked together. Although Blau was quite specific about different dimensions of 
exchange (i.e. volume vs. reciprocity of exchange), he was less explicit about the dimensionality 
of trust. In Study 3, we extended existing theory by explicitly linking different dimensions of 
intrateam trust (i.e. mean level of trust vs. trust asymmetry) to different dimensions of exchange. 
More specifically, we argued that the mean level of trust primarily affects the volume of 
exchange within dyads (and by extension: within teams), while the (a)symmetry in trust 
primarily affects the reciprocity of exchange. Moreover, we theorized that high trust levels by 
itself is an insufficient condition for effective social exchange and that symmetry in trust is a 
necessary condition to ensure that (team) members are willing to continue exchanging resources 
with one another.  
This dissertation also has important implications for theory on control and trust. The 
dominant theoretical prediction in the literature stipulates that control is harmful to trust because 
it is likely to be interpreted as a sign that trust is not warranted (Ferrin, Bligh, & Kohles, 2007). 
Challenging this prediction, our findings suggest that interpretations of control and monitoring 
need not be uniformly negative across all team members and can even be positive. Our Study 2 
and 3 findings furthermore suggest that these interpretations are dependent upon the level of 
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consensus among team members, either consensus about desirable work behavior (i.e. norm 
consensus) or consensus about how much monitoring is occurring within the team (i.e. 
monitoring consensus). As consensus increases, so does the likelihood of more converging 
interpretations among team members in responses to control/ monitoring by fellow teammates. 
These findings point out an important boundary condition of current theories on the 
control/monitoring-trust relationship by suggesting that the predictive validity of these theory 
may be limited in situations where consensus among team members is low. Likewise, the results 
imply that findings from empirical tests of these theories may lack generalizability beyond 
situations characterized by low consensus. In order to improve theoretical predictions, socio-
contextual factors, such as consensus, need to be taken into account.  
 
Issue 3: How do Intrateam Trust and Peer Control Affect Team Performance? 
The findings of our studies underline the general theoretical argument that trust among 
team members enhances team performance because it leads team members to engage in more 
productive team work interactions. At the same time, we move beyond this general line of 
reasoning to gain a more fine-grained understanding of how intrateam trust affects team 
performance, by examining the role of multiple teamwork processes as mediators between trust 
and team performance. Specifically, our Study 1 findings suggest that trust among team 
members enhances performance, not only because it motivates team members to exert more 
effort on team tasks (i.e. team effort), but also because it encourages team members to observe 
actions of fellow teammates more closely in order to look for errors or performance 
discrepancies (i.e. monitoring). In addition, our findings fail to support the idea that trust 
enhances performance because it motivates team members to collectively reflect upon their task 
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strategies, processes and goals (i.e. team reflexivity). These results imply that different 
theoretical explanations – particularly those that focus on effort and monitoring – need not be 
competing and may even be complementary in clarifying how trust affects team performance. At 
the same time, the results also show that testing multiple theoretical explanations is in fact 
imperative to be able to distinguish the mechanisms that help to explain how the effects of trust 
on team performance come about from those that do not. Conversely, singling out any theoretical 
explanation can lead to overstating the importance of a particular process (e.g. team reflexivity) 
in transferring the effect of trust to team performance.  
The Study 2 results suggest that the exercise of peer control (in the form of peer pressure 
and norm consensus) affects team performance by influencing the level of trust among team 
members. This trust, in turn, motivates team members to exert effort on team tasks. In 
demonstrating the mediating roles of trust and effort, this study is one of the first to offer 
systematic insight into the different explanatory mechanisms underlying the peer control-team 
performance relationship. More generally, our empirical findings suggest that the effect of peer 
control on team performance can be understood through its psychological and behavioral impact 
and that these psychological and behavioral processes transmit the effect of peer control to team 
performance in a sequential manner. As such, our study represents an important first step 
towards a more fine-grained theory about how peer control affects team performance, in which 
both multiple explanatory mechanisms and complex patterns of mediation are acknowledged. 
 
Issue 4: Cross-Fertilization Between Literatures 
Beyond contributing to the distinct bodies of literature on intrateam trust, peer control 
and team performance, this dissertation also reveals several possibilities for cross-fertilization – 
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i.e. using theoretical insights from one body of literature to advance understanding of an issue 
raised in another body of literature. In particular, it shows that Marks et al.’s (2001) team process 
taxonomy, which was developed within the team literature, can serve as a useful framework for 
organizing and selecting among the eclectic set of team processes proposed in the intrateam trust 
literature as potential mediators. By distinguishing between three broad distinct classes of team 
processes under which more specific team processes can be subsumed, Marks et al.’s taxonomy 
emphasizes distinctiveness and similar levels of specificity among different team processes as 
guiding principles for thinking through the different processes through which trust might affect 
team performance. In doing so, it helps to advance a more fine-grained understanding of how 
trust affects team performance beyond that which can be inferred from the rather generic 
theoretical frameworks that have so far dominated the trust literature (e.g. Mayer et al., 1995).  
Drawing on insights from a growing body of literature on within-unit dispersion (Cole & 
Hirschfeld, 2009; Colquitt et al., 2002; Dineen, Noe, Shaw, Duffy, & Wiethoff, 2007), this 
dissertation demonstrates the usefulness of distinguishing between mean and dispersion levels to 
clarify the nature and function of intrateam trust and peer control. As shown in Studies 3a and 
3b, this distinction advances understanding trust and control by highlighting dispersion as a 
unique team-level property that differentiates trust and control/ monitoring at the team level from 
trust and control at the individual level. In addition, these studies show that this approach helps 
to explain the functional relationships of trust and monitoring with team-level outcome variables, 
by demonstrating that dispersion acts as a moderator that accounts for the differential effects of 
mean levels of trust and monitoring on team performance. These findings have important 
implications for current theory building practices. To date, much of the theory building in the 
field of intrateam trust and peer monitoring involves borrowing concepts and theories that were 
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developed at the individual level, and applying them to the team level. This practice of ‘cross-
level theory borrowing’ (Whetten, Felin, & King, in press) is predicated on the assumption that 
trust and monitoring essentially have the same meaning and functionality across levels of 
analysis (also see Chapter 1). Our findings point out that this assumption, and hence the practice 
of cross-level theory borrowing, may be problematic because team-level manifestations of trust 
and monitoring typically involve dispersion, a property that is unique to team-level constructs 
and that does not feature in individual-level theories. Because some level of dispersion almost 
certainly exists in every team, relying exclusively on individual-level theories may severely limit 
our understanding of intrateam trust and peer control. Only in situations of extremely high/low 
intrateam trust and peer monitoring, where within-team dispersion is virtually absent, may cross-
level theory borrowing be relatively unproblematic.16 It is therefore important that scholars are 
more mindful of the consequences of cross-level theory borrowing for the quality of theory 
building about intrateam trust and peer control.  
Finally, our studies not only attest to the notion that the relationship between trust and 
control is complex, but also help to clarify several features of this complex relationship. 
Specifically, the studies advance understanding of the trust-monitoring relationship by clarifying 
the sign of the relationship (i.e. “is the relationship between trust and control positive or 
negative?”), the form of the relationship (i.e. “is the relationship straight-forward and linear or 
conditional and non-linear?”) and the direction of causality (i.e. “does trust influence monitoring 
or does monitoring influence trust?”). Furthermore, by showing that the effect of trust on team 
performance operates through monitoring (Study 1) and that that the effect of peer control on 
                                                            
16 Langfred’s (2004) study, for example, lends itself well for cross-level theory borrowing because of its specific 
focus on the effects of high levels of trust in self-managing teams. 
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team performance operates through trust (Study 2), our studies demonstrate that integrating trust 
and control/ monitoring into a single mediated-effects model contributes to a more substantive 
understanding of how each of these constructs affect team performance. By demonstrating and 
clarifying the links between trust and control, our studies provides some initial building blocks 
for a better integration of the previously disparate literatures on intrateam trust and on peer 
control. 
 
Practical Implications 
While members of self-managing teams are themselves responsible for exercising 
control, the Study 2 results by no means imply that managerial involvement should be avoided 
all together. On the contrary, our findings suggest that active managerial involvement in the 
control process is imperative. In order for peer control to work, managers need to foster a climate 
that allows team members to effectively exercise control themselves, for instance helping teams 
delineate a coherent set of shared values and norms that prescribes how members should act in 
order for the team work together effectively (Spich & Keleman, 1985). Another way for 
managers to be involved is by desensitizing team members to the peer control they are subjected 
to (see Study 3a). Peer control generally peer monitoring specifically can be a particularly 
sensitive issues among team members, such that teams rather avoid them all together, even when 
it comes at the expense of their performance as a team (Langfred, 2004). In discussing peer 
control with the team, managers therefore should emphasize that the exercise of control is a 
natural part of the team’s responsibility and that it is necessary for self-managing team to 
perform well.  
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The results of Studies 1 and 2 suggest that fostering trust among team members should be 
of primary concern to managers, for it can have a powerful and positive impact on team 
functioning and performance. Managers can achieve this through trust-building exercises, by 
managing team members’ perceptions of threat when intrateam trust is low, and by helping team 
members identify areas in which trust can be (re)built (Adler, 2005; Mesquita, 2007; Williams, 
2007). At the same time, we conjecture from our Study 1 results that investing time and energy 
in improving trust may not be as an effective means for improving the performance of short-term 
teams as may be for ongoing teams. Managers thus need to take into account the temporal nature 
of their teams in making decisions about whether such interventions are worthwhile. The Study 
3a and 3b results further qualify our recommendation about fostering trust within teams. 
Specifically, they suggest that besides high mean levels of trust, managers should also be 
concerned about fostering high mutuality of trust between team members. This is important 
because dispersion or asymmetry in trust prevents the potential team performance benefits of 
mean levels of trust to come about. Thus, without careful attention to asymmetry, managerial 
interventions aimed at promoting high mean levels of trust may not have the desired result.  
 
EXTENSIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
One of the aims of this dissertation was to lay a foundation for future theory development 
and research on the team performance implications of intrateam trust and peer control. Given the 
emerging state of the field (see Chapter 1) and the fact that our studies represent only a first step 
toward a more systematic understanding of this topic, more research in this area is clearly  
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needed. As summarized in Table 5.2 and discussed in more detail below, our studies open up 
many interesting opportunities for future theory building and research.  
 
Extension 1: What is the Nature of Intrateam Trust and Peer Control and Team 
Performance 
As we observed in Chapter 1, the dominant multi-dimensional approach to trust (i.e. 
affect- and cognition-based trust) only seemed to only have contributed to the existing 
inconsistent findings regarding the trust-team performance relationship rather than resolving 
them. However, given that combinations of mean and dispersion levels of trust proved useful in 
our study to account for differential effects of trust on team performance (see Chapter 4), it 
might be interesting to see if such a combinatory approach could also be useful for studying the 
differential effects of affect- and cognition-based intrateam trust. This could be done, for 
instance, by investigating combinations of mean and dispersion levels for each dimension of trust 
or by investigating combinations of affect- and cognition-based trust. Interestingly, while 
researchers tend to treat affect- and cognition-based trust as separate constructs (e.g. McAllister, 
1995), seminal work by Lewis and Weigert (1985) already suggested that trust is an experience 
that emerges from a combination of affective and cognitive processes. Studying combinations of 
affect- and cognition-based trust therefore seems like a particularly fruitful direction in which 
future research could proceed. 
Our focus on specific combinations of peer control mechanisms (i.e. peer pressure and 
norm consensus) raises the question of how other control mechanisms might combine to exert 
influence on team members. For instance, because we studied peer monitoring separately from 
peer pressure and norm consensus (see Chapters 3 and 4), remains unclear whether monitoring 
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complements or substitutes for these other peer control mechanisms. In addition, it will be 
interesting to study combinations of informal and formal control mechanisms. While informal 
control is the most pervasive form of control within teams (Loughry, in press), formal controls 
may be initiated as well – either by the team itself or by its manager – irrespective of the level of 
informal control within the team (Barker, 1993; Loughry & Tosi, 2008). Although recent 
evidence suggests that formal controls substitutes informal control within teams (Loughry & 
Tosi, 2008), more research is needed to determine how these controls might actually complement 
one another. In sum, we believe that much can be gained from extending our line of research to 
include other combinations of control mechanisms.  
Throughout this dissertation, we followed Mathieu, DeShon and Bergh (2008) in 
distinguishing between team performance outcomes and team performance behaviors (see 
Chapter 1). However, other typologies of team performance dimensions been proposed in the 
literature as well (e.g. Hackman, 1987; Hoegl & Parboteeah, 2006), which raises the question 
what team performance is and what its dimensions are. Even though the issue of the 
dimensionality of team performance was not explicitly addressed in this dissertation, it could be 
important because it introduces the possibility that effects of trust and control on performance 
may differ depending on the performance dimension studied. A multi-dimensional approach to 
team performance may help to clarify some of the mixed findings from prior research and would 
fit well with the need for greater specificity regarding the mediating processes between trust, 
control and team performance (see Chapter 2). Given that theory on this issue is still 
underdeveloped, we submit more theory building in this area as an important direction for the 
future.  
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Extension 2: When do Intrateam Trust and Peer Control Matter to Teams?  
Our studies demonstrated norm consensus (Chapter 3), trust asymmetry and monitoring 
consensus (Chapter 4) as important contingencies that accounted for the differential of intrateam 
trust and peer control. Besides providing direct empirical evidence for these particular 
contingency factors, our studies also allude to two other potentially important contingencies that 
deserve more scholarly attention.  
One of these is the notion of interdependence, which was implicit in our Chapter 4 
argument that trust asymmetry decreases the team performance benefits of mean levels of trust, 
because it inhibits reciprocation of important resources between team members. By drawing on 
social exchange theory the way we did, we implicitly incorporated the assumption of team 
member interdependence in our theoretical argument (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). While this 
assumption seems reasonable in team contexts (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006; Mathieu et al., 2008), 
teams can of course vary in their level of interdependence. This observation reveals a subtle 
nuance in our argument. Namely, it suggests that even though trust asymmetry may indeed 
inhibit reciprocation, this reduced reciprocity may not be as harmful for teams with low levels of 
interdependence as for teams with high levels of interdependence. Thus, our original line of 
reasoning may be more accurately portrayed by three-way interaction, in which interdependence 
moderates the interaction effect of trust asymmetry and mean trust on team performance. Future 
research should test this interaction directly in order to provide a more accurate empirical 
assessment of our theory.  
The second contingency factor is team type, which was implicit in the Chapter 2 and 3 
discussion sections, in which we cautioned against what Whetten et al. (in press) would call 
‘cross-context theory borrowing’, that is, generalizing theoretical predictions on trust within 
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ongoing teams to short-term teams and against generalizing theoretical predictions on peer 
control within self-managing teams to manager-led teams. In doing so, these chapters allude to 
team type as a potentially important moderator that accounts for the differential effects of trust 
and control on team functioning and performance. This moderator role of team type has recently 
been supported in other areas of team research as well (Chiocchio & Essiembre, in press; Joshi & 
Roh, 2009). Together, our conjectures and these recent empirical findings invite research that 
investigates more thoroughly whether the effect of trust and control is more pronounced in some 
types of teams than in others. We suggest meta-analytic and/or comparative research, in which 
teams are sampled that differ systematically on team type characteristics, as ways to address this 
issue.  
 
Extension 3: How do Intrateam Trust and Peer Control Affect Team Performance? 
We submit that more research is needed on how peer control affects team performance. In 
Study 2, we looked at the role of trust and effort in transmitting the effect peer control to team 
performance. While trust and effort are representative of the two broad classes of consequences 
of control identified in the literature – namely psychological consequences and behavioral 
consequences (Jaworski, 1988) – the psychological and behavioral consequences of control are 
by no means limited to just trust and effort. We therefore submit that besides trust, ‘role conflict’ 
could be a potentially relevant psychological consequence of control that helps to explain how 
peer control inhibits performance. In team settings, it is not uncommon that control is exercised 
by multiple team members who pose different and even competing directions upon a particular 
teammate. Such competing directions may lead the focal teammate to experience role conflict, 
which is likely to have a negative impact on his/her contribution to the team (House, 1970). This 
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argument suggests that understanding of how peer control inhibits team performance could be 
enhanced by integrating theories on role conflict with the focus on dispersion in the actual 
exercise of control within teams.  
Consistent with the growing importance of multi-level perspectives in organizational 
research (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007), we see great potential in multi-level research that 
examines the mediating processes that transfer the effect of team-level trust to individual-level 
performance. Interestingly, the theoretical arguments presented in this dissertation foreshadow 
two lower-level mechanisms through which intrateam trust might operate. The first of these is 
perceived social uncertainty, which was introduced in our Chapter 2 argument that high-trust 
team perform better than low-trust teams because trust allows team members to engage in 
productive team work interactions as if social uncertainty was favorably resolved. The second 
mechanism is social exchange, which was introduced in our Chapter 4 argument that high-trust 
teams perform better than low-trust teams because trust increases team members’ willingness to 
share important resources with fellow teammates. Together, these mechanisms can serve as 
initial building blocks for a multi-level framework of how intrateam trust affects team member 
performance. 
 
Extension 4a: Optimal Levels of Trust and Control 
Scholars studying trust and control seem to become increasingly interested in the notion 
of optimal levels, which holds that trust and control may only be beneficial up to a certain point 
and that too much or too little trust or control can be detrimental (e.g. Langfred, 2004). 
Interestingly, our Study 3 results already offer some support for this notion. Specifically, the 
Study 3 results reveal a curvilinear effect of monitoring consensus on trust (see Table 4.3, Model 
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4) as well as a curvilinear effect of mean intrateam trust on team performance (see Table 4.2, 
Model 4), above and beyond the interactive effects that we found. We contend that the combined 
examination of optimal levels (i.e. curvilinear effects) and interactive effects can add new and 
interesting complexities to the relationships between trust, control and team performance. So far, 
theory on intrateam trust and peer control has not developed far enough to make strong 
theoretical predictions about such complex effects. We therefore advocate surface response 
methodology (Edwards & Parry, 1993) as a useful tool to empirically explore these combined 
effects in order to identify compelling patterns of results that call for further theorizing on this 
topic (Hambrick, 2007). 
To illustrate this point, we applied surface response methodology to our data and plotted 
the curvilinear and interactive effects of mean monitoring and monitoring consensus on trust of 
Study 3a into a single graph (see Figure 5.1). Interestingly, the graph reveals that the highest 
level of trust is not fostered when consensus is high, but rather when consensus is at a moderate 
level. In other words, it suggests that some differences in monitoring perceptions among team 
members may actually be beneficial for creating trust within the team. One could speculate that 
this might be because moderate differences stimulate dialogue among team member and activate 
collective sense-making of the team’s reality, which may enable perspective-taking, shared 
understanding and ultimately trust. Large differences in monitoring perceptions, however, may 
only invite discord and conflict rather than dialogue and shared understanding, as differences in 
perceptions may be too large to overcome. Furthermore, high consensus may not enhance trust to 
the same extent as moderate consensus, because in the former case team members essentially all 
agree with one another so there is no need for further dialogue and sense-making regarding the 
team’s reality.  
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FIGURE 5.1 
Interactive and Curvilinear Effects of Mean Monitoring 
and Monitoring Consensus on Intrateam Trust 
 
 
 
Extension 4b: Determinants and Dynamics of Dispersion 
One of the most interesting findings in this dissertation is probably the pervasive impact 
that dispersion in trust and control has on team functioning and performance. As this dissertation 
clearly shows, dispersion is not just a “statistical hurdle” (Chan, 1998) to be overcome in team-
level studies, but rather a substantively meaningful property that adds explanatory power to 
models of intrateam trust and peer control. The importance of dispersion raises several 
unexplored questions.  
One of these questions is: how does asymmetry in trust between team members emerge in 
the first place? In other words, what are the determinants of trust asymmetry?. Although no study 
so far has directly addressed this issue, the trust literature does suggest several factors that could 
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enhance trust asymmetry between team members, such as divergent vulnerabilities (Gillespie, 
2005), differences in cultural background (Zaheer & Zaheer, 2006), and subgroup membership 
(Polzer, Crisp, Jarvenpaa, & Kim, 2006). In addition, the literature on within-unit dispersion has 
identified several important determinants, such as task independence, demographic diversity and 
structural characteristics of the team’s social network (Klein, Conn, Smith, & Sorra, 2001; Zohar 
& Tenne-Gazit, 2008). Finally, Roberson and Colquitt (2005) have developed a model on how 
justice perceptions among team members (fail to) converge, which may be extended to the study 
of intrateam trust. Together, insights from these literature can be used as a foundation for further 
theory building and research on the determinants of trust asymmetry.  
Although we have shown in this dissertation that asymmetry in trust can and does exist 
within teams, one may wonder whether asymmetric trust relationships are desirable or even 
viable in the long run. A second question is therefore: can asymmetry in trust persist (or even 
worsen) over time or is it merely a temporary state? Imagine a situation of high asymmetry, 
where team member ‘B’ trusts team member ‘A’, but ‘A’ does not trust ‘B’ (cf. Chapter 4). 
Based on social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), it could be argued that trust asymmetry can only 
persist for a little while: indeed, the trust that B has in A may initially prolong trust asymmetry, 
because trust provides initial assurance to B that temporary imbalances in his/her exchange with 
A will balance out in the long run.17 However, as trust asymmetry continues to persist over time, 
                                                            
17 Note that our concept of ‘(a)symmetry’ is differs in several respects from the concept of ‘structural balance’ used 
in Cartwright and Harary’s (1956) extension of Heider’s balance theory. First, whereas structural balance is 
conceptualized as a triadic-level phenomenon, we conceptualize trust symmetry as a dyadic-level phenomenon 
(which can be extended to the team level). Second, whereas structural balance only looks at undirected relationships, 
our concept of trust symmetry involves directed relationships – i.e. it distinguishes between A’s trust in B and B’s 
trust in A. Third, whereas structural balance theory assumes that relationships can only take on two values – positive 
or negative – our concept of trust symmetry treats the level of trust as a continuous variable. Fourth, whereas 
structural balance is conceptualized as balance in the signs of the relationships between three actors, our concept of 
trust symmetry reflects balance in the level of trust between two actors, irrespective of whether this level is 
indicative of a positive or negative relationship. 
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B will become aware that his/her exchange with A does not balance out and that A consistently 
violates B’s trust by sharing less resources than (s)he receives. Such awareness is likely to lead 
to a substantial decrease in B’s trust in A, thus resulting once more in a balanced, symmetric 
trust relationship. On the other hand, it could also be argued that trust asymmetry between team 
members might be able to persist over an extended period of time. More specifically, although 
asymmetry in trust between A and B may still inhibit direct reciprocation of exchange, this need 
not be problematic when there is generalized or indirect reciprocation of exchange (Ekeh, 1974) 
within the team as a whole, whereby B shares his/her resources with A, but receives resources 
from a third team member ‘C’. We submit this as an interesting direction for future research.  
 
These extensions, along with the findings from this dissertation, advances intrateam trust and 
peer control as exciting areas of research with many opportunities for future inquiry and 
discovery. 
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APPENDIX A. Study 1 Measurement Scales 
 
Intrateam trust  
 
1. I am able to count on my team members for help if I have difficulties with my job.  
2. I am confident that my team members will take my interests into account when making work-
related decisions.  
3. I am confident that that my team members will keep me informed about issues that concern my 
work.  
4. I can rely on my team members to keep their word.  
5. I trust my team members.  
 
Team reflexivity 
 
1. In this team we often review the feasibility of our objectives. 
2. In this team we often discuss the methods used to get the job done. 
3. In this team we regularly discuss whether we are working effectively together. 
4. In this team we modify our objectives in light of changing circumstances. 
5. In our team we often review our approach to getting the job done. 
 
Team monitoring 
 
1. In this team we check whether everyone meets their obligations to the team. 
2. In this team we watch whether everyone completes their work on time. 
3. In this team we keep close track of whether everyone performs as expected. 
4. In this team we check whether everyone is doing what is expected of him/ her. 
5. In this team we carefully monitor each other's progress on his/ her work. 
 
Team effort  
 
1. The members of my team work as hard as they can to achieve the team's objectives. 
2. Most members of my team carry their fair share of the overall workload. 
3. Most members of my team make an effort to attain high team performance levels. 
4. Even when experiencing setbacks, team members try to the best of their ability to realize team 
goals. 
5. Most team members go out of their way to accomplish team objectives, even when others are 
taking it easy. 
 
Team performance  
 
Grade the performance of this team in the light of established performance standards. 
1. The amount of work the team produces.  
2. The quality of work the team produces.  
3. Your overall evaluation of the team’s effectiveness. 
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APPENDIX B. Study 2 Measurement Scales 
 
Peer pressure  
 
1. We openly express our dissatisfaction with team members who behave inappropriately. 
2. If a team member behaves in a way we consider unprofessional, we confront him/her directly.  
3. We make sure to let team members know if they do something that is considered unacceptable. 
4. If a team member does not meet our performance expectations, we don't hesitate to tell him/her to 
shape up. 
 
Norm consensus 
 
Please indicate how (un)important you believe following behaviors are for the effective functioning of 
your team. 
 
1. Taking responsibility for team work 
2. Being prepared to work overtime 
3. Helping other team members 
4. Actively participating in group meetings 
5. Demonstrating commitment to the team 
6. Doing one's fair share of the work 
7. Putting patients' needs first  
8. Striving for excellence in one's work   
 
Team effort 
  
1. The members of my team work as hard as they can to achieve the team's objectives. 
2. Most members of my team carry their fair share of the overall workload. 
3. Most members of my team make an effort to attain high team performance levels. 
4. Even when experiencing setbacks, team members try to the best of their ability to realize team 
goals. 
5. Most team members go out of their way to accomplish team objectives, even when others are 
taking it easy. 
 
Intrateam trust  
 
1. I am able to count on my team members for help if I have difficulties with my job.  
2. I am confident that my team members will take my interests into account when making work-
related decisions.  
3. I am confident that that my team members will keep me informed about issues that concern my 
work.  
4. I can rely on my team members to keep their word.  
 
Team performance 
  
Please indicate how well/poor your teams perform on the following criteria: 
 
1. The amount of care provided to residents.  
2. The quality of care provided to residents.  
3. The extent to which the care, provided by the team, meets residents’ needs. 
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APPENDIX C. Study3 Measurement Scales 
 
Trust asymmetry 
Below, you’ll find five response descriptions corresponding to different levels of trust that people can 
have in each other. Please indicate for each of your teammates which of these descriptions best 
characterizes your level of trust in him/her. Note that there’s also a ‘neutral’ option included, in case 
you feel you don’t know a particular teammate well enough to be able to say whether you trust him/her 
or not. 
1. None: I have no trust whatsoever in this teammate. I would not trust him/her with anything 
that  
   concerns me.  
 
2. Very little: I have very little trust in this teammate: I would only trust him/her with things that 
 are unimportant to me.  
 
3. Some: I have some trust in this teammate: I would be willing to trust him/her with some 
  things, as long as these are not of crucial importance to me.  
 
4. Quite a lot: I have quite a lot of trust in this teammate: I am willing to trust him/her 
  with quite a few things, including things that are important to me.  
5. Complete: I completely trust this teammate: I am willing to trust him/her with just about 
 everything, even things that are really important to me.  
Neutral: I don’t know this teammate well enough to be able to say whether I trust him/her or 
not. 
 
Team performancea  
 
Please indicate how well/poor the board of your association performs the following roles: 
 
1. Ensuring mission and vision for the organization. 
2. Long-range planning and budget allocation. 
3. Entertaining relationships with the association’s general members. 
4. Maintaining relationships with external parties (i.e. sponsors, university, suppliers). 
 
Team performanceb  
 
Please indicate how well/poor your teams perform on the following criteria: 
 
1. The amount of care provided to residents.  
2. The quality of care provided to residents.  
3. The extent to which the care, provided by the team, meets residents’ needs. 
 
a item/scale used only in Study 3a 
b item/scale used only in Study 3b 
c item/scale used in both studies 
200 
 
 
201 
 
SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH) 
 
Dit proefschrift richt zich op de gevolgen van onderling vertrouwen en onderlinge controle voor 
de prestaties van teams in organisaties. Onderling vertrouwen (kortweg ‘vertrouwen’) kan 
worden omschreven als een staat van positieve verwachtingen die teamleden hebben ten aanzien 
van de acties van hun teamgenoten (Rousseau et al., 1998). Onderlinge controle (kortweg 
‘controle’) wordt hier gedefinieerd als een vorm van informele controle die wordt uitgeoefend 
door teamleden die geen formele autoriteit over elkaar hebben (Loughry, in press). Een team is 
een groep individuen die doelbewust bij elkaar zijn gebracht om taken uit te voeren die relevant 
zijn voor de organisatie, die één of meerdere gezamenlijke doelen hebben, die moeten 
interacteren met elkaar, die wederzijds afhankelijk zijn van elkaar, en die ingebed zijn in een 
organisatie context (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006). Teamprestaties wordt in dit proefschrift 
gedefinieerd als de mate waarin de output van het team voldoet aan de eisen van degenen die 
deze output gebruiken en/of beoordelen (Hackman, 1987). Vertrouwen en controle zijn in 
toenemende mate van belang voor hedendaagse organisaties, aangezien het uitoefenen van 
formele controle door managers steeds moeilijker wordt en aangezien het werken in teamverband 
toeneemt (Ouchi, 1980; Devine et al., 1999). Alhoewel organisatiewetenschappers al meerdere 
malen hebben gewezen op de noodzaak van meer onderzoek naar vertrouwen en controle in 
teams (Kiffin-Petersen, 2004; Loughry, in press), loopt het empirisch onderzoek naar dit 
onderwerp achter bij de ontwikkelingen in de praktijk. Dit proefschrift heeft daarom tot doel 
meer inzicht te verschaffen in de gevolgen van vertrouwen en controle voor het functioneren en 
presteren van teams. Hierbij wordt gebruik gemaakt van de volgende onderzoeksvragen: 
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1. Wat is de aard van vertrouwen en controle? Dat wil zeggen: wat zijn hun onderliggende 
componenten of kenmerken? 
2. Wanneer doen vertrouwen en controle ertoe in teams? Dat wil zeggen: onder welke 
omstandigheden bevorderen of bemoeilijken ze het functioneren en presteren van teams? 
3. Hoe beïnvloeden vertrouwen en controle teamprestaties? Dat wil zeggen: langs welke 
processen beïnvloeden ze teamprestaties? 
 
Om een antwoord op deze vragen te formuleren zijn er drie empirische studies uitgevoerd. Alle 
drie de studies zijn gedaan onder bestaande teams in bestaande organisaties (in tegenstelling tot 
laboratorium studies onder ad hoc teams) en bij alle drie de studies is gebruik gemaakt van 
kwantitatief vragenlijstonderzoek.  
De eerste studie (beschreven in hoofdstuk 2) gaat voornamelijk in op de vraag hoe 
vertrouwen teamprestaties beïnvloedt. De literatuur suggereert dat vertrouwen de prestaties van 
teams bevordert omdat het leidt tot een betere samenwerking tussen teamleden (Dirks 1999; 
Jones & George, 1998). De tot nu toe verrichtte studies op dit gebied beperken zich vaak tot het 
onderzoeken van één specifiek samenwerkingsproces (Schippers, 2003), waardoor er nog weinig 
bekend is over de rol die verschillende samenwerkingsprocessen spelen in het verklaren van de 
relatie tussen vertrouwen en teamprestaties. In mijn eerste studie kijk ik daarom naar de rol van 
verschillende samenwerkingsprocessen. Ik richt me specifiek op teams waarin teamleden 
langdurig met elkaar samenwerken, omdat theorie en eerdere studies suggereren dat de effecten 
van vertrouwen in dit type teams bijzonder uitgesproken kunnen zijn. Op basis van een 
bestaande typologie van samenwerkingsprocessen (Marks et al., 2001) en eerder onderzoek naar 
vertrouwen in teams (Dirks, 1999; Langfred, 2004; Schippers, 2003) kom ik tot een conceptueel 
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model, waarbij vertrouwen teamprestaties beïnvloedt via drie verschillende 
samenwerkingsprocessen: reflexiviteit, monitoring (‘voortgangsbewaking’) en inzet. Om dit 
model te testen heb ik cross-sectionele data verzameld onder 73 teams van een groot 
international adviesbureau. De resultaten van het onderzoek bevestigen dat vertrouwen een 
positieve invloed heeft op de prestaties van teams. De resultaten ondersteunen het idee dat deze 
positieve invloed verklaard kan worden doordat meer vertrouwen leidt tot meer monitoring èn 
doordat meer vertrouwen leidt tot een verhoogde inzet door teamleden. De resultaten wijzen 
daarnaast uit dat alhoewel vertrouwen zorgt voor meer reflexiviteit binnen teams, deze 
reflexiviteit niet per se de prestaties van teams verbetert.  
Onderlinge controle wordt steeds belangrijker voor organisaties waar veel in 
teamverband wordt gewerkt (Barker, 1993). Toch hebben nog maar weinig wetenschappers zich 
specifiek toegelegd op het onderzoeken van controle binnen teams. Hierdoor is een cumulatieve 
lijn van onderzoek naar dit belangrijke onderwerp uitgebleven (Leifer & Mills, 1996; Loughry & 
Tosi, 2008). Om meer inzicht in deze materie te krijgen is de tweede studie van dit proefschrift 
(beschreven in hoofdstuk 3) ingegaan op de vragen: ‘wat is onderlinge controle?’ en ‘wanneer en 
hoe beïnvloedt het teamprestaties?’. In deze studie heb ik me specifiek gericht op controle in 
zelfsturende teams, omdat eerdere studies hebben laten zien dat de effecten van controle in dit 
soort teams bijzonder uitgesproken kunnen zijn (Barker, 1993). In de dominante benadering van 
controle als een ideaal type wordt controle gelijk gesteld aan sterke normen (Ouchi, 1979; 1980). 
Ik volg echter een andere benadering, die stelt dat controle niet één ding is, maar een 
samenstelling van verschillende specifieke controlemechanismen die een rol spelen binnen teams 
(Crisp, 2003). Binnen deze studie richt ik me op twee mechanismen – overeenstemming over 
normen en het uitoefenen van groepsdruk. Op basis van inzichten uit de literatuur en eerdere 
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studies (Barker, 1999; Jaworski, 1988; Leifer & Mills, 1996) veronderstel ik dat controle 
teamprestaties primair beïnvloedt langs twee processen: inzet door teamleden en vertrouwen 
tussen teamleden.  
Om deze ideeën te testen heb ik cross-sectionele data verzameld onder 46 zelfsturende 
teams van een zorginstelling voor verstandelijk gehandicapten. De resultaten laten zien dat teams 
verschillen in de mate van overeenstemming over normen en in de mate waarin groepsdruk 
wordt uitgeoefend. Verder blijkt groepsdruk alleen een positieve uitwerking op inzet, vertrouwen 
en teamprestaties te hebben als er veel overeenstemming is tussen teamleden over de normen 
waardoor ze zich laten leiden. Wanneer er weinig overeenstemming is heeft groepsdruk geen of 
zelfs een negatieve uitwerking. Ten slotte ondersteunen de uitkomsten de veronderstelling, dat 
groepsdruk en overeenstemming over normen de prestaties van teams beïnvloeden via de invloed 
die ze hebben op zowel de inzet door teamleden als het vertrouwen tussen teamleden onderling.  
 De derde studie van dit proefschrift (beschreven in hoofdstuk 4) gaat voornamelijk in op 
de vragen: “wanneer monitoring en vertrouwen positief gerelateerd zijn aan elkaar en aan 
teamprestaties en wanneer negatief” en “wat is monitoring en vertrouwen?”. Onderzoek naar 
deze vragen is belangrijk, omdat eerdere studies op dit gebied inconsistente resultaten hebben 
laten zien (Aubert & Kelsey, 2003; Bijlsma et al., 2008; Costa, 2003; Langfred, 2004; Webber, 
2008). Daarnaast hebben deze studies vaak enkel gekeken naar het algemene niveau van 
vertrouwen en monitoring binnen teams en hebben daarbij weinig oog gehad voor verschillen in 
vertrouwen en monitoring tussen teamleden. Om in beide zaken meer inzicht te krijgen kijk ik in 
mijn derde studie naar de rol van verschillen in vertrouwen en monitoring speelt in het verklaren 
van de relatie tussen algemene niveaus van monitoring, vertrouwen in teams en teamprestaties. 
Om verschil in vertrouwen en monitoring te duiden heb ik de begrippen ‘monitoring consensus’ 
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en ‘vertrouwen asymmetrie’ geïntroduceerd. Op basis van sociale ruiltheorie (Blau, 1964; Dirks 
& Skarlicki, 2009) is mijn veronderstelling dat het positieve effect van vertrouwen op 
teamprestaties versterkt wordt wanneer er sprake is van weinig vertrouwen asymmetrie tussen 
teamleden. Daarnaast veronderstelde ik, op basis van literatuur over convergentie van 
interpretaties en attributies (Moussavi & Evans, 1993; Young, 2003), dat het effect van 
monitoring op vertrouwen sterker is wanneer er een hoge mate van monitoring consensus is 
tussen teamleden, dan wanneer er een lage mate van consensus is.     
Om deze ideeën te testen verzamelde ik longitudinale data onder 82 besturen van 
studentenverenigingen en maakte ik daarnaast gebruik van data uit de tweede studie. De 
resultaten van beide deelstudies tonen aan dat teamleden verschillen in de mate waarin ze elkaar 
vertrouwen en de percepties die ze hebben over het niveau van monitoring binnen het team. De 
resultaten ondersteunen grotendeels mijn veronderstellingen. Het effect van vertrouwen op 
teamprestaties hangt inderdaad af van de mate van vertrouwen asymmetrie tussen teamleden: 
naar mate de asymmetrie daalt wordt het positieve effect van vertrouwen steeds sterker. Uit de 
studie onder studentenverenigingsbesturen blijkt ook dat het effect van monitoring op 
vertrouwen sterker wordt naar mate het niveau van monitoring consensus tussen teamleden stijgt. 
Ten slotte laten de resultaten zien dat de gedifferentieerde effecten van monitoring op 
teamprestaties verklaard kunnen worden door de invloed die monitoring heeft op vertrouwen.     
De resultaten van de drie studies worden in hoofdstuk 5 samengevat en bediscussieerd. 
Samengevat wijzen de resultaten op de rol van samenwerkingsprocessen en de rol van 
verschillen tussen teamleden voor het begrijpen van de complexe gevolgen van vertrouwen en 
controle in teams. Deze factoren dragen bij aan een beter wetenschappelijk inzicht in de 
mechanismen waarlangs vertrouwen en controle werken en de omstandigheden waaronder zij 
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een positieve of negatieve invloed kunnen hebben op team functioneren en presteren. De 
resultaten wijzen verder op de noodzaak om stil te staan bij wat vertrouwen en controle nu 
precies is en welke componenten of kenmerken vertrouwen en controle op teamniveau 
onderscheiden van vertrouwen en controle op individueel niveau. Voor managers wijzen de 
studies op het belang van het creëren van een hoog niveau van onderling en wederzijds 
vertrouwen tussen teamleden, bijvoorbeeld met behulp van team building interventies. Daarnaast 
moeten managers actief betrokken blijven bij teams om ervoor te zorgen dat onderlinge controle 
van de grond komt en teamleden deze op een effectieve manier uitoefenen. Ten slotte geef ik een 
aantal aanbevelingen over hoe toekomstig onderzoek kan voortbouwen op de ingezette lijn van 
dit proefschrift. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn: onderzoek naar verschillende dimensies van 
vertrouwen en teamprestaties, verder onderzoek naar contingentiefactoren tussen vertrouwen, 
controle en teamprestaties en onderzoek naar de determinanten van vertrouwen asymmetrie.    
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